AN ABRIDGMENT OF Mr. *Locke's Eſſay* CONCERNING Humane Underſtanding.

LONDON,
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To the much Esteemed

Mr. JOHN LOCKE.

Honoured Sir,

I *Send you this imperfect Draught of your Excellent* Essay *concerning* Humane Understanding, *which I must confess, falls as much short of the Perfection, as it does of the Length of the Original. Nevertheless, as I lately intimated to you (and you were pleased to think, that what I propos'd in reference to this Design, would not be wholly lost Labour) I am not without hopes, that it may in this contracted* Form, *prove in*

ſome meaſure ſerviceable to that Noble End, which you have ſo ſucceſsfully aimed at in it, viz. The Advancement of Real and Uſeful Knowledge. *The Inducement which moved me to think of abridging it, was a Conſideration purely extrinſical to the work it ſelf; and in Effect no other than this; That it would be better ſuited, to the Eaſe and Convenience of ſome ſort of Readers, when reduced into this narrow Compaſs. In order to this, I thought the* Firſt *Book, which is employ'd in refuting the common Opinion of* Innate Notions *and* Ideas, *might be beſt ſpared in this Abridgment; eſpecially, ſince the Reader may be convinced by what he ſhall find here, that ſuch a ſuppoſition is at leaſt needleſs, in regard he may*

attain

attain to all the Knowledge he has, or finds himself capable of, without the help of any such Innate Ideas. *Besides this, I have retrench'd most of the larger Explications; and some useful Hints, and instructive Theories I have wholly omitted, not because they are less considerable in themselves; but because they seemed not so necessary to be insisted on in this* Abridgment, *considered as a previous Instrument, and preparatory Help, to Guide and Conduct the Mind in its* Search after Truth and Knowledge. *I did particularly pass by that accurate Discourse, concerning the Freedom and Determination of the* Will *contained in* Cap. 21. l. 2. *because I found it too long to be inserted here at large, and too*

weighty and momentous to be but ſlightly and imperfectly repreſented. This I hope will prove no prejudice to the Eſſay *it ſelf; ſince none I preſume will think it reaſonable to form a Judgment of the whole Work, from this Abridgment of it: And I perſwade my ſelf, that few* Readers *will be content with this* Epitome, *who can conveniently furniſh themſelves with the* Eſſay *at large. However, I am apt to think, that this alone will ſerve to make the way to Knowledge ſomewhat more plain and eaſie; and afford ſuch Helps for the improvement of Reaſon, as are perhaps in vain ſought after in thoſe Books, which profeſs to Teach the* Art of Reaſoning. *But nevertheleſs, whether you ſhall think fit to let it*

come

come abroad, under the diſadvantages that attend it in this Form, *I muſt leave you to judge. I ſhall only add, that I think my own pains abundantly recompenc'd by the Agreeable, as well as Inſtructive Entertainment, which this nearer View, and cloſer Inſpection into your* Eſſay, *afforded me: And I am not a little pleaſed, that it has given me this opportunity of expreſſing the juſt Value and Eſteem I have for it, as well as the Honour and Reſpect I have for its Author. I am*

Honoured SIR,

Oxon, Ap. 17. 1695. Your very Humble and Oblig'd Servant,

JOHN WYNNE.

ERRATA.

PAge 11, Line 2. r. for *Body*. l. 4. r. *to Body*. l. 13. r. *to any*. p. 12. l. 17. r. *its ſtock*. p. 23. l. 5. for *eſteem* r. *Exiſtence*. p 30. l. 17. r. *not the*. p. 32. l. 16. r *or Jet*) p. 33. l. 11. r. *Vegetables many of them*. p. 34. l. 11. r. *receiv'd*. p. 37. l. 4. r. *occaſions*. p. 40. l. 17. *Univerſals*. p. 41. l. 3. *Self*. p. 42. l. 10. r. *Subſtances, Thirdly*. l. 26. *Beholder. Theſt*. p. 43. l. 3. *Subſtances*. p. 44. *penult. dele the*. p. 53. l. 18. r. *than*. p. 65. l. 12. r. *obſerved*, p. 70. l. 9. r. *by the*, p. 73. l. 15. r. *Complex one*, p. 75. l. 14. r. *Diſpoſition*. p. 77. l. 2. r. *Ideas of*. p. 78. l. 16. r. *Ideas*. l. 19. r. *Idea*. penult. r. *Capacities*. p. 81. l. 12. r. *one. is as*. p. 84. l. 2. r. *this Notion*. p. 90. l. 2. r. *where*. l. 19. dele *they*. p. 91. l. 17. r. *united*, l. 20. r. *nouriſhment*; p. 92. l. 15. r. *Body, Animal is*. p. 94. l. 7. dele *a*. p. 96. l. 6. r. *ſhall be*. p. 110. l. 17. r. *repreſent*. p. 111. l. 22. r. *becauſe it agrees*. l. 23. *to be its*. p. 113. l. 3. dele *in* l. 8. r. *Ideas*. p. 132. l. 14. r. *Claſſing*. p. 223. l. 5. r. *præcneſſis*. p. 248. l. 17. r. *then*. p. 251. l. 23. dele *are*. p. 253. l. 2. dele *out*. p. 256. l. 23. r. *one on another*. p. 257. l. 6. r. *veritates*. p. 259. l. 24. r. *an*. p. 261. l. 23. r. *vary*. p. 280. l. 6. r. *capricio's*.

THE

Introduction.

1. *SINCE it is the* Understanding *that sets Man above the rest of Sensible Beings, and gives him all the Advantage and Dominion which he has over them; it is certainly a Subject, even, for its Nobleness, worth the enquiring into.*

2. *My purpose therefore is to enquire into the* Original, Certainty, *and* Extent *of Human Knowledge; together with the Grounds and Degrees of* Belief, Opinion, *and* Assent, *which I shall do in the following Method.*

3. First, *I shall enquire into the* Original *of those* Ideas *or Notions, which a Man observes and is Conscious to himself he has in his Mind; and the* Ways *whereby the Understanding comes to be furnished with them.*

Secondly, *what* Knowledge *the Understanding hath by those Ideas; and the* Certainty, *Evidence, and Extent of it.*

Thirdly, *I shall make some Enquiry into the Nature and Grounds of* Faith *and* Opinion.

4. *If by this Enquiry into the* Nature *of the Understanding, I can discover the Powers thereof,* how far *they reach, and where they fail us, it may be of use to prevail with the busy Mind of Man to be more Cautious in meddling with things exceeding its Comprehension, to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its Tether, and to sit down in a quiet Ignorance of those Things, which upon Examination are found to be beyond the reach of our* Capacities. *We should not then perhaps be so forward, out of an Affectation of* Universal Knowledge, *to perplex our selves with Disputes about Things to which our Understandings are not suited; and of which we cannot frame in our Minds any clear or distinct Perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any Notions at all: But should learn to content our selves with what is attainable by us in this State.*

5. *For*

5. *For though the* Comprehenſion *of our Underſtanding comes exceeding ſhort of the vaſt Extent of Things; yet we ſhall have cauſe enough to magnifie the bountiful* Author *of our Being, for that Portion and Degree of Knowledge, he has beſtowed on us ſo far above all the reſt of the Inhabitants of this our Manſion. Men have reaſon to be well ſatisfied with what* God *hath thought fit for them, ſince he has given them (as St.* Peter *ſays,* Πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν) *whatſoever is neceſſary for the Conveniencies of* Life, *and Information of* Virtue; *And has put within the reach of their diſcovery, the comfortable Proviſion for this Life, and the Way that leads to a better. How ſhort ſoever their Knowledge may come of an Univerſal, or perfect Comprehenſion of whatſoever is, it yet ſecures their great Concernments, that they have Light enough to lead them to the Knowledge of their* Maker, *and the Sight of their own* Duties. *Men may find Matter ſufficient to buſie their Heads, and employ their Hands with Variety, Delight and Satisfaction; if they will not boldly Quarrel with their own Conſtitution, and throw away the Bleſſings their Hands are filled with, becauſe they are not big enough to graſp every thing. We*

shall not have much Reason to complain of the Narrowness of our Minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us; for of that they are very capable: And it will be an Unpardonable, as well as Childish Peevishness, if we undervalue the Advantages of our Knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the Ends for which it was given us, because there are some things that are set out of the reach of it. It will be no Excuse to an idle and untoward Servant, who would not attend his Business by Candle-light, to plead that he had not broad Sun-shine. The Candle that is set up in us, shines bright enough for all our purposes. The Discoveries we can make with this, ought to satisfie us. And we shall then use our Understandings right, when we entertain all Objects in that Way and Proportion, that they are suited to our Faculties; and upon those Grounds, they are capable of being proposed to us; And not peremptorily or intemperately require Demonstration, *and demand* Certainty, *where* Probability *only is to be had, and which is sufficient to govern all our Concernments. If we will disbelieve every Thing, because we cannot certainly know all Things; we shall do much what as wisely as he who would not use his Legs, but sit still*

and

and Perish because he had no Wings to Fly.

6. *When we know our own* Strength, *we shall the better know what to undertake with hopes of Success. And when we have well Survey'd the* Powers *of our own Minds, we shall not be enclin'd either to sit still, and not set our Thoughts on Work at all, in despair of knowing any Thing; nor on the other side, question every Thing, and disclaim all Knowledge, because some Things are not to be understood. Our* Business *here, is not to know all Things but those Things which concern our Conduct. If we can find out those Measures whereby a* Rational Creature, *put into that State which Man is in, in this World, may and ought to govern his Opinions and Actions depending thereon, we need not be troubled that some other Things escape our Knowledge.*

7. *This was that which gave the first* Rise *to this* Essay *concerning the Understanding. For I thought that the first step towards satisfying several Enquiries the Mind of Man was very apt to run into, was, To take a Survey of our* Understandings, *examine our own* Powers, *and see to what Things they were adapted. Till that was done, I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for Satisfaction in a quiet and secure possession*

of Truths that moſt concern'd us, whilſt we let looſe our Thoughts in the vaſt Ocean *of Being, as if all that boundleſs Extent were the natural and undoubted Poſſeſſion of our Underſtandings; wherein there was nothing exempt from its Deciſions, or that eſcaped its Comprehenſion. Thus Men extending their Enquiries beyond their Capacities, and letting their Thoughts wander into thoſe Depths where they can find no ſure Footing; it is no wonder, that they raiſe* Queſtions, *and multiply* Diſputes, *which never coming to any clear Reſolution, are proper only to continue and increaſe their Doubts, and to confirm them at laſt in perfect* Scepticiſm. *Whereas, were the Capacities of our Underſtandings well Conſidered, the Extent of our Knowledge once Diſcovered, and the* Horizon *found, which ſets Bounds between the enlightened and dark Parts of Things, between what is, and what is not Comprehenſible by us, Men would perhaps with leſs ſcruple Acquieſce in the avow'd Ignorance of the* One, *and imploy their Thoughts and Diſcourſe, with more Advantage and Satisfaction to the* Other.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

Of Ideas in General, and their Original.

BY the Term *Idea*, I mean whatever is the Object of the understanding, when a Man *Thinks*; or whatever it is which the Mind can be employ'd about in Thinking.

I preſume it will be eaſily granted me, that there are ſuch *Ideas* in Mens minds: Every one is conſcious of them in himſelf; and Men's Words and Actions will ſatisfie him that they are in others. Our *firſt Inquiry* then ſhall be, How they come into the Mind.

It is an eſtabliſh'd Opinion amongſt ſome Men, that there are in the underſtanding certain *Innate Principles*, ſome primary Notions, (Κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι) *Characters*, as it were ſtamp'd upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very firſt Being, and brings into the World with it.

This Opinion is accurately discuss'd, and refuted in the *First* Book of this *Essay*, to which I shall refer the Reader, that desires Satisfaction in this particular.

It shall be sufficient here to shew, how Men barely by the use of their *Natural Faculties*, may attain to all the Knowledge they have, without the help of any *Innate* Impressions; and may arrive at certainty without any such Original Notions or Principles. For I imagine, any one will easily grant, That it would be impertinent to suppose the Ideas of *Colours* innate in a Creature to whom God hath given *Sight*, and a Power to receive them by the Eyes from External Objects. I shall shew by what Ways and Degrees all other *Ideas* come into the mind; for which I shall appeal to every ones own Experience and Observation.

Let us then suppose the Mind to be, as we say *White Paper*, void of all Characters, without any *Ideas*: How comes it to be furnished? Whence has it all the Materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from *Experience* and *Observation*. This, when employ'd about External sensible Objects, we may call *Sensation*: By this we have

the

the Ideas of *Bitter*, *Sweet*, *Yellow*, *Hard*, &c. which are commonly call'd *Senſible Qualities*, becauſe convey'd into the Mind by the *Senſes*. The ſame *Experience*, when employ'd about the internal Operations of the Mind, perceiv'd, and reflected on by us, we may call *Reflection*. Hence we have the Ideas of *Perception*, *Thinking*, *Doubting*, *Willing*, *Reaſoning*, &c.

Theſe two, *viz.* *External Material Things*, as the Objects of Senſation; and the *Operations of our own Minds*, as the Objects of Reflection, are to me the only *Originals* from whence all our Ideas take their Beginnings. The Underſtanding ſeems not to have the leaſt glimmering of Ideas, which it doth not receive from one of theſe two *Sources*. Theſe, when we have taken a full Survey of them, and their ſeveral *Modes* and Compoſitions, we ſhall find to contain our whole ſtock of Ideas; and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of theſe two Ways.

'Tis evident that Children come by degrees to be furniſh'd with Ideas from the Objects they are converſant with. They are ſo ſurrounded with Bodies that perpetually

petually and diverſly affect them, that ſome Ideas will (whether they will or no) be imprinted on their Minds. *Light* and *Colours*, *Sounds* and *Tangible* Qualities, do continually ſollicite their proper *Senſes*, and force an entrance into the Mind. 'Tis late commonly before *Children* come to have Ideas of the Operations of their Minds; And ſome Men have not any very clear or perfect Ideas of the greateſt part of them all their Lives. Becauſe, tho' they paſs there continually; yet, like floating Viſions, they make not deep Impreſſions enough to leave in the Mind clear and laſting Ideas, till the Underſtanding turns inward upon its ſelf, and *reflects* on its own Operations, and makes them the Objects of its own Contemplation.

When a Man *firſt perceives*, then he may be ſaid *to have Ideas*; having Ideas, and Perception, ſignifying the ſame thing. It is an Opinion maintain'd by ſome, That the *Soul always Thinks*, and that it always has the actual Perception of Ideas, as long as it Exiſts: And that *actual Thinking* is as inſeparable from the Soul, as *actual Extenſion* is from the Body. But I cannot conceive it any more

neceſſary

neceſſary for the Soul always to *Think*, than for the Body always to *Move*: The Perception of Ideas being (as I conceive) to the Soul, what motion is to the Body, not its *Eſſence*, but one of its *Operations*: And therefore, though Thinking be never ſo much the proper Action of the Soul; yet it is not neceſſary to ſuppoſe, that it ſhould always Think, always be in Action. That perhaps is the priviledge of the Infinite *Author* and Preſerver of all Things, *Who never Slumbers nor Sleeps*; but is not competent in any *Finite* Being. We know certainly by Experience, that we ſometimes Think; and thence draw this infallible Conſequence, that there is ſomething in us that has a Power to Think, but whether that Subſtance perpetually Thinks or no, we can be no farther aſſured than Experience informs us.

I would be glad to learn from thoſe Men, who ſo confidently pronounce, that the Human Soul always Thinks, how they come to know it: Nay, how they come to know that they themſelves Think, when they themſelves do not perceive it. The moſt that can be ſaid of it, is, That 'tis poſſible the Soul may always

always Think; but not always retain it in *Memory*: And I ſay, it is as poſſible the Soul may not always Think; and much more probable that it ſhould ſometimes not Think, than it ſhould often Think, and that a long while together, and not be Conſcious to it ſelf the next Moment after that it had Thought.

I ſee no reaſon therefore to believe, that the Soul Thinks before the Senſes have furniſhed it with Ideas to Think on; and as thoſe are increas'd and retain'd, ſo it comes by Exerciſe to improve its Faculty of Thinking, in the ſeveral parts of it; as well as afterwards by *Compounding* thoſe Ideas, and *Reflecting* on its own Operations, it increaſes in *Stock*, as well as Facility in Remembring, Imagining, Reaſoning, and other *Modes* of Thinking.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of Simple Ideas.

OF Ideas ſome are *Simple*, others *Complex*. A *Simple Idea*, is one uniform Appearance or Conception in the Mind, which is not diſtinguiſhable into different Ideas. Such are *Senſible Qualities*, which though they are in the Things themſelves ſo united and blended, that there is no Separation, no Diſtance between them; yet the Ideas they produce in the Mind, enter by the Senſes ſimple and unmix'd. Thus, tho' the Hand feels *Softneſs* and *Warmth* in the ſame piece of *Wax*; yet the Simple Ideas thus united in the ſame Subject, are as perfectly *diſtinct* as thoſe that come in by different Senſes.

Theſe Simple Ideas are ſuggeſted no other way than from the two Ways abovementioned, viz. *Senſation* and *Reflexion*.

The Mind being once ſtored with theſe Simple Ideas, has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them to an infinite

finite variety: and ſo can make at pleaſure new *Complex Ideas*. But the moſt enlarged Underſtanding cannot frame one new *Simple Idea*; nor by any force deſtroy them that are there.

CHAP. III.

Of Ideas of one Senſe.

Ideas with Reference to the different ways wherein they approach the Mind, are of *Four Sorts*.

Firſt, There are ſome which come into our Minds by *one Senſe* only.

Secondly, There are others convey'd into the Mind by *more Senſes than one*.

Thirdly, Others that are had from *Reflexion* only.

Fourthly, There are ſome ſuggeſted to the Mind by all the ways of *Senſation* and *Reflection*.

Firſt, Some enter into the Mind only by one Senſe peculiarly adapted to receive them. Thus *Colours*, *Sounds*, *Smells*, &c. come in only by the *Eyes*, *Ears*, and *Noſe*;

Noſe. And if theſe Organs are any of them ſo diſorder'd as not to perform their Functions, they have no Poſtern to be admitted by; no other way to bring themſelves in view, and be perceiv'd by the Underſtanding. It will be needleſs to enumerate all the particular *Simple Ideas* belonging to each *Senſe*; nor indeed is it poſſible; there being a great many more than we have *Names* for.

CHAP. IV.

Of Solidity.

I Shall here mention one which we receive by our *Touch*, becauſe it is one of the chief Ingredients in many of our complex Ideas; and that is the Idea of *Solidity*: It ariſes from the Reſiſtance, one Body makes to the Entrance of another Body into the Place it poſſeſſes, till *it* has left it. There is no Idea which we more conſtantly receive from *Senſation* than this. In whatever poſture we are, we feel ſomewhat that ſupports us, and hinders us from ſinking downwards:

And

And the Bodies we daily handle, make us perceive that while they remain between them, they do by an unsurmountable force hinder the approach of the parts of our Hands that press them. This Idea is commonly called *Impenetrability*. I conceive Solidity is more proper to express it, because this carries something more of *Positive* in it than Impenetrability, which is *Negative*, and is perhaps more a Consequence of Solidity, than Solidity it self. This seems to be the most *Essential* property of Body, and that whereby we conceive it to fill space: The Idea of which is, that where we imagine any space taken up by a solid Substance, we conceive it so to possess it, that it excludes all other solid Substances. This Resistance is so great, that no Force can surmount it. All the Bodies in the World pressing a *drop of Water* on all sides, will never be able to overcome the Resistance it makes to their approaching one another, till it be removed out of their way.

The Idea of Solidity is distinguished from that of *pure Space*, in as much as this *latter* is neither capable of Resistance, nor Motion: 'Tis distinguished from

Hard-

Hardneſs, in as much as Hardneſs is a firm Cohæſion of the ſolid Parts of Matter making up Maſſes of a ſenſible bulk, ſo that the whole doth not eaſily change its Figure. Indeed, *Hard* and *Soft*, as commonly apprehended by us, are but *Relative* to the Conſtitutions of our Bodies: That being called *Hard*, which will put us to Pain ſooner than change its Figure, by the preſſure of any part of our Bodies; and that *Soft*, which changes the Situation of its Parts upon an eaſie and unpainful Touch.

This difficulty of changing Situation amongſt the Parts gives no more *Solidity* to the hardeſt Body, than to the ſofteſt, nor is an *Adamant* one jot more ſolid than *Water*: He that ſhall fill a yielding ſoft Body well with *Air* or *Water*, will quickly find its Reſiſtance. By this we may diſtinguiſh the Idea of the Extenſion of *Body*, from the Idea of the Extenſion of *Space*: That of *Body*, is the Cohæſion or Continuity of ſolid, ſeparable, and moveable Parts; that of *Space*, the Continuity of unſolid, inſeparable, and immoveable Parts. Upon the Solidity of Bodies depends their mutual *Impulſe*, *Reſiſtance*, and *Protruſion*: Of *pure Space* and *Solidity*

 theſe

there are ſeveral (among which I confeſs my ſelf one) who perſwade themſelves they have clear and diſtinct Ideas: And that they can think on *Space* without any thing in it that reſiſts or is protruded by Body, as well as on ſomething *that fills Space*, that can be protruded by the Impulſe of other Bodies, or reſiſt their Motion; the Idea of the diſtance between the oppoſite Parts of a Concave Surface, being equally clear without, as with the Idea of any Solid Parts between. If any one ask what this *Solidity* is, I ſend him to his Senſes to inform him: Let him put a *Flint* or *Foot-ball* between his Hands, and then endeavour to joyn them, and he will know.

CHAP. V.

Of Simple Ideas of divers Senſes

SOme Ideas we get iuto the Mind by *more than one Senſe*, as *Space*, *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Reſt* and *Motion*. Theſe are perceivable by the Eyes or Touch.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

Of Simple Ideas of Reflection.

SOme are had from *Reflection*, only: ſuch are the Ideas we have of the *Operations* of our Minds: of which the two principal are *Perception* or *Thinking*; and *Volition* or *Willing*. The powers of producing theſe Operations are call'd *Faculties*, which are the *Underſtanding* and *Will*, the ſeveral *Modes* of thinking, *&c.* belong to this Head.

CHAP. VII.

Of Simple Ideas of Senſation and Reflection.

THere are ſome Simple Ideas convey'd into the Mind by all the ways of *Senſation* and *Reflection*; ſuch are *Pleaſure, Pain, Power, Exiſtence, Unity, Succeſſion.* Pleaſure or Delight, Pain or

Uneaſineſs accompany almoſt every impreſſion of our Senſes, *and* every Action or Thought of the *Mind*. By *Pleaſure* or *Pain* we mean whatever delights or moleſts us, whether it ariſes from the Thoughts of our Minds; or any thing operating on our Bodies. Satisfaction, Delight, Pleaſure, Happineſs and Uneaſineſs, Trouble, Torment, Miſery, *&c.* are but different degrees, the one of Pleaſure, the other of Pain.

The Author of our Beings having given us a Power over ſeveral parts of our Bodies, to move or keep them at reſt as we think fit; and alſo by their motion to move our ſelves and other contiguous Bodies; having alſo given a Power to our Minds in ſeveral inſtances, to chuſe amongſt its Ideas which it will think on: To excite us to theſe actions of *Thinking* and *Motion* he has joyn'd to ſeveral Thoughts and Senſations a Perception of *Delight*: without this we ſhould have no reaſon to prefer one Thought or Action to another Motion to Reſt: In which ſtate Man however furniſh'd with the Faculties of Underſtanding and Will, would be a very idle unactive Creature, and paſs his time

time only in a lazy Lethargick dream.

Pain has the ſame Efficacy to ſet us on work that Pleaſure has; ſince we are as ready to avoid that, as to purſue this. This is worth our Conſideration, that *Pain is often produc'd by the ſame Objects and Ideas that produce Pleaſure* in us. This their near conjunction gives us new occaſion of admiring the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of our *Maker*, who deſigning the preſervation of our Being, has annex'd Pain to the application of many things to our Bodies, to warn us of the harm they will do us, and as advices to withdraw us from them. But he not deſigning our preſervation barely, but the preſervation of every part and Organ in its Perfection, hath in many caſes annexed Pain to thoſe very Ideas which delight us. Thus *heat* that is very agreeable to us in one degree, by a little greater increaſe of it, proves no ordinary Torment: which is wiſely ordered by *Nature*, that when any Object does by the vehemence of its operation diſorder the inſtruments of Senſation, whoſe ſtructures cannot but be very delicate, we might by the pain be warn'd to withdraw before the Organ be quite put out of order. That this is

the *end of pain*, appears from this consideration; that tho' great Light is insufferable to the Eyes; yet the highest degree of *darkness* does not at all disease them: because *that* causes no disorderly motion in that curious Organ the Eye. But excess of *cold*, as well as *heat* pains us; because it is equally destructive to the temper which is necessary to the preservation of Life.

Another reason why God hath annex'd several degrees of Pleasure and Pain to all the things that environ and affect us, and blended them together in all things that our Thoughts and Senses have to do with, is, that we finding imperfection and dissatisfaction, and want of compleat Happiness in all the enjoyments of the Creatures, might be led to seek it in the enjoyment of Him *with whom is fulness of Joy, and at whose right hand are pleasures for evermore.* Thô what is here said concerning *Pleasure* and *Pain* may not perhaps make those Ideas clearer to us, than our own experience does, yet it may serve to give us due Sentiments of the Wisdom and Goodness of the *Sovereign* Disposer of all things, which is not unsuitable to the main end of these

Enquiries

Enquiries: the knowledge and veneration of Him being the *chief End* of all our Thoughts, and the proper buſineſs of all Underſtandings.

Duration and *Unity* are two other Ideas ſuggeſted by every object without, and every Idea within: when Ideas are in our Minds, we conſider them as being actually there, as well as we conſider things to be actually without us; which is, that they *exiſt*, or have exiſtence: and whatever we conſider as *one thing*, whether a *Real* Being, or *Idea*, ſuggeſts the Idea of *Unity*.

Power is another Idea deriv'd from theſe ſources: for finding in our ſelves that we can *think*, and *move* ſeveral parts of our Bodies at Pleaſure; and obſerving the *effects* that natural Bodies produce in one another: by both theſe ways we get the Idea of *Power*.

Succeſſion is another Idea ſuggeſted by our Senſes, and by Reflection on what paſſes in our Minds. For if we look into our ſelves, we ſhall find our *Ideas* always whilſt we are awake, or have any Thought, paſſing in train, one going and another coming without intermiſſion.

CHAP. VIII.

Some farther Conſiderations concerning Simple Ideas.

WHatſoever is able by affecting our Senſes, to cauſe any perception in the Mind, doth thereby produce in the Underſtanding a *Simple Idea*; which whatſoever be the cauſe of it, is look'd upon as a *real poſitive Idea* in the Underſtanding. Thus the Ideas of *Heat* and *Cold*, *Light* and *Darkneſs*, *Motion* and *Reſt*,&c. are equally Poſitive in the Mind, thô ſome of their Cauſes may be meer *Privations*. An enquiry into their Cauſes concerns not the Ideas as in the Underſtanding; but the nature of the things exiſting without us. Thus a *Painter* has diſtinct Ideas of White and Black, as well as the *Philoſopher*, who tells us what kind of Particles, and how rang'd in the ſurface occaſion'd thoſe colours.

That a *Privative* Cauſe may produce a *Poſitive* Idea, appears from ſhadows, which (thô nothing but the abſence of

Light) are diſcernible; and cauſe clear and poſitive Ideas. The natural reaſon of which may be this, *viz.* That ſince Senſation is produced only by different degrees and modes of Motion in our animal Spirits, variouſly agitated by external Objects; the abatement of any former Motion muſt as neceſſarily produce a new Senſation, as the increaſe and variation of it; and thereby introduce a new Idea. We have ſome *negative* Names, which ſtand for no poſitive Ideas: but conſiſt wholly in negation of ſome certain Ideas, as *Silence*, *Inviſible*. theſe ſignify not any Ideas in the Mind, but their *Abſence*.

It will be uſeful to diſtinguiſh *Ideas* as they are *Perceptions* in our Minds, from what *they are in the Bodies* that cauſe ſuch Perceptions in us: for we are not to think the former exact Images and Reſemblances of ſomething inherent in the ſubject. Moſt of thoſe of *Senſation* being in the mind, no more the likeneſs of ſomething exiſting without us, than the names that ſtand for them are the likeneſs of our Ideas, which yet upon hearing, they are apt to excite in us.

What-

Whatſoever the *Mind perceives in it ſelf*, or is the immediate object of Perception, Thought or Underſtanding, that I call an Idea: and the power to produce any Idea in our Mind I call the *quality of the ſubject* wherein that power is: thus a *Snow-ball* having the power to produce in us the Ideas of *White*, *Cold* and *Round*, thoſe *powers* as they are in the Snow-ball I call *Qualities*; and as they are *Senſations* or *Perceptions* in our Underſtandings I call them *Ideas*: which Ideas if I ſpeak of ſometimes, as in the things themſelves, I would be underſtood to mean thoſe *Qualities* in the Objects which produce them in us. Theſe *Qualities* are of *Two ſorts*, Firſt *Original* or Primary, ſuch are *Solidity*, *Extention*, *Motion* or *Reſt*, *Number* and *Figure*. Theſe are inſeparable from Body, and ſuch as it conſtantly keeps in all its changes and alterations: Thus take a grain of *Wheat*, divide it into Two Parts, each Part has ſtill *Solidity*, *Extenſion*, *Figure*, *Mobility*: Divide it again, and it ſtill retains the ſame Qualities, and will do ſo ſtill, thô you divide it on till the Parts become inſenſible. The next thing to be conſider'd, is, *How Bodies operate upon one another*, and that is manifeſtly

manifeſtly by *Impulſe*, and nothing elſe. For Body cannot operate on what it does not touch: nor when it does touch, any other way than by Motion. If ſo, then when external Objects (which are not united to our Minds) produce Ideas in us; 'tis evident that ſome Motion muſt be thence continued by our Nerves or animal Spirits to the Brains, or ſeat of Senſation. And ſince Extenſion, Figure, Motion, *&c.* may be perceived at a diſtance by the Sight, tis evident that ſome Bodies muſt come from them to the Eyes, and thereby convey to the Brain ſome Motion which produces thoſe Ideas we have in us.

Secondly, *Secondary Qualities*, ſuch as *Colours*, *Smells*, *Taſts*, *Sounds*, &c, which whatever Reality we by miſtake may attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the Objects themſelves but *Powers* to produce various Senſations in us; and depend on the Qualities before-mentioned.

The *Ideas* of *Primary* Qualities of Bodies are reſemblances of them; and their patterns really exiſt in Bodies themſelves: But the Ideas produced in us by *Secundary* Qualities, have no reſemblance of them

them at all, And what is *Sweet*, *Blue*, or *Warm* in the Idea, is but the certain Bulk, Figure, and Motion of the insensible parts in the Bodies themselves, which we call so.

Thus we see that Fire at one distance produces in us the sensation of *Warmth*, which at a nearer approach causes the sensation of *Pain*. Now what reason have we to say that the Idea of *Warmth* is actually in the Fire, but that of *Pain* not in the Fire, which the same Fire produces in us the same way. The Bulk, Number, Figure, and Motion of the Parts of Fire, are really in it, whether we perceive them or no; and therefore may be call'd *Real* Qualities, because they really exist in that Body. But *Light* and *Heat* are no more really in it, than Sickness or Pain: take away the Sensation of them; let not the Eyes see Light or Colours, nor the Ear hear Sounds; let the Palate not Taste, or the Nose Smell, and all *Colours*, *Tasts*, *Odours*, and *Sounds*, as they are such particular Ideas vanish and cease; and are reduced to their Causes, (that is) Bulk, Motion, Figure, *&c.* of Parts.

These

Theſe *Secondary* Qualities are of Two ſorts, firſt *immediately perceiveable*, which by immediately operating on our Bodies, produce ſeveral different Ideas in us. Secondly, *mediately perceivable*, which by operating on other Bodies, change their primary Qualities, ſo as to render them capable of producing Ideas in us different from what they did before. Theſe laſt are Powers in Bodies which proceed from the particular conſtitution of thoſe Primary and Original Qualities, to make ſuch a change in the *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Texture*, &c. of another Body, as to make it operate on our Senſes different from what it did before; as in Fire to make Lead fluid: theſe two laſt being nothing but Powers relating to other Bodies, and reſulting from the different Modifications of the Original Qualities are yet otherwiſe thought of; the former being eſteemed *Real Qualities*; but the later barely *Powers*: The reaſon of this miſtake ſeems to be this; That our Ideas of ſenſible Qualities containing nothing in them of Bulk, Figure, *&c.* we cannot think them the effect of thoſe primary Qualities which appear not to our Senſes to operate in their productions,

ons, and with which they have not any apparent congruity, or conceivable connexion: nor can Reaſon ſhew how Bodies by their Bulk, Figure, *&c.* ſhould produce in the Mind the Ideas of *Warm*, *Yellow*, &c. But in the other caſe when Bodies operate upon one another, we plainly ſee that the Quality produced hath commonly no reſemblance with any thing in the thing producing it, and therefore we look upon it as the effect of Power: But our Senſes not being able to diſcover any unlikeneſs between the Idea produced in us, and the quality of the Object producing it, we imagine that our Ideas are reſemblances of ſomething in the Objects and not in the Effects of certain Powers placed in the modification of the primary Qualities, with which primary Qualities the Ideas produced in us, have no reſemblance.

This little excurſion into Natural Philoſophy was neceſſary in our preſent Enquiry to diſtinguiſh the primary and real Qualities of Bodies which are always in them, from thoſe ſecundary and imputed Qualities, which are but the Powers of ſeveral combinations of thoſe Primary ones, when they operate without being

ing distinctly discern'd; whereby we learn to know what Ideas are, and what are not Resemblances of something really existing in the Bodies we denominate from them.

CHAP. IX.

Of Perception.

Perception is the first Idea we receive from Reflection: it is by some called *Thinking* in general: thô *Thinking* in the propriety of the English Tongue, signifies that sort of operation of the Mind about its Ideas, wherein the Mind is active; where it considers any thing with some degree of voluntary attention: for in bare *Perception* the Mind is for the most part only *Passive*: and what it perceives it cannot avoid perceiving. What this is, we cannot otherwise know, than by Reflecting on what passes in our Minds when we *See, Feel, Hear,* &c.

Impressions made on the outward Parts if they are not taken notice of within, cause no *Perception*: as we see in those whose

whoſe Minds are intently buſied in the contemplation of certain Objects. A ſufficient impulſe there may be upon the organs of Senſation: but if it reach not the obſervation of the Mind, there follows no Perception: ſo that wherever there is Senſe or Perception, there ſome Idea is actually produced and preſent in the Underſtanding.

We may obſerve that the Ideas we receive from Senſation, are often in grown People alter'd by the judgment without our taking notice of it. Thus a Globe of any uniform Colour (as of Gold) or Jet, being ſet before our Eyes, the *Idea* thereby imprinted is of a flat circle variouſly ſhadowed. But being accuſtomed to perceive what kind of appearances convex Bodies are wont to make in us; the Judgment alters the appearances into their Cauſes; and from that variety of Shadow or Colour, frames to it ſelf the Perception of a convex Figure of one uniform Colour. This in many caſes by a ſettl'd habit is perform'd ſo readily, that we take that for the perception of our Senſation, which is but an Idea formed by the Judgment: ſo that one ſerves only to excite the other,

and

and is ſcarce taken notice of itſelf. As a Man who reads and hears with attention, takes little notice of the Characters or Sounds, but of the Ideas that are excited in him by them. Thus habits come at laſt to produce actions in us, which often ſcape our obſervation.

The faculty of *Perception* ſeems to be that which puts the diſtinction between the animal Kingdom, and the inferior parts of Nature: Since Vegetables have ſome degrees of Motion, and upon the different application of other Bodies to them, do very briskly alter their Figutes and Motions, and thence have obtain'd the name of *Senſitive Plants*: which yet is, I ſuppoſe, but bare *Mechaniſm*, and no otherwiſe produced, than the ſhortning of a Rope by the affuſion of Water. But Perception, I believe, is in ſome degree in all ſorts of Animals: thô I think we may from the make of an *Oiſter* or *Cockle*, reaſonably conclude that it has not ſo many, nor ſo quick Senſes as a Man, or ſeveral other Animals.

Perception is alſo the firſt ſtep and degree towards Knowledge, and the Inlet of all the materials of it: ſo that the fewer Senſes any Man has, and the dul-

ler the impreſſions that are made by them are, the more remote he is from that Knowledge which is to be found in other Men.

CHAP. X.

Of Retention.

THE next Faculty of the Mind whereby it makes a farther progreſs towards Knowledge, I call *Retention*: which is the keeping of thoſe Ideas it has receiv'd. which is done two ways.

Firſt, By keeping the Idea which is brought into the Mind for ſome time actuaactually in view, which is called *Contemplation.*

Secondly, By reviving thoſe Ideas in our Minds which have diſappeared, and have been as it were, laid out of ſight; and this is *Memory*, which is as it were, the Store-houſe of our Ideas, for the narrow Mind of Man not being capable of having many Ideas under view at once, it was neceſſary to have a Repoſitory to lay up thoſe Ideas which at another time it may have

have uſe of. But our *Ideas* being nothing but actual Perceptions in the Mind which ceaſe to be any thing, when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our *Ideas* in the Repoſitory of the Memory ſignifies no more but this, That the Mind has a power in many caſes to revive Perceptions it has once had, with this additional Perception annex'd to them, that it has had them before. And it is by the aſſiſtance of this Faculty, that we are ſaid to have all thoſe *Ideas* in our Underſtandings, which we can bring in ſight, and make the object of our Thoughts, without the help of thoſe ſenſible Qualities which firſt imprinted them there.

Attention and *Repetition* help much to the fixing *Ideas* in our Memories: but thoſe which make the deepeſt and moſt laſting impreſſions are thoſe which are accompanied with *Pleaſure* and *Pain*. *Ideas* but once taken in and never again repeated are ſoon loſt; as thoſe of Colours in ſuch as loſt their Sight when very young.

The Memory in ſome Men is tenacious, even to a miracle: but yet there ſeems to be a conſtant decay of all our

Ideas, even of those which are struck deepest; and in Minds the most retentive: so that if they be not sometimes renewed, the Print wears out, and at last there remains nothing to be seen. Those *Ideas* that are often refresh'd by a frequent return of the Objects or Actions that produce them, fix themselves best in the Memory, and remain longest there: Such are the *Original qualities of Bodies*, viz. Solidity, Extension, Figure, Motion, *&c.* and *those that almost constantly affect us*, as Heat and Cold: and those that are the *Affections of all kinds of Beings*, as Existence, Duration, Number: these and the like, are seldom quite lost while the Mind retains any *Ideas* at all.

In memory the Mind is oftentimes more than barely *passive*; for it often sets it self on work to search some hidden *Ideas*; sometimes they start of their own accord: and sometimes turbulent and tempestuous Passions tumble them out of their Cells.

The defects of the Memory are *Two*.

First, That it loses the *Idea* quite, and so far it produces perfect *Ignorance*.

Secondly,

Secondly, That it moves ſlowly and retrieves not the *Ideas* laid up in ſtore quick enough to ſerve the Mind upon occaſions. this if it be to a great degree is *ſtupidity*. In the having *Ideas* ready at hand on all occaſions, conſiſts what we call *Invention*, *Fancy*, and *Quickneſs of Parts*.

This Faculty other *Animals* ſeem to have to a great degree as well as *Man*, as appears by Birds learning of Tunes, and their endeavour to hit the Notes right. For it ſeems impoſſible that they ſhould endeavour to conform their Voices (as 'tis plain they do) to Notes, whereof they have no *Ideas*.

CHAP. XI.

Of Diſcerning, and other Operations of the Mind.

ANother Faculty of the Mind is, That of *diſcerning between its Ideas*: on this depends the evidence, and certainty of ſeveral even general Propoſitions, which

paſs for *Innate Truths*: whereas indeed they depend on this clear diſcerning Faculty of the Mind, whereby it perceives two *Ideas* to be the ſame or different. In being able nicely to diſtinguiſh one thing from another, where there is the leaſt difference, conſiſts in a great meaſure, that *Exactneſs of Judgment* and *Clearneſs of Reaſon*, which is to be obſerved in one Man above another; which is quite oppoſite to *Wit*, which conſiſts moſt in the aſſemblage of *Ideas*, and putting thoſe together with quickneſs and variety, which have the leaſt reſemblance, to form agreeable viſions: whereas Judgment ſeparates carefully thoſe *Ideas*, wherein can be found the leaſt difference to prevent Error and Deluſion.

To the well diſtinguiſhing our *Ideas*, it chiefly contributes that they be clear and determinate, and when they are ſo, it will not breed any confuſion or miſtake about them, thô the Senſes ſhould convey them from the ſame Object differently on different occaſions.

The *comparing* of our *Ideas* one with another in reſpect of *Extent*, *Degree*, *Time*, *Place*, or any other circumſtances, is another Operation of the Mind about its

Ideas

Ideas, which is the ground of *Relations*. Brutes ſeem not to have this Faculty in any great degree. They have probably ſeveral *Ideas* diſtinct enough; but cannot compare them farther than ſome ſenſible circumſtances annex'd to the Objects themſelves. The power of comparing general *Ideas*, which we may obſerve in Men, we may probably conjecture *Beaſts* have not at all.

Compoſition is another Operation of the Mind whereby it combines ſeveral of its ſimple *Ideas* into *Complex* ones: under which Operation we may reckon that of *Enlarging*, wherein we put ſeveral *Ideas* together of the ſame kind, as ſeveral Unites to make a *Dozen*. In this alſo I ſuppoſe Brutes come far ſhort of Man; for tho' they take in and retain together ſeveral combinations of ſimple *Ideas*, as poſſibly a Dog does the *Shape*, *Smell* and *Voice* of his Maſter; yet theſe are rather ſo many diſtinct marks, whereby he knows him, than one *Complex Idea* made out of thoſe ſeveral ſimple ones.

Abſtraction is another Operation of the Mind, whereby the Mind forms general *Ideas* from ſuch as it receiv'd from particular Objects, which it does by conſidering them as they are in the Mind ſuch appearances ſeperate from the circumſtance of real Exiſtence, as *Time*, *Place*, &c. Theſe become general *Repreſentatives* of all of the ſame kind, and their names applicable to whatever exiſts conformable to ſuch abſtract *Ideas*. Thus the *Colour* which I receive from *Chalk*, *Snow*, and *Milk*, is made a repreſentative of all of that kind; and has a name given it (*Whiteneſs*) which ſignifies the ſame quality, wherever to be found or imagin'd. And thus *Univerſally* both *Ideas* and *Terms* are made.

This puts the great difference between Man and Brutes: they ſeem to reaſon about particular Objects, and *Ideas*, but there appear no footſteps of *Abſtraction* in them, or of making *general Ideas*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Of Complex Ideas.

IN the reception of Simple Ideas the Mind is only *Passive*, having no power to frame any to its self, but as these Simple *Ideas* do exist in several combinations united together, so the Mind may consider them as united, not only as they are really united in external Objects, but as it self has joyned them. *Ideas* thus made up of several ones put together, I call *Complex*, as a *Man*, *Army*, *Beauty*, *Gratitude*, &c. By this faculty of repeating and joyning together its *Ideas*, the Mind has great power in varying and multiplying the Objects of its Thoughts. But it is still confin'd to those Simple *Ideas* which it received from the two Sources of *Sensation* and *Reflection*. It can have no other *Ideas* of sensible Qualities, than what come from without by the Senses, nor any other *Ideas* of the Operations of a thinking Substance, thanwhat it finds in itself

it ſelf, but having once got theſe Simple *Ideas*, it can by its own power put them together and make new *Complex ones*, which it never received ſo united.

Complex *Ideas* however compounded and decompounded, tho' their number be infinite, and their variety endleſs, may all be reduced under theſe three heads, Firſt *Modes*, Secondly, *Subſtances*, Thirdly, *Relations*.

Modes, I call ſuch Complex *Ideas* which contain not the ſuppoſition of ſubſiſting by themſelves, but are conſider'd as dependences on, and affections of Subſtances, as *Triangle*, *Gratitude*, *Murder*, &c. Theſe Modes are of Two ſorts, Firſt *Simple*, which are but the combinations of the ſame Simple *Idea* as a Dozen, Score, *&c.* which are but the *Ideas* of ſo many diſtinct Unites put together. Secondly, *Mix'd*, which are compounded of Simple *Ideas* of ſeveral kinds, as *Beauty*, which conſiſts in a certain compoſition of Colour and Figure, cauſing delight in the Beholder.

Theft, which is the concealed change of the poſſeſſion of any thing without the conſent of the Proprietor. *Theſe* viſibly contain

contain a combination of ſeveral *Ideas*, of ſeveral kinds.

Secondly *Subſtance*, the *Ideas* of Subſtances are only ſuch combinations of Simple *Ideas* as are taken to repreſent diſtinct particular things ſubſiſting by themſelves; in which the confuſed *Idea* of Subſtance is always the chief. Thus a combination of the *Ideas* of a certain Figure, with the powers of Motion, Thought, and Reaſoning joyn'd to Subſtance, make the ordinary *Idea* of Man.

Theſe again are either of *ſingle Subſtances*, as *Man*, *Stone*, or of *collective*, or ſeveral put together, as *Army*, *Heap*: *Ideas* of ſeveral ſubſtances thus put together, are as much each of them one ſingle *Idea*, as that of a *Man*, or an *Unite*.

Thirdly, *Relations* which conſiſt in the conſideration and comparing one *Idea* with another. Of theſe ſeveral kinds we ſhall Treat in their Order.

CHAP.

CAAP. XIII.

Of Simple Modes, and First of the Simple Modes of Space.

CONcerning *Simple Modes* we may observe that the Modifications of any *Simple Idea*, are as perfectly different, and distinct *Ideas* in the Mind, as those of the greatest distance or contrariety; Thus *Two* is as distinct from *Three*, as *Blueness* from *Heat*. Under this Head I shall first consider the Modes of *Space*.

Space is a Simple *Idea* which we get both by our Sight and Touch. When we consider it barely in length between two Bodies, 'tis called *Distance*, ; when in length, breadth, and thickness, it may be called *Capacity*. When consider'd between the extremities of Matter which fills the capacity of Space with something Solid, Tangible and Moveable, it is called *Extension*, and thus *Extension* will be an *Idea* belonging to the Body: but *Space* may be conceived without it.

Each

Each different *distance* is a different modification of space: and each *Idea* of any different space is a *Simple Mode* of this *Idea*. Such are an *Inch*, *Foot*, *Yard*, &c. which are the *Ideas* of certain stated lengths, which Men settle in their Minds, for the use, and by the custom of measuring. When these *Ideas* are made familiar to Men's Thoughts, they can in their Minds repeat them as often as they will, without joyning to them the *Idea* of Body, and frame to themselves the *Ideas* of Feet, Yards or Fathoms beyond the utmost bounds of all Bodies: and by adding these still one to another, enlarge their *Idea* of space as much as they please. From this power of repeating any *Idea* of Distance, without being ever able to come to an end, we come by the *Idea* of *Immensity*.

Another modification of Space is taken from the *Relation* of the parts of the termination of Capacity or Extension amongst themselves: and this is what we call *Figure*. This the *Touch* discovers in sensible Bodies, whose extremities come within our reach: and the *Eye* takes both from Bodies and Colours, whose boundaries are within its view;

where

where obſerving how the extremities terminate either in ſtraight lines, which meet at diſcernible Angles; or in crooked lines, wherein no Angles can be perceiv'd: by conſidering theſe as they relate to one another in all parts of the extremities of any Body or Space, it has that *Idea* we call *Figure*: which affords to the Mind infinite variety.

Another *Mode* belonging to this head, is that of *Place*. Our *Idea* of *Place* is nothing but the Relative poſition of any thing with reference to its diſtance from ſome fix'd, and certain points. Whence we ſay, that a thing has or has not changed *Place*, when its diſtance either is, or is not altered with reſpect to thoſe Bodies with which we have occaſion to compare it. That this is ſo, we may eaſily gather from hence; that we can have no *Idea* of the place of the *Univerſe*, tho' we can of all its parts. To ſay that the World is *ſomewhere* means no more than that it does *exiſt*. The word *Place* is ſometimes taken to ſignifie that *Space* which any body takes up; and ſo the Univerſe may be conceived in a Place.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Duration and its Simple Modes.

THere is another ſort of *Diſtance*, the *Idea* of which we get from the fleeting, and perpetually periſhing parts of Succeſſion which we call *Duration*. The Simple Modes of it are any different Lengths of it, whereof we have diſtinct *Ideas*, as *Hours*, *Days*, *Years*, &c. *Time* and *Eternity*.

The *Idea* of *Succeſſion* is got by reflecting on that train of *Ideas* which conſtantly follow one another in our Minds as long as we are awake. The diſtance between any parts of this *Succeſſion* is what we call *Duration*: and the continuation of the exiſtence of our Selves, or any thing elſe *commenſurate* to the Succeſſion of any *Ideas* in our Minds, is what we call our *own Duration*, or *that* of another thing co-exiſting with our Thinking. That this is ſo, appears from hence, that we have no Perception of Succeſſion or Duration, when that Succeſſion of our

Ideas

Ideas ceaſes, as in *Sleep*: the moment that we Sleep, and awake, how diſtant ſoever ſeems to be joyn'd and connected. And poſſibly it would be ſo to a waking Man, could he fix upon one *Idea* without variation, and the ſucceſſion of others. And we ſee that they whoſe Thoughts are very intent upon one thing, let ſlip out of their account a good part of that *Duration*, : and think that time ſhorter than it is. But if a Man during his Sleep *Dream*, and variety of *Ideas* make themſelves perceptible in his Mind, one after another he hath then, during ſuch Dreaming, a Senſe of *Duration* and of the length of it.

A Man having once got this *Idea* of Duration, can apply it to things which exiſt while he does not think: and thus we meaſure the Time of our Sleep, as well as that wherein we are awake.

Thoſe who think we get the *Idea* of *Succeſſion* from our obſervation of Motion, by our Senſes, will be of our Opinion, when they conſider that Motion produces in the Mind an *Idea* of Succeſſion, no otherwiſe than as it produces there a continu'd Train of diſtinguiſhable *Ideas*. A Man that looks upon a Body

body really moving perceives no motion, unleſs that motion produces a conſtant *train of ſucceſſive Ideas*. But wherever a Man is, tho' all things be at reſt about him, if he thinks, he will be *conſcious* of *Succeſſion* without perceiving any motion. Hence motions very *ſlow* are not perceived by us: becauſe the change of diſtance is ſo ſlow, that it cauſes no new *Ideas* in us, but after a long Interval. The ſame happens in things that move very *Swift*, which not affecting the Senſe with ſeveral diſtinguiſhable diſtances of their motion, cauſe not any train of *Ideas* in our Minds, and conſequently are not perceived. Thus any thing that moves round in a Circle in leſs time than our *Ideas* are wont to ſucceed one another in our Minds, is not perceived to move, but ſeems to be a perfect entire Circle of that matter which is in motion. Such a part of duration as takes up the time of only one *Idea* in our Minds, wherein we perceive no ſucceſſion, we call an *Inſtant*.

Duration, as mark'd by certain Periods and Meaſures, is what we moſt properly call *Time*: which we meaſure by the Diurnal and Annual *Revolutions* of the Sun, as being conſtant, regular, and uni-

verſally obſervable by all Mankind, and ſuppoſed equal to one another,

It is not neceſſary that Time ſhould be *meaſured by motion*: any conſtant periodical appearance in ſeemingly equidiſtant ſpaces, may as well diſtinguiſh the Intervals of *Time* as what we make uſe of. For ſuppoſing the Sun to be lighted, and then extinguiſh'd every day: and that in the ſpace of an Annual Revolution, it ſhould ſenſibly increaſe in Brightneſs, and ſo decreaſe again; ſuch a regular appearance would ſerve to meaſure out the diſtances of Duration, to all that could obſerve it, as well without, as with Motion. The freezing of Water, the blowing of a Plant returning at equidiſtant Periods in all the parts of the Earth would ſerve for the ſame purpoſe. In effect, we find that a People of *America* counted their Years by the *coming* and *going away* of Birds at certain ſeaſons.

The Mind having once got ſuch a meaſure of *Time* as the Annual Revolution of the Sun, can eaſily apply it to Duration wherein that meaſure it ſelf did not exiſt: and the *Idea* of *Duration* equal to an *Annual Revolution of the Sun*, is as eaſily applicable in our Thoughts to Duration

where

where no Sun, nor Motion was, as the *Idea* of a *Foot* or *Yard* to distances beyond the confines of the World.

By the same means we come by the *Idea* of *Eternity*: for having got the *Ideas* of certain Lengths of Duration, we can in our Thoughts add them to one another as oft as we please, without ever coming to an end.

CHAP. XV.

Of Duration and Expansion considered together.

TIme is to *Duration* as *Place* is to *Space* or *Expansion*. They are so much of those boundless Oceans of *Eternity* and *Immensity* as is set out, and distinguished from the rest; And so are made use of to denote the position of finite real Beings in respect one to another, in those infinite Oceans of Duration and Space. Each of these have a *twofold acceptation*.

First, Time in general is taken for so much of Infinite Duration as is coexistent with

the Univerſe, and meaſured out by the motions of its great Bodies. Thus it is uſed in the Phraſes *before all Time*, when *Time ſhall be no more.*

Place is likewiſe taken for that *portion* of infinite Space poſſeſſed by the material World, tho' this might be more properly called *Extenſion.* Within *theſe two* are confined the particular Time or Duration, Extenſion or Place of all corporeal Beings.

Secondly, Time is ſometimes applied to Parts of that infinite Duration that were not really meaſured out by real Exiſtence, but ſuch as we upon occaſion do ſuppoſe equal to certain Lengths of meaſur'd Time. As in the *Julian Period* which makes an Excurſion of ſeven hundred ſixty four years beyond the Creation. Thus we may ſpeak of Place or Diſtance in the great *Inane*, wherein I can conceive a Space equal to, or capable of receiving a Body of any aſſigned Dimenſions.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Numbers.

THe complex *Ideas* of *Number* are form'd by adding ſeveral *Unites* together. The *Simple Modes* of it are each ſeveral combination, as, *Two*, *Three*, &c. Theſe are of all others moſt diſtinct, the neareſt being as clearly different from each other as the moſt remote: *Two* being as diſtinct from *One*, as Two hundred. But it is hard to form diſtinct *Ideas* of every the leaſt exceſs in Extenſion. Hence Demonſtrations in Numbers are more general in their Uſe, and more determinate in their Application than thoſe of Extenſion.

Simple Modes of Numbers, being in our Minds but ſo many Combinations of Unites which have no variety, but More or Leſs: *Names* for each diſtinct Combination, ſeem more neceſſary then in any other ſort of *Ideas*. For without a *Name* or *Mark*, to diſtinguiſh that preciſe Collection, it will hardly be kept from being a heap of Confuſion. Hence ſome *Americans* have no diſtinct *Idea* of any

Number beyond Twenty: so that when they are discourſed with of greater Numbers, they ſhew the hairs of their Head. So that to reckon right two things are required.

Firſt, That the Mind diſtinguiſh carefully two *Ideas* which are different one from another, only by the Addition or Subſtraction of one Unite.

Secondly, That it retain in memory the Names or Marks of the ſeveral Combinations from an Unite to that Number; and that in exact Order, as they follow one another. In either of which if it fails, the whole Buſineſs of *Numbring* will be diſturbed: and there will remain only the confuſed *Idea* of *Multitude*: but the *Ideas* neceſſary to diſtinct Numeration will not be attain'd to.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Infinity:

THE *Idea* ſignified by the name *Infinity*, is beſt examined, by conſidering to *what* Infinity is by the Mind attributed

buted, and then *how* it frames it. *Finite* and *Infinite* then are look'd upon as the modes of Quantity, and attributed primarily to things that have Parts, and are capable of Increaſe or Diminution, by the *Addition* or *Subſtraction* of any the leaſt part. Such are the *Ideas* of *Space*, *Duration*, and *Number*.

When we apply this *Idea* to the *Supreme Being*: we do it primarily in reſpect of his Duration and Ubiquity; more figuratively when to his *Wiſdom*, *Power*, *Goodneſs*, and other Attributes which are properly *inexhauſtible* and *incomprehenſible*: for when we call them Infinite, we have no other *Idea* of this Infinity, but what carries with it ſome reflexion on the *Number*, or the *Extent* of the *Acts* or *Objects* of God's Power and Wiſdom, which can never be ſuppoſed ſo great or ſo many, which theſe attributes will not always ſurmount and exceed, thô we multiply them in our Thoughts, with the Infinity of *endleſs Number*. I do not pretend to ſay, how theſe Attributes *are in God*, who is infinitely beyond the reach of our narrow Capacities: but this is our way of *conceiving them*, and theſe our *Ideas* of their Infinity.

The next thing to be considered, is *how we come* by the *Idea* of Infinity. Every one that has any *Idea* of any stated lengths of Space, as a *Foot*, *Yard*, &c. finds that he can repeat that *Idea*, and joyn it to *another*, to a *Third*, and so on without ever coming to an end of his Additions: From this power of enlarging his *Idea* of Space, he takes the *Idea* of Infinite Space or *Immensity*. By the same power of repeating the *Idea* of any length of Duration we have in our Minds, with all the endless addition of Number, we come by the *Idea* of *Eternity*.

If our *Idea* of *Infinity* be got by repeating without end our own *Ideas*; why do we not attribute it to other *Ideas*, as well as those of *Space* and *Duration*; since they may be as easily and as often repeated in our Minds as the other? yet no body ever thinks of infinite *Sweetness*, *Whiteness*, thô he can repeat the *Idea* of Sweet or White as frequently, as those of *Yard* or *Day*. *I Answer*, that those *Ideas* that have Parts, and are capable of Increase, by the addition of any Parts, afford us by their repetition an *Idea* of Infinity; because with the endless repetition there is continued an Enlarge-

ment

ment, of which there is no end: but it is not ſo in other *Ideas*: For if to the perfecteſt *Idea* I have of *White*, I add another of equal Whiteneſs; it enlarges not my *Idea* at all. Thoſe *Ideas* that conſiſt not of Parts, cannot be augmented to what proportion Men pleaſe, or be ſtretch'd beyond what they have received by their Senſes; but *Space*, *Duration* and *Number* being capable of increaſe by Repetition, leave in the Mind an *Idea* of an endleſs room for more; and ſo thoſe *Ideas* alone lead the Mind towards the Thought of Infinity.

We are carefully to diſtinguiſh between the *Idea* of the *Infinity of Space*, and the *Idea* of a *Space Infinite*. The firſt is nothing but a ſuppoſed endleſs Progreſſion of the Mind over any repeated *Idea* of Space. But to have actually in the Mind the *Idea* of a Space Infinite, is to ſuppoſe the Mind already paſſed over all thoſe repeated *Ideas* of Space, which an endleſs Repetition can never totally repreſent to it; which carries in it a plain Contradiction.

This will be plainer, if we conſider *Infinity in Numbers*. The Infinity of Numbers, to the end of whoſe addition every one

one perceives there is no approach, eaſily appears to any one that reflects on it: But how clear ſoever this *Idea* of the Infinity of Number be, there is nothing yet more evident, than the Abſurdity of the actual *Idea* of Infinite Number.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of other Simple Modes.

THE Mind has ſeveral diſtinct *Ideas* of *Sliding*, *Rolling*, *Walking*, *Creeping*, &c. which are all but the different modifications of Motion. *Swift* and *Slow* are two different *Ideas* of Motion, the meaſures whereof are made out of the diſtances of Time and Space put together.

The like variety we have in *Sounds*: Every articulate word is a different modification of Sound: as are alſo Notes of different length put together, which make that Complex *Idea* called *Tune*.

The Modes of *Colours* might be alſo very various: ſome of which we take notice of, as the different degrees, or as they are termed Shades of the ſame Colour.

lour. But since we seldom make assemblages of Colours, without taking in Figure also, as in Painting, *&c.* Those which are taken notice of do most commonly belong to mixed Modes, as *Beauty*, *Rainbow*, &c.

All compounded *Tastes* and *Smells* are also Modes made up of the Simple *Ideas* of those Senses: But they being such as generally we have no Names for, cannot be set down in writing, but must be left to the Thoughts, and Experience of the Reader.

CHAP. XIX.

Of the Modes of Thinking.

WHen the Mind turns its view inwards upon its self, *Thinking* is the first *Idea* that occurs: wherein it observes a great variety of Modifications; and thereof frames to it self distinct *Ideas*. Thus the Perception annex'd to any impression on the Body made by an external Object, is call'd *Sensation*. When an *Idea* recurs without the presence of the

the Object, it is called *Remembrance*. When ſought after by the Mind, and brought again in view, it is *Recollection*. When held there long under attentive conſideration, it is *Contemplation*. When *Ideas* float in the Mind without Regard or Reflection, 'tis called in French *Reſvery*, our Language has ſcarce a name for it. When the *Ideas* are taken notice of, and as it were Regiſtred in the Memory, it is *Attention*. When the Mind fixes its view on any one *Idea*, and conſiders it on all ſides, it is *Intention* and *Study*. *Sleep* without Dreaming is Reſt from all theſe. And *Dreaming*, is the Perception of *Ideas* in the Mind, not ſuggeſted by any external Objects, or known occaſions; nor under any choice or conduct of the Underſtanding. Of theſe various modes of Thinking, the Mind forms as diſtinct *Ideas*, as it does of White and Red, a Square or a Circle.

CHAP.

CHAP. XX.

Of the Modes of Pleaſure and Pain.

Pleaſure and *Pain* are Simple *Ideas* which we receive both from Senſation and Reflection. There are Thoughts of the Mind, as well as Senſations, accompanied with Pleaſure or Pain. Their Cauſes are termed *Good* or *Evil*. For things are eſteemed Good or Evil only in reference to Pleaſure or Pain. That we call *Good* which is apt to cauſe or increaſe Pleaſure, or diminiſh Pain in us: to procure or preſerve the poſſeſſion of any Good, or abſence of any Evil: And on the contrary, that we call *Evil*, which is apt to produce or increaſe any Pain, or diminiſh any Pleaſure in us; or elſe to procure us any Evil, or deprive us of any Good, By Pleaſure and Pain I would be underſtood to mean of *Body* or *Mind*, as they are commonly diſtinguiſhed; thô in Truth they are only different conſtitutions of the Mind, ſometimes occaſion'd

ſion'd by diſorder in the Body, ſometimes by thoughts of the Mind. *Pleaſure* and *Pain*, and their cauſes *Good* and *Evil*, are the Hinges upon which our Paſſions turn: by reflecting on the various Modifications or Tempers of Mind, and the internal Senſations which Pleaſure and Pain, Good and Evil produce in us, we may thence form to our ſelves the *Ideas* of our Paſſions. Thus by reflecting upon the Thought we have of the Delight, which any thing is apt to produce in us, we have an *Idea* we call *Love*: and on the contrary, the thought of the Pain, which any thing preſent or abſent produces in us, is what we call *Hatred*. *Deſire* is that uneaſineſs which a Man finds in himſelf, upon the abſence of any thing, the preſent enjoyment of which carries the *Idea* of Delight with it. Joy is a Delight of the Mind ariſing from the preſent or aſſur'd approaching poſſeſſion of a Good. *Sorrow* is an uneaſineſs of the Mind, upon the thought of a Good loſt, or the Senſe of a preſent Evil. *Hope* is a pleaſure in the Mind upon the thought of a probable future Enjoyment of a thing which is apt to delight. *Fear* is an uneaſineſs of

the

the Mind upon the thought of a future Evil, likely to befall us. *Anger* is a diſcompoſure of Mind upon the receipt of Injury, with a preſent purpoſe of Revenge. *Deſpair* is the thought of the unattainableneſs of any Good. *Envy* is an uneaſineſs of Mind, cauſed by the conſideration of a Good we deſire, obtained by one we think ſhould not have had it before us.

It is to be conſidered that in reference to the Paſſions, the Removal or Leſſening of a Pain, is conſidered, and operates as a Pleaſure: and the loſs or diminiſhing of a Pleaſure, as a Pain. And farther, that the Paſſions in moſt Perſons operate on the Body, and cauſe various Changes in it: But theſe being not always ſenſible, do not make a neceſſary part of the *Idea* of each Paſſion. Beſides theſe modes of Pleaſure and Pain which reſult from the various conſiderations of Good and Evil, there are many others, I might have inſtanced in, as the *pain* of *Hunger* and *Thirſt*, and the pleaſure of *Eating* and *Drinking*; and of *Muſick*, &c. but I rather choſe to inſtance in the Paſſions, as being of much more concernment to us.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Power.

THE Mind being every day informed by the Senſes, of the alteration of thoſe Simple *Ideas* it obſerves in things without: reflecting alſo on what paſſes within it ſelf, and obſerving a conſtant Change of its *Ideas*, ſometimes by the impreſſions of outward Objects upon the Senſes; and ſometimes by the Determination of its own Choice: and concluding from what it has ſo conſtantly obſerved to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the ſame things, by the ſame Agents, and by the like ways, conſiders in one thing, the poſſibility of having any of its Simple *Ideas* changed; and in another, the poſſibility of making that Change, and ſo comes by that *Idea* which we call *Power*. Thus we ſay *Fire* has a power to *melt Gold*, and make it fluid; and *Gold* has a power to be *melted*.

Power

Power thus considered is Twofold, *viz.*. as able to make or able to receive any change: the one may be called *Active*, the other *Passive Power*. Of *Passive Power* all sensible things abundantly furnish us with *Ideas*, whose sensible Qualities and Beings we find to be in a continual Flux, and therefore with reason we look on them as liable still to the same change. Nor have we of *Active Power*, fewer instances: since whatever change is observed: the Mind must collect a Power somewhere able to make that change. But yet if we will consider it attentively, Bodies by our Senses do not afford us, so clear and distinct an *Idea* of *Active* Power, as we have from Reflection on the Operations of our Minds. For all Power relating to Action, and there being but Two sorts of *Action*, viz. *Thinking* and *Motion*, let us consider whence we have the clearest *Ideas* of the Powers, which produce these Actions.

Of *Thinking*, Body affords us no *Idea* at all: it is only from Reflection that we have that; neither have we from Body any *Idea* of the beginning of Motion. A Body at Rest affords us no *Idea* of any

Active Power to move; and when it is ſet in motion it ſelf, that Motion is rather a Paſſion than an Action in it. The *Idea* of the beginning of Motion we have only by Reflection on what paſſes in our ſelves; where we find by Experience, that barely by willing it, we can move the parts of our Bodies, which were before at Reſt.

We find in our ſelves a Power to begin or forbear, continue or end ſeveral actions of our Minds, and motions of our Bodies, barely by a Thought or Preference of the Mind. This Power which the Mind has thus to order the conſideration of any *Idea*, or the forbearing to conſider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the Body to its Reſt, and *vice verſâ* in any particular inſtance, is, that we call the *Will*. The actual exerciſe of that Power, is that which we call *Volition* or *Willing*: The forbearance or performance of that action, conſequent to ſuch order or command of the Mind, is called *Voluntary*: And whatſoever action is performed without ſuch a thought of the Mind is called *Involuntary*.

The

The Power of Perception is that we call the *Underſtanding*. *Perception* which we make the act of the Underſtanding is of *Three* ſorts. *Firſt*, The Perception of *Ideas* in our Minds, *Secondly*, The Perception of the ſignification of Signs. *Thirdly*, The Perception of the agreement or diſagreement of any diſtinct *Ideas*. Theſe Powers of the Mind, *viz.* of perceiving and preferring are uſually called by another name; and the ordinary way of ſpeaking is that the Underſtanding and Will are two *Faculties* of the Mind. A word proper enough, if it be uſed ſo as not to breed any confuſion in Men's Thoughts, by being ſuppoſed, (as I ſuſpect it has been) to ſtand for ſome real Beings in the Soul that performed thoſe actions of Underſtanding and Volition.

From the conſideration of the Extent of the power of the Mind, over the actions of the Man, which every one finds in himſelf, ariſe the *Ideas* of *Liberty* and *Neceſſity*: So far as a Man has a power to think, or not to think; to move, or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own Mind, ſo far is a Man *Free*. Wherever any performance or forbearance, are not equally in a Man's pow-

er; wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his Mind, there, he is not *Free*, thô perhaps the action may be *voluntary*. So that the *Idea* of *Liberty*, is the *Idea* of a Power in any Agent, to do or forbear any action according to the determination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the power of the Agent to be produced by him, according to his Volition, there he is not at Liberty: that Agent is under *Neceſſity*. So that *Liberty* cannot be where there is no *Thought*, no *Volition*, no *Will*: but there may be Thought, there may be Will, there may be Volition, where there is no *Liberty*. Thus a *Tennis-ball*, whether in motion by the ſtroke of a Racket, or lying ſtill at Reſt, is not by any one taken to be a Free Agent; becauſe we conceive not a Tennis-ball to think, and conſequently not to have any Volition or Preference of motion to Reſt, or *vice verſâ*. So a Man ſtriking himſelf or his Friend by a convulſive motion of his Arm, which it is not in his power by Volition or the direction of his Mind, to ſtop or forbear; no body thinks he has in this *Liberty*,

berty, every one pities him as acting by *Neceſſity*, and *Conſtraint*. Again, ſuppoſe a Man be carried whilſt faſt aſleep into a room where is a Perſon he longs to ſee, and be there locked faſt in beyond his power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to ſee himſelf in ſo deſirable company, which he ſtays willingly in; that is, prefers his ſtaying to going away. Is not this ſtay voluntary? I think no body will doubt it, and yet being locked faſt in, he is not at liberty to ſtay, he has not freedom to be gone. So that *Liberty* is not an *Idea* belonging to Volition or Preferring; but to the Perſon having the Power of doing or forbearing to do, according as the Mind ſhall chuſe or direct.

As it is in the motions of the Body, ſo it is in the thoughts of our Minds: where any one is ſuch, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by according to the preference of the Mind, there we are at liberty. A waking Man is not at liberty to think or not to think, no more than he is at liberty, whether his Body, ſhall touch any other or no: but whether he will remove his contemplation from one *Idea* to another, is many

times in his choice. And then he is in reſpect of his *Ideas*, as much at liberty as he is in reſpect of Bodies he reſts on. He can at pleaſure remove himſelf from one to another: But yet ſome *Ideas* to the Mind, like ſome motions to the Body are ſuch, as in certain circumſtances it cannot avoid nor obtain their abſence by their utmoſt effort it can uſe. Thus a Man on the Rack, is not at liberty to lay by the *Idea* of *Pain*, and entertain other contemplations.

Wherever Thought is wholly wanting, or the power to act or forbear, according to the direction of Thought, there neceſſity takes place. This in an Agent capable of Volition, when the beginning or continuation of any action is contrary to the preference of his Mind, is called *Compulſion*: when the hindring or ſtopping any action is contrary to his Volition, it is called *Reſtraint*. Agents that have no Thought, no Volition at all, are in every thing neceſſary Agents.

And thus I have in a ſhort draught given a view of our *Original Ideas*, from whence all the reſt are derived, and of which they are made up. And which may be all reduc'd to theſe few primary and

and original ones, *viz. Extention, Solidity,* and *Mobility* which by our Senſes we receive from Body: *Thinking*, and the *power of moving*, which by reflection we receive from our Minds. *Exiſtence, Duration, Number* which belong both to the one, and to the other. By theſe I imagine might be explained the nature of *Colours, Sounds, Taſts Smells,* and all other *Ideas* we have; if we had but Faculties acute enough to perceive the ſeveral modified Extenſions and Motions of theſe minute Bodies which produce thoſe ſeveral Senſations in us.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Mixed Modes.

Mixed Modes are combinations of Simple *Ideas* of different kinds, (whereby they are diſtinguiſhed from ſimple Modes, which conſiſt only of ſimple *Ideas* of the ſame kind, put together by the Mind) as *Virtue, Vice*, a *Lie*, &c. The Mind being once furniſhed with Simple *Ideas* can put them together in ſe-

veral compoſitions, without examining whether they exiſt ſo together in Nature: To form ſuch *Ideas* it ſuffices, if they are conſiſtent: There are three ways whereby we get theſe complex *Ideas* of *Mixed Modes*.

Firſt, by *Experience* and obſervation of things themſelves: thus by ſeeing two Men wreſtle, we get the *Idea* of Wreſtling.

Secondly, by *Invention* or voluntary putting together of ſeveral ſimple *Ideas* in our own Minds; ſo he that firſt invented *Printing*, had an *Idea* of it firſt in his Mind, before it ever exiſted.

Thirdly, by *Explaining* the names of actions we never ſaw, or notions we cannot ſee; and by enumerating all thoſe *Ideas* which go to the making them up. Thus the mixed Mode which the word *Lie* ſtands for, is made up of theſe Simple *Ideas*: Firſt, *Articulate Sounds*. Secondly, *Certain* Ideas *in the mind of the Speaker*. Thirdly, *Words, the ſigns of theſe Ideas*. Fourthly, *Thoſe ſigns put together* by Affirmation or Negation, otherwiſe than the *Ideas* they ſtand for, are in the mind of the Speaker. Since Languages are made, *complex Ideas* are uſually got by

by the explication of thoſe terms that ſtand for them, for ſince they conſiſt of Simple *Ideas* combined, they may by words ſtanding for thoſe Simple *Ideas* be repreſented to the Mind of one who underſtands thoſe words, thô that combination of Simple *Ideas* was never offer'd to his Mind by the real exiſtence of things.

Mixed Modes have their *Unity* from an act of the Mind, combining thoſe ſeveral Simple *Ideas* together, and conſidering them as one Complex one: The *mark* of this Union, is one *name* given to that Combination. Men ſeldom reckon any number of *Ideas* to make one complex one: but ſuch collections as there be Names for. Thus the *Killing of an old Man*, is as fit to be united into one *Complex Idea*, as that of *a Father*: yet there being no name for it, it is not taken for a particular Complex *Idea*; nor a diſtinct ſpecies of action, from that of killing any other Man.

Thoſe collections of *Ideas* have names generally affixed, which are of frequent uſe in converſation: in which caſes Men endeavour to communicate their thoughts to one another with all poſſible diſpatch. Thoſe others which they have ſeldom occaſion to mention, they tie not together, nor give them names. This

This gives the reaſon, why there are words in every Language, which cannot be rendred by any one ſingle word of another. For the Faſhions and Cuſtoms of one Nation, make ſeveral combinations of *Ideas* familiar in one, which another had never any occaſion to make. Such were, Ὁσεχτισμὸς among the *Greeeks*, *Proſcriptio* among the *Romans*. This alſo occaſions the *conſtant change* of Languages; becauſe the change of Cuſtom and Opinions, brings with it new combinations of *Ideas*, which, to avoid long deſcriptions, have new Names annexed to them, and ſo they become *new Species* of Complex Modes.

Of all our Simple *Ideas*, thoſe that have had moſt *Mixed Modes* made out of them are *Thinking*; and *Motion*; (which comprehend in them all *Action*) and *Power*, from whence theſe Actions are conceived to flow. For Actions being the great buſineſs of Mankind, it is no wonder if the ſeveral Modes of Thinking, and Motion ſhould be taken notice of, the *Ideas* of them obſerved, and laid up in Memory, and have Names aſſigned them. For without ſuch *Complex Ideas* with Names to them, Men could not eaſily

eaſily hold any communication about them. Of this kind are the Modes of Actions diſtinguiſhed by their *Cauſes*, *Means*, *Objects*, *Ends*, *Inſtruments*, *Time*, *Place*, and other Circumſtances; as alſo of the Powers, fitted for thoſe Actions: Thus *Boldneſs* is the Power to do or Speak what we intend without Fear or Diſorder: which Power of doing any thing, when it has been acquired by the frequent doing the ſame thing, is that *Idea* we call *Habit*: when forward and ready upon every occaſion to break into Action, we call it *Diſpoſitions*. Thus *Teſtineſs*, is a diſpoſition or aptneſs to be Angry.

Power being the ſource of all Action, the Subſtances wherein theſe Powers are, whenthey exert this Power, are called *Cauſes*: and the ſubſtances thereupon produced, or the Simple *Ideas* introduced into any ſubject, *Effects*. The Efficacy whereby the new Subſtance or *Idea* is produced, is called, in the Subject Exerting that Power, *Action*; in the Subject wherein any Simple *Idea* is changed, or produced, *Paſſion*: which Efficacy in *intellectual Agents*, we can I think, conceive to be nothing elſe but Modes of Thinking and Willing: In *corporeal Agents*, nothing elſe

elſe but modifications of Motion: Whatever ſort of Action, beſides theſe produces any effect; I confeſs my ſelf to have no Notion, or *Idea* of. And therefore many words which ſeem to expreſs ſome Action, ſignify nothing of the Action, but barely the Effect, with ſome circumſtances of the Subject wrought on, or cauſe operating. Thus *Creation*, *Annihilation*, contain in them no *Idea* of the action or manner, whereby they are produced, but barely of the Cauſe, and the thing done. And when a Country-man ſays the Cold *freezes Water*, thô the word Freezing, ſeem to import ſome Action, yet it truly ſignifies nothing but the effect, *viz.* That Water that was before *fluid*, is become *hard*, and *conſiſtent*, without containing any *Idea* of the Action whereby it is done.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of our Complex Ideas *or Subſtances.*

THE Mind obſerving ſeveral Simple *Ideas* to go conſtantly together, which being preſumed to belong to one thing, are called, when ſo united by one name; and by miſtake afterwards conſidered as one Simple *Idea*. We imagine not theſe Simple *Ideas* to ſubſiſt by themſelves, but ſuppoſe ſome *Subſtratum*, wherein they ſubſiſt, which we call *Subſtance*. The *Idea* of pure Subſtance is nothing but the ſuppos'd, but unknown Support of theſe Qualities, which are capable of producing Simple *Ideas* in us.

The *Ideas* of *particular Subſtances* are compoſed out of this obſcure, and general *Idea* of Subſtance, together with ſuch combinations of Simple *Ideas*, as are obſerved to exiſt together, and ſuppoſed to flow from the internal Conſtitution, and unknown Eſſence of that Subſtance. Thus we come by the *Ideas* of

Man,

Man, *Horſe*, *Gold*, &c. Thus the ſenſible qualities of *Iron*, or a *Diamond* make the Complex *Idea* of thoſe Subſtances, which a Smith or a Jeweller commonly knows better, than a Philoſopher.

The ſame happens concerning the Operations of the Mind *viz. Thinking*, *Reaſoning*, &c. which we concluding not to ſubſiſt by themſelves, nor apprehending how they can belong to Body, or be produced by it; we think them the Actions of ſome other Subſtance, which we call *Spirit*: of whoſe Subſtance or Nature we have as clear a Notion as of that of Body; the one being but the ſuppoſed *Subſtratum* of the Simple *Idea*, we have from without; as the other of thoſe Operations which we experiment in our ſelves within: ſo that the *Ideas* of *Corporeal Subſtance* in matter, is as remote from our Conceptions as that of *Spiritual Subſtance*.

Hence we may conclude that he has the perfecteſt *Idea* of any particular Subſtance, who has collected moſt of thoſe Simple *Ideas* which do exiſt in it: among which we are to reckon its *Active Powers*, and *Paſſive Capacities*. Tho' not ſtrictly *Simple Ideas*.

Secondary

Secondary Qualities for the moſt part ſerve, to diſtinguiſh Subſtances. For our Senſes fail us in the diſcovery of the *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Texture*, &c. of the minute parts of Bodies on which their real Conſtitutions, and Differences depend: and Secondary Qualities are nothing, but Powers with relation to our Senſes. The *Ideas* that make our Complex ones of Corporeal Subſtances, are of Three ſorts. *Firſt*, The *Ideas* of Primary Qualities of Things, which are diſcovered by our Senſes: Such are *Bulk*, *Figure*, *Motion*, &c. *Secondly*, the Senſible ſecondary Qualities, which are nothing but Powers to produce ſeveral *Ideas* in us by our Senſes. *Thirdly*, The aptneſs we conſider in any Subſtance to cauſe, or receive ſuch alterations of Primary Qualities, as that the Subſtance ſo altered, ſhould produce in us different *Ideas*, from what it did before: And they are called *Active* and *Paſſive Powers*. All which, as far as we have any notice, or notion of them, terminate in *Simple Ideas*.

Had we Senſes acute enough to diſcern the minute Particles of Bodies, it is not to be doubted, but they would produce quite different *Ideas* in us; as we find

find in viewing things with *Microſcopes*. Such Bodies as to our naked Eyes are coloured and opaque, will through *Microſcopes* appear pellucid. *Bloud*, to the naked Eye appears all Red; but by a good *Microſcope* we ſee only ſome Red Globules ſwimming in a tranſparent Liquor.

The *Infinite wiſe Author* of our Beings has fitted our Organs, and Faculties to the conveniences of Life and the buſineſs we have to do here: We may by our Sences know and diſtinguiſh Things ſo far as to accommodate them to the Exigencies of this Life. We have alſo Inſight enough into their admirable contrivances, and wonderful Effects to admire, and magnify the Wiſdom, Power, and Goodneſs of their Author. Such a Knowledge as this which is ſuited to our preſent condition, we want not Faculties to attain; and we are fitted well enough with Abilities to provide for the conveniencies of living.

Beſides the Complex *Ideas* we have of material Subſtances; by the ſimple *Ideas* taken from the operations of our own Minds, which we experiment in our ſelves, as *Thinking*, *Underſtanding*, *Willing*, *Knowing*,

ing, &c. coexiſting in the ſame Subſtance, we are able to frame the Complex *Idea* of a *Spirit*. And this *Idea* of an *Immaterial Subſtance*, is as clear as that we have of a *Material*. By joyning theſe with Subſtance, of which we have no diſtinct *Idea*, we have the *Idea* of a *Spirit*: and by putting together the *Ideas* of coherent, ſolid Parts, and Power of being moved, joyned with ſubſtance, of which likewiſe we have no poſitive *Idea*, we have the *Idea* of *Matter*. The one is ſo clear and diſtinct as the other. The ſubſtance of *Spirit* is unknown to us; and ſo is the ſubſtance of *Body* equally unknown to us: Two primary Qualities or Properties of Body, *viz. Solid coherent Parts*, and *Impulſe*, we have diſtinct clear *Ideas* of: So likewiſe have we, of two primary Qualities or Properties of Spirit, *Thinking*, and a *power of Action*. We have alſo clear and diſtinct *Ideas* of ſeveral Qualities inherent in Bodies, which are but the various Modifications of the Extenſion of cohering ſolid Parts, and their Motion. We have likewiſe the *Ideas* of the ſeveral modes of Thinking, *viz.* Believing, Doubting, Hoping, Fearing, *&c.* As alſo of Willing and

Moving the Body conſequent to it.

If this motion of Spirit may have ſome difficulties in it, not eaſie to be explained, we have no more reaſon to deny or doubt of the *exiſtence of Spirits*, than we have, to deny or doubt of the *exiſtence of Body*: becauſe the notion of Body is cumbred with ſome difficulties very hard, and perhaps impoſſible to be explained. The *Diviſibility in infinitum*, for inſtance, of any finite Extenſion involves us, whether we grant or deny it in conſequences impoſſible to be explicated, or made conſiſtent. We have therefore as much reaſon to be ſatisfied with our notion of *Spirit*, as with our notion of *Body*; and the exiſtence of the one, as well as the other. We have no other *Idea* of the *Supream Being*, but a Complex one of *Exiſtence*, *Power*, *Knowledge*, *Duration*, *Pleaſure*, *Happineſs*, and of ſeveral other Qualities, and Powers which it is better to have than be without, with the addition of *Infinite* to each of theſe.

In which Complex *Idea* we may obſerve that there is no Simple one, bating *Infinity*, which is not alſo a part of our Complex *Idea* of other Spirits: becauſe in our *Ideas*, as well of Spirits as other things,

things, we are reſtrained to thoſe we receive from *Senſation* and *Reflection*.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of Collective Ideas *of Subſtances.*

THere are other *Ideas* of Subſtances which may be call'd *Collective*, which are made up of many particular Subſtances conſidered as united into one *Idea*, as a *Troop*, *Army*, &c. which the Mind makes by its power of Compoſition. Theſe *Collective* Ideas, are but the artificial Draughts of the Mind bringing things remote, and independent into one view, the better to contemplate and diſcourſe of them united into one Conception, and ſignified by one name. For there are no things ſo remote, which the Mind cannot by this Art of Compoſition, bring into one *Idea* as is viſible in that ſignified by the name, *Univerſe*.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Relation.

THere is another Sort of *Ideas* which the Mind gets from the *comparing of one thing with another.* When the Mind ſo conſiders one thing, that it does as it were bring it to, and ſet it by another, and carry its view from one to the other, this is *Relation* or *Reſpect*: and the denominations given to things intimating that Reſpect, are what we call *Relatives.* And the things ſo brought together *Related.* Thus when I call *Cajus, Husband,* or *Whiter,* I intimate ſome other Perſon, or Thing in both caſes, with which I compare him. Any of our *Ideas* may be the foundation of Relation.

Where Languages have failed to give correlative Names, there the Relation is not ſo eaſily taken notice of: As in *Concubine,* which is a Relative name, as well as *Wife.*

The *Ideas* of Relation may be the ſame, in thoſe Men who have far different *Ideas* of

of the things that are Related. Thus thoſe who have different *Ideas*, of *Man*; may agree in that of a *Father*.

There is no *Idea* of any kind, which is not capable of an almoſt infinite number of Conſiderations, in reference to other things: and therefore this makes no ſmall part of Men's Words, and Thoughts. Thus one ſingle Man, may at once ſuſtain the Relations of *Father*, *Brother*, *Son*, *Husband*, *Friend*, *Subject*, *General*, *European*, *Engliſhman*, *Iſlander*, *Maſter*, *Servant*, *Bigger*, *Leſs*, &c. to an almoſt infinite number; he being capable of as many Relations, as there can be occaſions of comparing him to other things in any manner of Agreement, Diſagreement, or Reſpect whatſoever.

The *Ideas* of Relations are much *clearer* and more *diſtinct*, than of the Things related; becauſe the Knowledge of one Simple *Idea*, is oftentimes ſufficient to give me the notion of a Relation: but to the knowing of any ſubſtantial Being, an accurate collection of ſundry *Ideas* is neceſſary.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Cauſe and Effect and other Relations.

THE *Ideas* of *Cauſe* and *Effect*, we get from our obſervation of the *viciſſitude of Things*, while we perceive ſome Qualities or Subſtances begin to exiſt, and that they receive their exiſtence from the due application and operation of other Beings: that which *produces*, is the *Cauſe*; that which is *produced*, the *Effect*. Thus *Fluidity* in Wax is the Effect of a certain degree of Heat, which we obſerve to be conſtantly produced by the application of ſuch Heat.

We diſtinguiſh the Originals of things into two ſorts.

Firſt When the thing is wholly made new, ſo that no part thereof did ever exiſt before, as when a new Particle of Matter, doth begin to exiſt which had before no Being; 'tis called *Creation*.

Secondly, When a thing is made up of Particles

Particles which did all of them before exiſt, but the thing ſo conſtituted of pre-exiſting Particles, which altogether make up ſuch a collection of ſimple *Ideas*, had not any Exiſtence before, as this *Man*, this *Egg*, this *Roſe*, &c. when produced in the ordinary courſe of Nature, by an Internal Principle, but ſet on work by ſome External Agent, and working by inſenſible ways which we perceive not; 'tis called *Generation*.

When the Cauſe is Extrinſical, and the Effect introduced by a ſenſible Separation or Juxta-poſition of diſcernible Parts, we call it *Making*; and ſuch are all Artificial Things. When any ſimple *Idea* is produced, which was not in that Subject before, we call it *Alteration*.

The Denominations of Things taken from *Time*, are for the moſt part only Relations. Thus when it is ſaid that Queen *Elizabeth* lived Sixty nine, and Reigned Forty five Years, no more is meant, than, that the duration of her Exiſtence, was equal to Sixty nine, and of her Government to Forty five Annual Revolutions of the Sun: and ſo are all words anſwering, *How long*.

Young and *Old*, and other words of Time, that are thought to ſtand for poſitive *Ideas*, are indeed Relative; and intimate a Relation to a certain length of Duration, whereof we have the *Idea* in our Minds. Thus we call a Man Young, or Old, that has lived little or much of that time that Men uſually attain to. This is evident from our application of theſe Names to other things; for a *Man* is called Young at Twenty, but a *Horſe* Old, *&c.* The Sun and Stars we call not Old at all, Becauſe we know not what period God has ſet to that ſort of Beings.

There are other *Ideas*, that are truly *Relative*, which we ſignify by names that are thought *Poſitive* and *Abſolute*; ſuch as *Great* and *Little*, *Strong* and *Weak*. The things thus denominated are referred to ſome Standards with which we compare them. Thus we call an *Apple Great*, that is bigger than the ordinary ſort of thoſe we have been uſed to. And a Man *Weak*, that has not ſo much Strength or Power to move as Men uſually have, or thoſe of his own ſize.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Identity and Diverſity.

ANother occaſion the Mind takes of comparing, is the very *Being of Things*: when conſidering a Thing as exiſting at any certain time, or place, and comparing it with it ſelf as exiſting at any other time, *&c.* we form the *Ideas* of *Identity*, and *Diverſity*. When we ſee any thing in any certain time and place, we are ſure, it is that very thing; and can be no other how like ſoever it may be in all other Reſpects.

We conceiving it impoſſible, that two Things of the ſame kind ſhould exiſt together in the ſame place, we conclude that whatever exiſts any where at the ſame time, excludes all of the ſame kind, and is there it ſelf alone. When therefore we demand whether any thing be the *ſame*, or no, it refers always to ſomething that exiſted ſuch a time, in ſuch a place, which it was certain at that inſtant was the ſame with it ſelf, and no other.

We have *Ideas* of Three ſorts of Subſtances, Firſt, *God*: Secondly, *Finite Intelligence*: Thirdly, *Bodies*. *Firſt*,

First, God being Eternal, Unalterable, and every where concerning his *Identity*, there can be no doubt.

Secondly, Finite Spirits having had their determinate time and place of beginning to exist, the Relation to that time and place will always determine to each its *Identity*, as long as it exists.

Thirdly, The same will hold of every Particle of Matter to which no Addition or Subtraction is made. These three exclude not one another out of the same place, yet each exclude those of the same kind, out of the same place.

The Identity and Diversity of *Modes* and *Relations* are determined after the same manner, that Substances are: only the actions of Finite Beings, as *Motion* and *Thought*, consisting in Succession, they they cannot exist in different times, and places as permanent Beings: For no Motion or Thought consi dered as at different times can be the same, each part thereof having a different beginning of Existence.

From whence it is plain, that Existence it self is the *Principium Individuationis*, which determins a Being to a particular time, and place incommunicable

to

to two Beings of the ſame kind. Thus, ſuppoſe an *Atom* exiſting in a determin'd time, and place; it is evident that conſidered in any inſtant, it is the ſame with it ſelf, and will be ſo, as long as its exſtence continues. The ſame may be ſaid of Two, or more, or any number of Particles, whilſt they continue together. The *Maſs* will be the ſame however jumbled, but if one Atom be taken away, it is not the ſame Maſs.

In *Vegetables*, the Identity depends not on the ſame Maſs, and is not applied to the ſame thing. The reaſon of this is the difference between an animate Body, and maſs of Matter; *This* being only the Coheſion of Particles any how united. *The other*, ſuch a diſpoſition and organization of Parts, as is fit to receive and diſtribute nouriſhment. So as to continue and frame the Wood, Bark, Leaves, *&c.* of an *Oak*, for inſtance, in which conſiſts the vegetable Life. That therefore which has ſuch an Organization of Parts partaking of one common life, continues to be the ſame *Plant*, thô that life be communicated to new Particles of Matter vitally united to the living Plant. The caſe is not ſo much different in

Brutes,

Brutes, but that any one may hence ſee what makes an *Animal*, and continues it the *ſame*.

The Identity of the *ſame Man* likewiſe conſiſts in a participation of the ſame continued life, in ſucceeding Particles of Matter vitally united to the ſame organized Body.

To underſtand *Identity* aright, we muſt conſider what *Idea* the word it is applied to, ſtands for. It being one thing to be the *ſame Subſtance*, another the *ſame Man*, and a Third the *ſame Perſon*.

An *Animal*, is a living organized Body and the ſame Animal, is the ſame continued life communicated to different particles of Matter, united to that organized, living Body; our notion of *Man*, is but of a particular ſort of Animal: Should we ſee a Creature of our own ſhape, thô it had no more reaſon than a *Parret*, we ſhould call it a Man: or ſhould we hear a Parret diſcourſe rationally, we ſhould hardly call, or think it any thing but a Parret.

Perſon ſtands for an Intelligent Being, that reaſons and reflects, and can conſider it ſelf the ſame thing in different Times and Places; which it doth by that *Conſci-*

conſciouſneſs that is inſeparable from Thinking. By this every one is to himſelf what he calls *Self*, without conſidering whether that *Self* be continued in the ſame, or divers ſubſtances. In this conſiſts *Perſonal Identity*, or the Sameneſs of a Rational Being: and ſo far as this Conſciouſneſs extends backward to any paſt Action, or Thought, ſo far reaches the Identity of that Perſon. It is the ſame *Self* now, it was then; And it is by the ſame *Self*, with this preſent one, that now reflects on it, that that action was done.

Self is that conſcious thinking Thing, whatever ſubſtance it matters not, which is conſcious of Pleaſure or Pain, capable of Happineſs or Miſery; and ſo is concerned for it ſelf, as far as that conſciouſneſs extends. That with which the conſciouſneſs of this preſent thinking Thing, can joyn it ſelf, makes the ſame Perſon, and is one Self with it; and ſo attributes to its Self, and owns all the actions of that thing, as its own, as far as that conſciouſneſs reaches.

This *Perſonal Identity*, is the object of Reward and Puniſhment, being that by which every one is concerned for himſelf. If the *Conſciouſneſs* went along with the

the little Finger, when that was cut off it would be the ſame Self, that was juſt before concerned for the whole Body.

If the ſame *Socrates*, waking and ſleeping, did not partake of the ſame conſciouſneſs, they would not be the ſame *Perſon*: A *Socrates* waking, could not be in juſtice accountable for what *Socrates* ſleeping did, no more than one *Twin*, for what his Brother Twin did, becauſe their outſides were ſo like, that they could not be diſtinguiſhed.

But ſuppoſe I wholly loſe the memory of ſome parts of my Life, beyond a poſſibility of retrieving them; So that I ſhall never be conſcious of them again: Am I not again the *ſame Perſon* that did thoſe actions, tho I have now forgot them? I Anſwer, that we muſt here take notice what the word *I* is applied to, which in this caſe is the Man only: And the ſame Man being preſumed to be the ſame Perſon, I is eaſily here ſuppos'd to ſtand alſo for the ſame Perſon. But if it be poſſible for the ſame Man, to have diſtinct incommunicable conſciouſneſs at different times, it is paſt doubt the ſame Man would, at different times, make different Perſons. Which we ſee is the ſenſe of Man-

Mankind in the ſolemneſt Declaration of their Opinions, Human Laws not puniſhing the Madman, for the ſober Man's Actions, nor the ſober Man, for what the Madman did; thereby making them two Perſons. Thus we ſay in *Engliſh*, ſuch a one *is not himſelf*, or is *beſides himſelf*, in which Phraſes it is inſinuated, that *Self* is changed, and the *Self ſame Perſon* is no longer in that Man.

But is not a Man Drunk or Sober the ſame Perſon? Why elſe is he puniſhed for the ſame Fact he commits when Drunk, thô he be never afterwards conſcious of it? Juſt as much the ſame Perſon, as a Man that walks, and does other things in his Sleep, is the ſame Perſon: and is as anſwerable for any miſchief he ſhall do in it. Human Laws puniſh both, with a Juſtice ſuitable to their way of Knowledge: Becauſe in theſe caſes, they cannot diſtinguiſh certainly what is real, and what is counterfeit: And ſo the ignorance in Drunkenneſs or Sleep is not admitted as a Plea. For thô puniſhment be annexed to Perſonality, and Perſonality to Conſciouſneſs; and the Drunkard perhaps is not conſcious of what he did: yet Human Judicatures juſtly puniſh him

him, because the Fact is proved against; but want of consciousness cannot be proved for him. But in the great day wherein the *secrets of all hearts shall be laid open*, it may be reasonable to think no one should be made to answer, for what he knows nothing of; but shall receive his doom, his *own Conscience accusing*, or else *excusing him*.

To conclude, whatever substance begins to exist, it must during its existence be the same: whatever compositions of Substances begin to exist, during the union of those Substances, the concrete must be the same. Whatsoever Mode begins to exist, during its existence it is the same: And so if the composition be of distinct Substances, and different Modes, the same Rule holds. Whence it appears that the difficulty or obscurity that has been about this matter, rather arises from the *names ill used*, than from any *obscurity in the things* themselves. For whatever makes the specifick *Idea*, to which the name is applied, if that *Idea* be steadily kept to, the distinction of any thing into the *same*, and *divers*, will easily be conceived, and there can arise no doubt concerning it.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of other Relations.

ALL Simple *Ideas*, wherein are Parts or Degrees, afford an occaſion of comparing the Subjects wherein they are to one another in reſpect of thoſe Simple *Ideas*. As *Whiter*, *Sweeter*, *More*, *Leſs*, &c. Theſe depending on the equality, and exceſs of the ſame ſimple *Idea*, in ſeveral Subjects may be called, *Proportional Relations*.

Another occaſion of comparing things is taken from the circumſtances of their Origine, as *Father*, *Son*, *Brother*, &c. Theſe may be called *Natural Relations*.

Sometimes the foundation of conſi. dering things, is ſome act whereby any one comes by a Moral Right, Power, or Obligation to do ſomething: ſuch are *General*, *Captain*, *Burgher*; theſe are *Inſtituted*, and *Voluntary Relations*, and may be diſtinguiſhed from the *Natural*, in that they are alterable and ſeparable from the Perſons to whom they ſometimes belong-

ed, thô neither of the Subſtances ſo Related be deſtroyed. But Natural Relations are not alterable, but are as laſting as their Subjects.

Another Relation is the conformity or diſagreement of Mens voluntary Actions to a Rule to which they are referred, and by which they are judged of: Theſe may be called *Moral Relations.* It is this Conformity or Diſagreement of our actions to ſome Law (whereby Good or Evil is drawn on us from the Will and Power of the Law-maker, and is what we call *Reward* or *Puniſhment*) that renders our Actions Morally Good, or Evil.

Of theſe Moral *Rules* or *Laws* there ſeem to be three ſorts with their different enforcements. *Firſt*, The *Divine Law.* Secondly, *Civil Law.* Thirdly, *The Law of Opinion* or *Reputation.* By their Relation to the Firſt, our Actions are either *Sins* or *Duties:* To the Second, *Criminal* or *Innocent*: to the Third *Vertues* or *Vices.*

1*ſt.* By the *Divine Law*, I mean that Law which God has ſet to the Actions of Men, whether promulgated to them by the light of Nature, or the voice of Revelation. That

That God has given a Law to Mankind, ſeems undeniable, ſince he has, *Firſt*, A Right to do it, we are his Creatures. *Secondly*, Goodneſs and Wiſdom to direct our Actions to what is beſt. *Thirdly*, Power to enforce it by Reward, and Puniſhment of infinite Weight, and Duration. This is the only true Touch-ſtone of Moral Rectitude, and by which Men judge of the moſt conſiderable Moral Good or Evil of their Actions: That is, Whether as Duties or Sins they are like to procure them Happineſs or Miſery from the Hands of the Almighty.

2ly. The *Civil Law*, is the Rule ſet by the Common-wealth, to the Actions of thoſe that belong to it. This Law no body over-looks; the Rewards and Puniſhments being ready at hand to enforce it, extending to the protecting or taking away of Life, Liberty, and Eſtate of thoſe who obſerve or diſobey it.

3ly. The Law of Opinion or Reputation. *Virtue* and *Vice* are Names ſuppoſed every where, to ſtand for Actions in their own Nature, Right and Wrong. As far as they are really ſo applied, they ſo far are co-incident with the Divine

Law. But it is visible that these Names in the particular instances of their application, through the several Nations and Societies of Men, are constantly attributed only to such Actions as in each Countrey and Society, are in Reputation or Discredit. So that the measure of what is every where called and esteemed Vertue and Vice, is the approbation or dislike, praise or blame, which by a tacit Consent establishes it self in the Societies and Tribes of Men in the World; whereby several Actions come to find Credit or Disgrace amongst them, according to the Judgment, Maxims or Fashions of the place.

That this is so, appears hence; That tho' that passes for Vertue in one place, which is elsewhere accounted Vice; yet every where *Vertue* and *Praise*, *Vice* and *Blame* go together; *Vertue* is every where that which is thought Praise-worthy: and nothing else but that which has the allowance of publick Esteem, is called *Vertue*. These have so close an Alliance, that they are often called by the same name.

'Tis

'Tis true, Vertue and Vice do in a great measure every where correspond with the unchangeable Rule of Right and Wrong, which the Laws of God have established; because the observation of these Laws visibly secures and advances the general Good of Mankind, and the neglect of them breeds Mischief and Confusion: and therefore Men without renouncing all Sense and Reason, and their own Interest, could not generally mistake in placing their commendation and blame on that side, that deserved it not.

They who think not Commendation and Disgrace sufficient motives to engage Men to accommodate themselves to the Opinions and Rules of those with whom they converse, seem little skill'd in the History of Mankind. The greatest part whereof govern themselves chiefly by this *Law of Fashion.*

The penalties that attend the breach of God's Laws are seldom seriously reflected on, and those that do reflect on them, entertain Thoughts of future reconciliation. And for the punishment due from the Laws of the Commonwealth, Men flatter themselves with the

hopes of Impunity: But no Man escapes Censure and Dislike who offends against Fashion; nor is there one of ten thousand stiff and insensible enough, to bear up under the constant dislike and condemnation of his own Club.

Morality then is nothing but a Relation to these Laws or Rules; And these Rules being nothing but a collection of several simple *Ideas*; The conformity thereto is but so ordering the Action, that the Simple *Ideas* belonging to it, may correspond to those which the Law requires. By which we see how Moral Beings, and Notions are founded on, and terminated in the Simple *Ideas* of Sensation and Reflection. For example, Let us consider the Complex *Idea* signified by the word *Murder*. First from Reflection, we have the *Ideas* of *Willing*, *Considering*, *Purposing*, *Malice*, &c. Also of *Life*, *Perception*, and *Self-motion*. Secondly from Sensation, we have the *Ideas* of *Man*, and of some Action whereby we put an end to that Perception, and Motion in the Man, all which Simple *Ideas*, are comprehended in the word *Murder*.

This

This collection of Simple *Ideas* being found to agree or disagree with the esteem of the Country I have been bred in, and to be held worthy of praise or blame, I call the Action *Vertuous*, or *Vicious*. If I have the Will of a Supreme Invisible, Law-maker for my Rule, then, as I suppose the Action commanded or forbidden by *God*, I call it Good or Evil, *Sin* or *Duty*: If I compare it with the Civil-Law of my Country, I call it *Lawful or Unlawful*, a Crime or no Crime.

Moral Actions may be considered Two ways,

First, as they are in themselves a collection of Simple *Ideas*, in which Sense they are positive absolute *Ideas*.

Secondly, As *Good*, or *Bad*, or *Indifferent*: in this respect they are *Relative*, it being their conformity or disagreement with some Rule, that makes them be so. We ought carefully to distinguish between the positive *Idea* of the Action, and the reference it has to a Rule: both which are commonly comprehended under one name, which often occasions confusion, and misleads the Judgment.

It would be infinite to go over all sorts of Relations; I have here mention-

ed ſome of the moſt conſiderable, and ſuch as may ſerve to let us ſee from whence we get our *Ideas* of Relations, and wherein they are founded.

CHAP. XXIX.

Of clear obſcure, diſtinct and confuſed Ideas.

HAving ſhewn the Original of our *Ideas*, and taken a view of their ſeveral ſorts: I ſhall offer ſome few other Conſiderations concerning them. The Firſt, is that ſome are *clear*, others *obſcure*: ſome *diſtinct*, and others *confuſed*.

Our Simple *Ideas* are clear, when they are ſuch as the Objects themſelves from whence they were taken, did in a well-ordered Senſation or Perception preſent them. Whilſt the Memory retains them thus, and can produce them ſo to the Mind when it has occaſion to conſider them, they are clear *Ideas*.

Our *Complex Ideas* are *clear* when the *Ideas* that go to their Compoſition are clear: and the Number and Order of thoſe

thoſe Simple *Ideas*, that are their Ingredients, is determinate and certain.

The cauſe of *Obſcurity in Simple* Ideas ſeems to be either dull Organs, or ſlight Impreſſions made by the Objects, or a weakneſs in the Memory, not able to retain them as received.

A *diſtinct Idea* is that wherein the Mind perceives a difference from all other: And a *Confuſed*, is ſuch an one as is not ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from another from which it ought to be different. Obſcurity is oppoſed to Clearneſs. Confuſion to Diſtinctneſs.

Confuſion is occaſioned chiefly by the following defaults.

Firſt, When any *Complex Idea* (for it is *Complex Ideas* that are moſt liable to Confuſion) is made up of too ſmall a number of Simple *Ideas*, and ſuch as are common to other things: Whereby the differences that make it deſerve a different name, are left out. Thus an *Idea* of a *Leopard* being conceived only as a ſpotted Beaſt, is Confuſed; it not being thereby ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed from a *Panther*, and other ſorts of Beaſts that are ſpotted.

Secondly,

Secondly, When the *Ideas* are ſo jumbled together in the Complex one, that it is not eaſily diſcernible, whether it more belongs to the name given it, than to any other. We may conceive this Confuſion by a ſort of Pictures, uſually ſhewn, wherein the Colours mark out very odd and unuſual Figures, and have no diſcernible Order in their poſition. This, when ſaid to be the Picture of a *Man* or *Cæſar*, we reckon Confuſed, becauſe it is not diſcernible in that State, to belong more to the name *Man* or *Cæſar*, than to the name *Baboon* or *Pompey*. But when a Cylindrical Mirrour rightly placed, hath reduced thoſe irregular Lines on the Table, into their due Order and Proportion, then the Eye preſently ſees that it is a *Man*, or *Cæſar*: that is, that it belongs to thoſe Names, and is ſufficiently diſtinguiſhable from a *Baboon* or *Pompey*; that is, from the *Ideas* ſignified by thoſe Names.

Thirdly, When any one of our *Ideas* ſignified by a Name is uncertain and undetermined. Thus he that puts in, or leaves out an *Idea* out of his Complex one of *Church* or *Idolatry*, every time that he thinks of either, and holds not

ſteady

ſteady to any one preciſe combination of *Ideas*, that makes it up, is ſaid to have a confuſed *Idea* of *Church* or *Idolatry*. Confuſion always concerns Two *Ideas*, and thoſe moſt which moſt approach one another. To avoid Confuſion therefore we ought to examine what other it is in danger to be confounded with, or which it cannot eaſily be ſeparated from; and that will be found an *Idea* belonging to another Name, and ſo ſhould be a different thing, from which yet it is not ſufficiently diſtinct, and ſo keeps not that difference from that other *Idea* which the different Name imports.

It is to be obſerved that our *Complex Ideas* may be very clear and diſtinct in one part, and very obſcure and confuſed in another. Thus in *Chiliaedrum*, or Body of a *thouſand Sides*, the *Idea* of the Figure may be confuſed, tho' that of the Number be very diſtinct: We can diſcourſe and demonſtrate concerning that part of this Complex *Idea* which depends on the Number Thouſand; thô it is plain we have no preciſe *Idea* of its Figure, ſo as to diſtinguiſh it by that from One that has but Nine hundred ninety nine Sides. The not obſerving this, cauſes

no

no ſmall error in Men's Thoughts, and confuſion in their Diſcourſes.

CHAP. XXX.

Of Real and Fantaſtical Ideas.

OUR *Ideas* in reference to things from whence they are taken, or which they may be ſuppoſed to repreſent, come under a *Threefold* Diſtinction, and are Firſt either *Real* or *Fantaſtical.* Secondly *Adequate* or *Inadequate.* Thirdly *True* or *Falſe.*

By *Real Ideas* I mean ſuch as have a Foundation in Nature; ſuch as have a conformity with the Real Being and Exiſtence of Things, or with their Archetypes.

Fantaſtical are ſuch as have no foundation in Nature, nor any conformity with that Reality of Being, to which they are referred as to their *Archetypes.* By examining the ſeveral ſorts of *Ideas* we ſhall find, that Firſt our *Simple Ideas* are all Real; not that they are Images or Repreſentations of what does exiſt, but as they are the certain Effects of Powers

Powers in things without us, Ordained by our Maker, to produce in us ſuch Senſations: They are Real *Ideas* in us, whereby we diſtinguiſh the Qualities that are really in things themſelves.

Their Reality lies in the ſteady Correſpondence they have with the diſtinct Conſtitutions of real Beings. But whether they anſwer to thoſe Conſtitutions as to *Cauſes* or *Patterns*, it matters not: it ſuffices that they are conſtantly produced by them.

Complex Ideas being arbitrary combinations of Simple *Ideas* put together, and united under one general Name, in forming of which the Mind uſes its liberty; we muſt enquire which of theſe are Real, and which Imaginary Combinations, and to this I ſay, that,

Firſt, Mixed Modes and Relations having no other Reality, than what they have in the Minds of Men; Nothing elſe is required to make them Real, but a poſſibility of Exiſting conformable to them. Theſe *Ideas* being themſelves *Archetypes*, cannot differ from their *Archetypes*, and ſo cannot be Chimerical; unleſs any one will jumble together in them inconſiſtent *Ideas*. Thoſe indeed that

that have Names assigned them in any Language, must have a conformity to the ordinary signification of the Name that is given them, that they may not be thought Fantastical.

Secondly, Our Complex *Ideas* of Substances being made, in reference to things existing without us, whose Representations they are thought, are no farther real, than as they are such combinations of Simple *Ideas*, as are really united, and co-exist in things without us. Those are Fantastical which are made up of several *Ideas*, that never were found united, as *Centaur*, &c.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Ideas *Adequate or Inadequate.*

REal *Ideas* are either 1. *Adequate*, which perfectly represents those Archetypes which the Mind supposes them taken from, and which it makes them to stand for. *Secondly*, *Inadequate*, *which* are such as do but partially or incompleatly represent those Archetypes to which

which they are referred: whence it appears.

First, that all our *Simple Ideas* are *Adequate*, for they being but the effects of certain Powers in things fitted and ordained by God, to produce ſuch Senſations in us; they cannot but be Correſpondent and Adequate to ſuch Powers, and we are ſure they agree to the reality of things.

Secondly, Our *Complex Ideas of Modes* being Voluntary collections of Simple *Ideas*, which the Mind puts together without reference to any real Archetypes, cannot but be *Adequate Ideas*. They are referred to no other Pattern, nor made by any Original, but the Good-liking and Will of him that makes the Combination. If indeed one would conform his *Idea*, to that which is formed by another Perſon, it may be Wrong or *Inadequate*, becauſe they agree not to that which the Mind deſigns to be their Archetype and Pattern. In which reſpect only, any *Ideas* of Modes can be Wrong, Imperfect or Inadequate.

Thirdly, Our *Ideas of Subſtances*, have in the Mind a double Reference: *Firſt*, They are ſometimes referred to a ſuppoſed

posed real Essence, of each species of Things. *Secondly*, They are designed for Representations in the mind of Things that do exist, by *Ideas* discoverable in them: in both which respects they are *Inadæquate*.

First, If the Names of Substances stand for Things, as supposed to have certain real Essences, whereby they are of this or that Species, (of which real Essences Men are wholly ignorant and know nothing) it plainly follows that the *Ideas* they have in their Minds, being referr'd to real Essences, as *Archetypes* which are unknown, they must be so far from being Adequate, that they cannot be supposed to be any Representation of them at all. Our Complex *Ideas* of Substances are, as has been shewn, nothing but certain collections of Simple *Ideas* that have been observed, or supposed constantly to Exist together. But, such a Complex *Idea* cannot be the real Essence of any Substance: For then the Properties we discover in it would be deducible from it, and their necessary connexion with it be known, as all the Properties of a *Triangle* depend on, and are deducible from the Complex *Idea* of *Three Lines*

including

including a Space: But it is certain that in our Complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, are not contained in ſuch *Ideas* on which all the other Qualities that are to be found in them depend.

Secondly, Thoſe that take their *Ideas* of Subſtances from their ſenſible Qualities, cannot form Adequate *Idæas* of them: becauſe their Qualities and Powers are ſo various, that no Man's Complex *Idæa* can contain them all. Moſt of our Simple *Idæas*, whereof our Complex ones of Subſtances do conſiſt, are Powers which being Relations to other Subſtances; we cannot be ſure we know all the Powers, till we have tryed what changes they are fitted to give and receive from other Subſtances, in their ſeveral ways of Application: which being impoſſible to be tryed upon one Body, much leſs upon All, It is impoſſible we ſhould have Adequate *Idæas* of any Subſtance, made of a collection of all its properties.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of True and False Ideas.

Truth and *Falſhood* in propriety of Speech belong only to Propoſitions; and when *Ideas* are termed *True* or *Falſe*, there is ſome ſecret or tacit Propoſition, which is the foundation of that Denomination. Our *Ideas* being nothing but *Appearances* or *Perceptions* in the Mind, can in ſtrictneſs of Speech no more be ſaid to be True or Falſe, than ſingle Names of Things. The *Idea* of *Centaur* has no more Falſhood in it, when it appears in our Minds, than the name *Centaur* when it is pronounced or writ on Paper. For Truth or Falſhood lying always in ſome Affirmation or Negation, our *Ideas* are not capable any of them, of being falſe, till the Mind paſſes ſome Judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies ſomething of them. In a *Metaphyſical* Senſe they may be ſaid to be true, that is, to be really ſuch as they exiſt; tho' in things called true, even in that Senſe,

Senſe, there is perhaps a ſecret reference to our *Ideas*, looked upon as the Standards of that Truth; which amounts to a *Mental Propoſition*.

When the Mind refers any of its *Ideas* to any thing extraneous to it, they are then capable of being True or Falſe: becauſe in ſuch a reference the Mind makes a tacit ſuppoſition of their conformity to that thing; which ſuppoſition, as it is True or Falſe, ſo the *Ideas* themſelves come to be denominated, This happens in theſe caſes:

Firſt, When the Mind ſuppoſes its *Idea*, conformable to that in other Mens Minds, called by the ſame name, ſuch as that of *Juſtice*, *Vertue*, &c.

Secondly, When the Mind ſuppoſes any *Idea* conformable to ſome real Exiſtence. Thus that of a *Man* is True, that of *Centaur* Falſe, the one having a conformity to what has really exiſted; the other not.

Thirdly, When the Mind refers any of its *Ideas* to that real Conſtitution, and Eſſence of any thing whereon all its Properties depend: and thus the greateſt part, if not all our *Ideas of Subſtances*, are falſe.

As to the *First*, When we judge of our *Ideas* by their conformity to those of other Men, they may be any of them False. But Simple *Ideas* are least liable to be so mistaken; we seldom mistake *Green* for *Blue*, or *Bitter* for *Sweet*; much less do we confound the Names belonging to different Senses, and call a *Colour* by the name of a *Taste*. Complex *Ideas* are much more liable to Falshood in this particular: and those of Mixed Modes more than Substances. Because in Substances their sensible Qualities serve for the most part to distinguish them clearly: But in Mixed Modes we are more uncertain, and we may call that *Justice*, which ought to be called by another name. The reason of this is, That the abstract *Ideas* of Mixed Modes, being Mens voluntary Combinations of such a precise collection of Simple *Ideas*, we have nothing else to refer our *Ideas* of Mixed Modes as Standards to; but the *Ideas* of those who are thought to use names in their proper significations: and so as our *Ideas* conform or differ from them, they pass for True or False.

As

As to the *Second*, When we refer our *Ideas* to the real Exiſtence of Things, none can be termed Falſe, but our Complex *Ideas* of Subſtances. For our Simple *Ideas* being nothing but Perceptions in us anſwerable to certain Powers in external Objects, their Truth conſiſts in nothing but ſuch appearances, as are produced in us ſuitable to thoſe Powers: Neither do they become liable to the imputation of Falſhood, whether we judge theſe *Ideas* to be in the Things themſelves, or no. For God having ſet them as Marks of diſtinguiſhing Things, that we may be able to diſcern one thing from another; and thereby chuſe them as we have occaſion: It alters not the nature of our Simple *Ideas*, whether we think the *Idea* of *Blue* (for inſtance) to be in the *Violet* it ſelf, or in the Mind only: And it is equally from that appearance to be denominated *Blue*, whether it be that real Colour, or only a peculiar Texture in it, that cauſes in us that *Idea*: Since the name *Blue* notes properly nothing but that mark of diſtinction, that is in a Violet, diſcernible only by our Eyes, whatever it conſiſts in.

Neither would our Simple *Ideas* be *False*, if by the different ſtructure of our Organs it were ſo ordered, that the ſame Object ſhould produce in ſeveral Mens Minds different *Ideas*. For this could never be known, ſince Objects would operate conſtantly after the ſame manner. It is moſt probable nevertheleſs, that the *Ideas* produced by Objects in different Mens Minds, are very near and undiſcernibly like. Names of Simple *Ideas* may be miſ-applied, as a Man ignorant in the *Engliſh* Tongue may call *Purple*, *Scarlet*: but this makes no Falſhood in the *Ideas*.

Complex *Ideas* of Modes, cannot be Falſe in reference to the Eſſence of any thing really Exiſting; Becauſe they have no reference to any pattern Exiſting, or made by Nature.

Our Complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, being all referr'd to patterns in Things themſelves, may be Falſe. They are ſo, *Firſt*, When looked upon as repreſentations of the unknown Eſſences of Things. *Secondly*, When they put together Simple *Ideas* which in the real Exiſtence of Things, have no Union: as in *Centaur*. *Thirdly*, When from any collection of

Simple

Simple *Ideas*, that do always Exiſt together, there is ſeparated by a direct Negation any one Simple *Idea*, which is conſtantly joyned with them. Thus, if from Extenſion, Solidity, Fixedneſs, Malleableneſs, Fuſibility, *&c.* we remove the Colour obſerved in *Gold*.

If this *Idea* be only left out of the Complex one of *Gold*, it is to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect, rather than a Falſe one: ſince, thô it contains not all the Simple *Ideas*, that are united in Nature: yet it puts none together, but what do really Exiſt together.

Upon the whole, I think that our *Ideas* as they are conſidered by the Mind, either in reference to the proper ſignification of their Names, or in reference to the reality of Things, may more properly be called *Right* or *Wrong Ideas*, according as they agree or diſagree to thoſe Patterns to which they are referred. The *Ideas* that are in Mens Minds ſimply conſidered, cannot be wrong, unleſs Complex *Ideas*, wherein inconſiſtent Parts are jumbled together. All other *Ideas* are in themſelves Right, and the Knowledge about them right, and true

Knowledge. But when we come to refer them to any Patterns, or Archetypes, then they are capable of being wrong, as far as they disagree with such Archetypes.

Having thus given an account of the *Original Sorts* and *Extent* of our *Ideas*, which are the materials of our *Knowledge*, before I proceed to shew what use the Understanding makes of them, and what Knowledge we have by them, I find it necessary, because of that close connexion between *Ideas*, and Words; and that constant Relation, which our Abstract *Ideas* and General Words have one with another, to consider, First, The *Nature*, *Use*, and *Signification* of *Language*, which therefore must be the business of the next Book.

BOOK

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of Words or Language in General.

GOD having deſign'd Man for a ſociable Creature, made him not only with an Inclination, and under a Neceſſity to have fellowſhip with thoſe of his own kind: But furniſhed him alſo with *Language*, which was to be the great Inſtrument and common Tye of Society. Man therefore had by Nature his Organs ſo faſhioned, as to be fit to frame *Articulate Sounds*, which we call Words.

But beſides Articulate Sounds (which Birds may be taught to imitate) it was further neceſſary that he ſhould be able to uſe *theſe Sounds* as Signs of *Internal Conceptions*, and make them ſtand as marks of

of the *Ideas* of his Mind, whereby they might be made known to others.

But neither is it enough for the perfection of Language, that Sounds can be made ſigns of *Ideas*, unleſs theſe can be made uſe of, ſo as to comprehend ſeveral particular things: for the multiplication of Words would have perplexed their uſe, had every particular thing need of a diſtinct name to be ſignified by. To remedy this inconvenience, Language had yet a farther improvement in the uſe of *General Terms*, whereby one Word was made to mark a multitude of particular Exiſtences, which advantageous uſe of Sounds was obtained only by the difference of the *Ideas* they were made Signs of. Thoſe Names becoming *general*, which are made to ſtand for *general Ideas*; and thoſe remaining *particular*, where the *Ideas* they are uſed for are *particular*. There are other Words which ſignify the *Want* or *Abſence* of *Ideas*, as *Ignorance*, *Barrenneſs*, &c. which relate to poſitive *Ideas*, and ſignify their Abſence.

It is obſervable that the Words which ſtand for Actions and Notions, quite removed from Senſe, are borrowed from ſenſible *Ideas*, *v. g.* to Imagine, Apprehend,

hend, Comprehend, Understand, Adhere, Conceive, Instill, Disgust, Disturbance, Tranquillity, *&c.* which are all taken from the Operations of Things sensible, and applied to *Modes of Thinking*. *Spirit* in its primary signification is no more than Breath; *Angel* a Messenger. By which we may guess what kind of Notions they were, and whence derived; which filled the Minds of the first Beginners of Languages, and how Nature, even in the naming of things unawares suggested to Men, the Originals of all their Knowledge: whilst to give names that might make known to others any operations they felt in themselves, or any other *Ideas*, that came not under their Senses, they were fain to borrow Words from the ordinary and known *Ideas* of *Sensation*.

The better to understand the *Use* and *Force* of Language, as subservient to Knowledge, it will be convenient to consider,

First, To what it is that *Names* in the use of Language are immediately applyed.

Secondly, Since all (except proper Names) are *General*, and so stand not for this or that single thing, but for *Sorts* and

and *Ranks*: it will be neceſſary to conſider what thoſe ſorts and kinds of Things are; wherein they conſiſt, and how they come to be made. This ſhall be conſidered in the following Chapters.

CHAP II.

Of the Signification of Words.

MAN, thô he have great variety of Thoughts, yet are they all within his own Breaſt, inviſible and hidden from others, nor can of themſelves be made to appear. It was neceſſary therefore, for the comfort and advantage of Society, that Man ſhould find out ſome *External Signs*, whereby thoſe inviſible *Ideas* might be made known to others. For which purpoſe nothing was ſo fit, either for Plenty or Quickneſs, as thoſe *Articulate Sounds* he found himſelf able to make. Hence *Words* came to be made uſe of by Men, as Signs of their *Ideas*: not upon the account of any *Natural* connexion between Articulate Sounds, and certain

Ideas

Ideas; for then there would be but one Language amongſt all Men: but by a voluntary Impoſition, whereby ſuch a Word is made *Arbitrarily* the mark of ſuch an *Idea*. The uſe then of Words, is to be ſenſible marks of our *Ideas*: and the *Ideas* they ſtand for, are their *proper* and *immediate Signification*. In which they ſtand for nothing more but the *Ideas* in the Mind of him that uſes them. For when a Man ſpeaks to another, it is that he may be underſtood; that is, That his *Sounds* may make known his *Ideas* to the Hearer.

Words being voluntary Signs cannot be impoſed on Things we know not: this would be to make them Signs of nothing, Sounds without Significations. A Man cannot make his Words the Signs either of *Qualities* in Things, or of *Conceptions* in the Mind of another, whereof he has none in his own.

Words in all Mens Mouths (that ſpeak with any meaning) ſtand for the *Ideas* which thoſe that uſe them have: and which they would expreſs by them. Thus a *Child* that takes notice of nothing more in the Mettal he hears called *Gold*, than the *Yellow Colour*, calls the ſame *Colour* in

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a Peacock's Tail *Gold*. Another, that hath better obſerved, adds to ſhining Yellow, great weight; and then the Sound Gold ſtands, when he uſes it, for a Complex *Idea* of a ſhining Yellow, and very weighty ſubſtance.

Thô Words ſignify properly nothing but the *Ideas* in Mens Minds, yet they are in their Thoughts ſecretly referred to *Two* other Things.

Firſt, They ſuppoſe their Words to be marks of *Ideas*, in the Minds of other Men with whom they communicate; elſe they could not diſcourſe intelligibly with one another: In this caſe Men ſtand not to examine whether their *Ideas*, and thoſe of other Men be the ſame; they think it enough that they uſe the word in the common Acceptation of that Language.

Secondly, They ſuppoſe their words to ſtand alſo for the *reality of Things*.

Words then being immediately the ſigns of Mens *Ideas*, whereby they expreſs their Thoughts and Imaginations to others, there ariſes by conſtant uſe ſuch a connexion between certain *Sounds* and the *Ideas* they ſtand for; that the Names heard almoſt as readily excite certain

certain *Ideas*, as if the Objects themſelves were preſent to the Senſes.

And becauſe we examine not preciſely the ſignification of Words, we often in attentive conſideration ſet our Thoughts more on Words, than Things: Nay, ſome (becauſe we often learn Words before we know the *Ideas* they ſtand for) ſpeak ſeveral Words no otherwiſe than *Parrots* do, without any meaning at all. But ſo far as Words are of uſe and ſignification, ſo far there is a conſtant connexion between the *Sound* and *Idea*; And a deſignation that the one ſtand for the other; without which application of them, they are nothing but inſignificant noiſe.

Since then Words ſignifie only Mens peculiar *Ideas*, and that by an *arbitrary Impoſition*, it follows that every Man has an inviolable Liberty to make Words ſtand for what *Ideas* he pleaſes. It is true, common uſe by a tacit Conſent appropriates certain Sounds to certain *Ideas* in all Languages; which ſo far limits the ſignification of each Sound, that unleſs a Man applies it to the ſame *Ideas*, he cannot *ſpeak properly*: And unleſs a Man's Words excite the ſame *Ideas* in the

the Hearer, which he makes them ſtand for in ſpeaking, he cannot *ſpeak intelligibly*. But whatever be the conſequence of any Man's uſe of Words, different either from their publick uſe, or that of the Perſons to whom he addreſſes them; this is certain, their ſignification in his uſe of them is limited to his *Ideas*, and they can be ſigns of nothing elſe.

CHAP. III.

Of General Terms.

ALL Things that Exiſt being particulars, it might be expected that Words ſhould be ſo too in their ſignification: but we find it quite contrary, for moſt of the Words that make all Languages are *general Terms*. This is the effect of Reaſon and Neceſſity, For,

Firſt, It is *Impoſſible* that every particular Thing ſhould have a diſtinct peculiar Name, becauſe it is impoſſible to have diſtinct *Ideas* of every particular Thing; to retain its Name, with its peculiar appropriation to that *Idea*.

Secondly, It would be *Uſeleſs*, unleſs all could be ſuppoſed to have theſe ſame *Ideas*

Ideas in their Minds. For Names apply'ed to particular things, whereof I alone have the *Ideas* in my Mind, could not be Significant or Intelligible to another, who is not acquainted with all those particular Things which had fallen under my Notice.

Thirdly, It would be of no great *Use* for the *Improvement* of *Knowledge*, which thô founded in particular Things, enlarges it self by general views; to which, Things reduced into Sorts under general Names, are properly subservient. In Things where we have occasion to consider, and discourse of *Individuals*, and Particulars we use *proper* Names: as in *Persons*, *Countreys*, *Cities*, *Rivers*, *Mountains*, &c. Thus we see that Jockeys have particular names for their Horses, because they often have occasion to mention this or that particular Horse when he is out of sight.

The next thing to be considered, is how *General Words* come to be made. Words become general by being made Signs of *General Ideas*: *Ideas* become general by separating from them, the circumstances of Time, Place, or any other *Ideas* that may determinate them to this

or that particular Existence. By this way of *Abstraction*, they become capable of representing more Individuals, than one: each of which having a conformity to that abstract *Idea*, is of that sort.

But it may not be amiss to trace our Notions and Names, from their beginning; and observe by what degrees we proceed, and enlarge our *Ideas* from our first Infancy. It is evident that the first *Ideas Children* get, are only particular, as of the *Nurse* or *Mother*, and the Names they give them are confined to these Individuals. Afterwards observing that there are a great many other things in the World, that resemble them in shape, and other qualities, they frame an *Idea* which they find those many particulars do partake in; to that they give with others the Name *Man* for example; in this they make nothing *new*, but only leave out of the Complex *Idea* they had of *Peter*, *James*, *Mary*, &c. that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to all. And thus they come to have a general *Name*, and a general *Idea*.

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By the ſame method they advance to more general Names and Notions. For obſerving ſeveral things that differ from their *Idea* of *Man*, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that name, to agree with Man in ſome certain Qualities, by retaining only thoſe Qualities, and uniting them into one *Idea*, they have another more general *Idea*, to which giving a Name they make a *Term* of a more comprehenſive Extenſion. Thus by leaving out the Shape, and ſome other Properties ſignified by the name *Man*, and retaining only a Body with life, Senſe, and Spontaneous Motion; we form the *Idea*, ſignified by the Name *Animal*. By the ſame way the Mind proceeds to *Body*, *Subſtance*, and at laſt to *Being*, *Thing*, and ſuch Univerſal Terms which ſtand for any *Ideas* whatſoever. Hence we ſee that the whole Myſtery of *Genus* and *Species*, is nothing elſe but *Abſtract Ideas* more or leſs comprehenſive, with *Names* annexed to them.

This ſhews us the reaſon why in defining Words, we make uſe of the *Genus*: namely to ſave the labour of enumerating the ſeveral Simple *Ideas*, which the next general Term ſtands for: General Terms

then belong not to the *real* Exiſtence of Things; they are Inventions of the Underſtanding, and concern only Signs, either *Words* or *Ideas*.

It muſt be conſidered in the next place, what kind of ſignification it is that general Words have. It is evident that they do not barely ſignify one particular thing: for then they would not be general Terms, but proper Names: neither do they ſignify a *Plurality*: for then *Man* and *Men* would ſignifie the ſame thing; but that which they ſignifie, is a *ſort* of Things, and this they do, by being made a ſign of an *Abſtract Idea* in the Mind, to which *Idea*, as Things exiſting are found to agree, ſo they come to be ranked under that name, or to be of that ſort. The *Eſſences* then of the ſorts or ſpecies of Things, are nothing but theſe *Abſtract Ideas*.

It is not denyed here that Nature makes Things alike, and ſo lays the foundation of this Sorting and Cleanſing: But the *ſorts* of *Species* themſelves are the workmanſhip of Human Underſtanding: ſo that every diſtinct *Abſtract Idea*, is a diſtinct *Eſſence*, and the names that ſtand for ſuch diſtinct *Ideas*, are the

names

names of Things Essentially different Thus *Oval*, *Circle*, *Rain* and *Snow* are Essentially different. To make this clearer, it may not be amiss to consider the several significations of the word *Essence*.

First, It may be taken for the very Being of any Thing whereby it is, what it is; Thus the real Internal, (but unknown) Constitution in *Substances*, may be called their *Essence*. This is the proper signification of the word.

Secondly, In the *Schools* the word Essence has been almost wholly applyed to the artificial Constitution of *Genus* and *Species*; it is true, there is ordinarily supposed a real Constitution of the sorts of Things: and it is past doubt there must be some real Constitution, on which any collection of *Simple Ideas*, co-existing, must depend. But it being evident, that Things are ranked into sorts, under names only as they agree to certain *Abstract Ideas*, to which we have annexed those names, the Essence of each *Genus*, or *Species*, is nothing but the *Abstract Idea*, which the name stands for; this the word *Essence* imports in its most familiar use.

These two sorts of *Essence* may not unfitly be termed the one *Real*, the other *Nominal*. Between the Nominal Essence and the Name, there is so near a Connexion, that the name of any sort of Things, cannot be attributed to any particular Being, but what has the Essence whereby it answers that *Abstract Idea*, whereof that Name is the sign.

Concerning the Real Essences of Corporeal Substances, there are Two Opinions.

First, Some using the word *Essence* for they know not what, suppose a certain number of those *Essences*, according to which, all natural Things are made, and of which they equally partake, and do become of this or of that Species.

Secondly. Others look on all natural Things to have a Real, but unknown Constitution of their insensible Parts, from whence flow their sensible Qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another; and according to which we rank them into Sorts, under common Denominations. The former Supposition seems irreconcilable with the frequent production of Monsters, in all the Species of Animals: Since it is impossible

poſſible that Two Things partaking of the ſame Real *Eſſence*, ſhould have different *Properties*. But were there no other reaſon againſt it; yet the Suppoſition of Eſſences which cannot be known, and yet the making them to be that which diſtinguiſheth the Species of Things, is ſo wholly uſeleſs and unſerviceable to any part of *Knowledge*, that that alone were ſufficient to make us lay it by.

We may farther obſerve that the Nominal, and Real Eſſences of *Simple Ideas* and *Modes*, are always the ſame: but in *Subſtances* always quite different. Thus a Figure including a Space between three Lines, is the Real as well as Nominal Eſſence of a Triangle; it being that foundation from which all its Properties flow, and to which they are inſeparably annexed; But it is far otherwiſe in *Gold* or any other ſort of *Subſtance*, it is the real Conſtitution of its inſenſible Parts, on which depend all thoſe Properties that are to be found in it; which Conſtitution ſince we know not, nor have any particular *Idea* of, we can have no name that is the ſign of it. But yet it is its *Colour*, *Weight*, *Fuſibility*, and *Fixedneſs*, &c. which makes it to be *Gold*, or gives it a right to that

that name; which is therefore its *Nominal Eſſence*, ſince nothing can be called *Gold* but what has a conformity to that Abſtract Complex *Idea*, to which that name is annexed.

That Eſſences are but Abſtract *Ideas*, may farther appear by their being held Ingenerable and Incorruptible. This cannot be true of the real Conſtitution of Things. All Things in Nature (ſave the *Author* of it) are liable to Change: their *Real Eſſences* and Conſtitutions are deſtroyed and periſh: but as they are *Ideas* eſtabliſhed in the Mind, they remain immutable. For whatever becomes of *Alexander* or *Bucephalus*, the *Ideas* of Man and Horſe remain the ſame. By theſe means the Eſſence of a *Species* reſts ſafe and entire, without the Exiſtence of one *Individual* of that kind.

It is evident then that this Doctrine of the Immutability of Eſſences is founded only on the relation eſtabliſhed between Abſtract *Ideas* and certain Sounds: and will always be true, as long as the ſame Name can have the ſame Signification.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Names of Simple Ideas.

WOrds, thô they ſignifie nothing immediately, but the *Ideas* in the Mind of the Speaker; yet we ſhall find that the Names of Simple *Ideas*, mixed *Modes*, and natural *Subſtances* have each of them ſomething peculiar, And,

Firſt, The Names of *Simple Ideas* and *Subſtances*, with the Abſtract *Ideas* in the Mind, intimate ſome *Real Exiſtence*, from which was derived their original Pattern: but the Names of *Mixed Modes* terminate in the *Idea* that is in the Mind.

Secondly, The Names of *Simple Ideas* and *Modes* ſignifie the *Real* as well as *Nominal* Eſſences of their Species: the Names of *Subſtances* ſignifie rarely, if ever any thing, but barely the *Nominal Eſſences* of thoſe Species.

Thirdly, The Names of *Simple Ideas* are not capable of *Definitions*; thoſe of *Complex Ideas* are: the reaſon of which

I ſhall ſhew from the Nature of our *Ideas*, and the ſignification of *Words*.

It is agreed that a *Definition* is nothing elſe but the ſhewing the meaning of one Word, by ſeveral other, *not Synonymous Terms*. The meaning of Words being only the *Ideas* they are made to ſtand for; the meaning of any Term is then ſhewed, or the Word defined, when by other words the *Idea* it is made the ſign of, is as it were, repreſented or ſet before the view of another, and thus its ſignification aſcertained. The Names then of *Simple Ideas* are incapable of being defined, becauſe the ſeveral Terms of a Definition ſignifying ſeveral *Ideas*, they can altogether by no means repreſent an *Idea* which has no compoſition at all, and therefore a Definition, which is but the ſhewing of the meaning of one word, by ſeveral others not ſignifying each the ſame thing, can in the names of Simple *Ideas* have no place.

The not obſerving this difference in our *Ideas*, has occaſioned thoſe *trifling* Definitions which are given us of thoſe Simple *Ideas*; ſuch as is that of *Motion*, viz. *The Act of a Being in Power, as far forth as in Power.*

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The Atomiſts who define Motion to be a *paſſage* from one place to another, What do they more than put one Synonymous word for another? For what is *Paſſage* other than a Motion? Nor will the ſucceſſive application of the parts of the Superficies of one Body to thoſe of another, which the *Carteſians* give us, prove a much better definition of Motion when well examined.

The Act of Perſpicuous, as far forth as perſpicuous, is another Peripatetick definition of a Simple *Idea*, which it is certain can never make the meaning of the word *Light*, which it pretends to define underſtood by a blind Man. And when the *Carteſians* tell us, that Light is a great number of little Globules ſtriking briskly in the bottom of the Eye; theſe words would never make the *Idea* the word Light ſtands for, known to a Man that underſtood it not before.

Simple Ideas then can only be got by the impreſſions Objects make on our Minds, by the proper *Inlets* appointed to each ſort. If they are not received this way, all the words in the World will never be able to produce in us the *Ideas* they ſtand for. Words being Sounds,

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can produce in us no other Simple *Ideas*, but Sounds, nor excite any in us, but by that voluntary connexion which they have with ſome *Ideas*, which common Uſe has made them ſigns of: and therefore he that has not before received into his Mind by the proper In-lett the Simple *Idea*, which any word ſtands for, can never come to know the ſignification of that word, by any other Words or Sounds whatſoever.

But in *Complex Ideas* which conſiſt of ſeveral Simple ones, the cauſe is quite otherwiſe; for Words ſtanding for thoſe ſeveral *Ideas* that make up the compoſition, may imprint Complex *Ideas* in the Mind, that never were there before, and ſo make their Names be underſtood. In them Definitions take place. Thus the word *Rainbow*, to one who knew all thoſe Colours, but yet had never ſeen that *Phænomenon*, might by enumerating the *Figure*, *Largeneſs*, *Poſition* and order of the *Colours* be ſo well defined, that it might be perfectly underſtood.

The Names of Simple *Ideas*, *Subſtances*, and *mixed Modes* have alſo this diſference; that thoſe of *mixed Modes* ſtand for *Ideas* perfectly arbitrary:

arbitrary: those of *Substances* are not perfectly so, but refer to a pattern, thô with some Latitude: and those of Simple *Ideas* are perfectly taken from the Existence of Things, and are not arbitrary at all.

The Names of *Simple Modes*, differ little from those of *Simple Ideas*.

CHAP. V.

Of the Names of Mixed Modes *and Relations.*

THE Names of *Mixed Modes* being general, stand for *Abstract Ideas* in the Mind, as other general Names do; but they have something peculiar which may deserve our Attention.

And *First*, the *Ideas* they stand for, or if you please the Essences of the several Species of mixed *Modes*, are made by the Understanding; wherein they differ from those of *Simple Ideas*.

Seconaly, They are made Arbitrarily, without patterns, or reference to any real

real Existence, wherein they differ from those of *Substances*. The Mind unites and retains certain Collections, as so many distinct Specifick *Ideas*, whilst other combinations that as often in Nature occur, and are as plainly suggested by outward Things, pass neglected without particular Names, or Specifications.

The Mind in forming these Complex *Ideas*, makes no new *Idea*, but only puts together those which it had before, wherein it does *Three* Things. *First*, It chuses a certain Number. *Secondly*, It gives them Connexion, and makes them into one *Idea*. *Thirdly*, It ties them together by a Name; all this may be done before any one Individual of that Species of Modes ever existed: as the *Ideas* of *Sacrilege* or *Adultery* might be framed, before either of them was ever committed; and we cannot doubt but Law-makers have often made Laws about species of Actions, which were only the Creatures of their own Understanding.

But thô *Mixed Modes* depend on the Mind, and are made arbitrarily; yet they are not made at random, and jumbled together without any reason at all, but are always made for the convenience

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of Communication, which is the chief end of Language, and therefore such Combinations are only made as Men have frequent occasion to mention. Thus Men having joyned to the *Idea* of killing the *Idea* of *Father* and *Mother*, and so made a distinct Species from the killing a Man's *Son* or *Neighbour*, because of the different Heinousness of the Crime, and the distinct punishment due to it, found it necessary to mention it by a distinct Name, which is the end of making that distinct Combination.

In mixed *Modes* it is the *Name* that seems to preserve their Essences, and to give them their lasting Duration. The collection of *Ideas* is made by the Mind, but the name is as it were the *Knot* which ties them fast together; hence we seldom take any other for distinct Species of mixed *Modes*, but such as are set out by Names. We must observe that the names of mixed *Modes* always signify the real Essences of their Species, which being nothing but the Abstract Complex *Ideas*, and not referred to the real existence of Things; there is no supposition of any thing more signified by any Name of a mixed *Mode*, but barely that *Complex Idea* the Mind it

self

ſelf has formed: which when the Mind has formed, is all it would expreſs by it, and is *that* on which all the Properties of the *Species* depend, and from which alone they flow: and ſo in theſe the *real* and *nominal* Eſſence is the ſame.

This alſo ſhews the reaſon why the *Names* of *mixed Modes* are commonly got, before the *Ideas* they ſtand for are perfectly known: becauſe there being no Species of theſe ordinarily taken notice of, but ſuch as have Names, and thoſe Species being *Complex Ideas* made arbitrarily by the Mind, it is convenient, if not neceſſary to know the Names, before we learn the *Complex Ideas*; unleſs a Man will fill his Head with a company of Abſtract Complex *Ideas*, which others having no Names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by, and forget again. In the beginning of Languages it was neceſſary to have the *Idea* before one gave it the *Name*; and ſo it is ſtill, where a *new* Complex *Idea* is to be made, and a Name given it. In Simple *Ideas* and *Subſtances* I grant it is otherwiſe; which being ſuch *Ideas* as have real Exiſtence and Union in Nature, the *Ideas* or Names are got, one before the other, as it happens,

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What has been ſaid here of mixed *Modes*, is with very little difference applicable to *Relations* alſo, which ſince every Man himſelf may obſerve, I may ſpare my ſelf the pains to enlarge on.

CHAP. VI.

Of the Names of Subſtances.

THE common *Names of Subſtances* ſtand for Sorts as well as other general Terms; that is, for ſuch Complex *Ideas*, wherein ſeveral particular Subſtances do, or might agree, by virtue of which they are capable to be comprehended in one common Conception, and be ſignified by one Name; I ſay *do* or *might agree*, for thô there be but one *Sun* exiſting, yet the *Idea* of it being Abſtracted, is as much a *Sort*, as if there were as many Suns as there are Stars.

The meaſure and boundary of each Sort whereby it is conſtituted that *particular Sort*, and diſtinguiſhed from others; is what we call its *Eſſence*: which is nothing but that abſtract *Idea* to which that

Name is annexed, ſo that every thing contained in that *Idea*, is Eſſential to that Sort. This I call *Nominal Eſſence*, to diſtinguiſh it from that real conſtitution of *Subſtances*, on which this *Nominal Eſſence*, and all the Properties of that Sort depend, and may be called its *Real Eſſence*: Thus the *Nominal Eſſence* of *Gold* is that *Complex Idea* the word *Gold* ſtands for, let it be for inſtance a *Body*, Yellow, Weighty, Malleable, Fuſible, and Fixed: but its real *Eſſence* is the conſtitution of its inſenſible parts, on which thoſe Qualities, and all its other Properties depend; which is wholly unknown to us.

That *Eſſence* in the ordinary uſe of the Word, relates to *Sorts*, appears from hence, That if you take away, the Abſtract *Ideas* by which we ſort Individuals, and rank them under common Names, then the thought of any Thing eſſential to any of them, inſtantly vaniſhes: We have no notion of the one without the other, which plainly ſhews their Relation. No Property is thought Eſſential to any Individual whatſoever, till the Mind refers it to ſome Sort or *Species* of Things, and then preſently, according

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to the Abſtract *Idea* of that ſort, ſomething is found Eſſential; ſo that Eſſential or not Eſſential, relates only to our Abſtract *Ideas*, and the Names annexed to them, which amounts to no more but this, That whatever particular Thing has not in it thoſe Qualities contained in the *Abſtract Idea* which any general Term ſtands for, cannot be ranked under that Species, nor be called by that Name; ſince that *Abſtract Idea* is the very Eſſence of that *Species*. Thus if the *Idea* of *Body* with ſome People be bare Extenſion, or Space, then *Solidity* is not Eſſential to *Body*: If others make the *Idea*, to which they give the Name *Body*, to be Solidity and Extenſion; then Solidity is Eſſential alſo to *Body*. That alone therefore is conſidered as Eſſential, which makes a part of the *Complex Idea* the name of a Sort ſtands for, without which no particular thing can be reckoned of that ſort, nor be entituled to that Name.

Subſtances are diſtinguiſhed into *Sorts* and *Species* by their *Nominal Eſſence*; for it is that alone, that the Name which is the mark of the Sort ſignifies: and the *Species* of Things to us are nothing but

the ranking them under distinct Names, according to the Complex *Ideas* in *Us*, and not according to precise, distinct, *Real Essences* in *Them*.

We cannot rank and sort Things by their *real Essences*, because we know them not: our Faculties carry us no farther in the knowledge of Substances, than a collection of those sensible *Ideas* we ob-observe in them. But the internal Constitution whereon their Properties depend, is utterly unknown to us. This is evident when we come to examine but the *Stones* we tread on, or the *Iron* we daily handle: we soon find that we know not their Make, and can give no reason of the different Qualities we find in them; and yet how infinitely these come short of the fine Contrivances and unconceivable real Essences of *Plants* and *Animals*, every one knows. The workmanship of the All-wise and Powerful *God* in the great Fabrick of the Universe, and every part thereof farther exceeds the comprehension of the most inquisitive and intelligent Man, than the best contrivance of the most ingenious Man, doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational Creatures. In vain therefore do we pre-

tend

tend to range things into *Sorts* and dispose them into certain *Classes*, under Names by their *real Essences*, that are so far from our discovery or comprehension.

But thô the *Nominal Essences* of Substances are made by the Mind, they are not yet made so arbitrarily as those of mixed Modes. To the making of any *Nominal Essence*, it is necessary.

First, That the *Ideas* whereof it consists, have such an Union as to make but one *Idea*, how compounded soever.

Secondly, That the particular *Ideas* so united, be exactly the same, neither more or less: For if two Abstract Complex *Ideas* differ, either in *Number* or *Sorts* of their component Parts, they make two different, and not one and the same Essence.

In the *First* of these, the Mind in making its Complex *Ideas* of Substances, only follows *Nature*, and puts none together which are not supposed to have an Union in Nature. For Men observing certain Qualities always joyned and existing together therein copy Nature, and of *Ideas* so united, make their Complex ones of Substances.

Secondly, Thô the Mind in making its Complex *Ideas* of Subſtances, never puts any together that do not *really*, or are not ſuppoſed to co-exiſt: yet the number it combines depends upon the various Care, Induſtry or Fancy of him that makes it. Men generally content themſelves with ſome few obvious Qualities, and often leave out others as material and as firmly united as thoſe that they take.

In Bodies organized and propagated by Seeds, as *Vegetables* and *Animals*, the *Shape* is that which to us is the leading Quality and moſt characteriſtical Part that determines the *Species*: in moſt other Bodies not propagated by Seed, it is the *Colour* we chiefly fix on, and are moſt led by. Thus where we find the Colour of *Gold*, we are apt to imagine all the other Qualities comprehended in our Complex *Idea*, to be there alſo.

Thô the *Nominal* Eſſences of Subſtances are all ſuppoſed to be copied from Nature; yet they are all, or moſt of them very imperfect: and ſince the Compoſition of thoſe Complex *Ideas* is in ſeveral Men very different, we may conclude that theſe Boundaries of Species are as

Men

Men, and not as *Nature* makes them; if at leaſt there are in Nature any ſuch prefixed Bounds.

It is true, that many particular Subſtances are ſo made by Nature, that they have an Agreement and Likeneſs one with another, and ſo afford a Foundation of being ranked into Sorts: but the *Sorting* of Things by us, being in order to naming and comprehending them under general Terms; I cannot ſee how it can be properly ſaid, That Nature ſets the *Boundaries* of the ſpecies of Things. But if it be ſo, our *Boundaries* of Species, are not exactly conformable to Nature.

If the firſt Sorting of Individuals depends on the Mind of Man, variouſly collecting the Simple *Ideas*, that make the *Nominal* Eſſence of the loweſt Species; it is much more evident that the more *comprehenſive Claſſes*, called *Genera*, do ſo. In forming more general *Ideas* that may comprehend different Sorts, the Mind leaves out thoſe Qualities that diſtinguiſh them, and puts into its new Collection only ſuch *Ideas* as are common to ſeveral Sorts. Thus by leaving out thoſe Qualities which are peculiar to, Gold, Silver, *&c.* and retaining a

Complex *Idea*, made up of thoſe that are common to each Species, there is a new *Genus* conſtituted, to which the Name *Metal* is annexed.

So that in this whole buſineſs of *Genera* and *Species*, the *Genus* or more comprehenſive, is but a partial Conception of what is in the *Species*, and the *Species* but a partial *Idea*, of what is to be found in each *Individual*. In all which there is no new Thing made, but only more or leſs comprehenſive Signs, whereby we may be enabled to expreſs in a few Syllables great numbers of particular Things, as they agree in more or leſs general Conceptions, which we have framed to that purpoſe. If theſe *Abſtract General Idæas* be thought to be compleat, it can only be in reſpect of a certain eſtabliſhed Relation between them, and certain Names, which are made uſe of to ſignify them, and not in reſpect of any Thing exiſting as made by Nature.

This is adjuſted to the true end of Speech, which is to be the eaſieſt and ſhorteſt way of communicating our Notions. This is the proper buſineſs of *Genus* and *Species*: And this Men do without any conſideration of real Eſſences,

and

and ſubſtantial Forms, which come not within the reach of our Knowledge, when we think of thoſe Things; nor within the ſignification of our Words, when we diſcourſe with others.

CHAP. VII.

Of Particles.

BEſides Words which are the Names of *Ideas* in the Mind, there are others made uſe of to ſignify the *Connexion* that the Mind gives to *Ideas* or Propoſitions one with another, and to intimate ſome particular *Action* of its own at that time relating to thoſe *Ideas*. This it does ſeveral ways: as *is*, *is Not*, are marks of the Mind affirming or denying: Beſides which, the Mind does in declaring its Sentiments to others connect not only the parts of Propoſitions, but whole Sentences one to another with their ſeveral Relations, and Dependencies to make a coherent Diſcourſe.

The Words ſignifying, that Connexion the Mind gives to ſeveral Affirmations

ons and Negations, that it unites in one continued Reaſoning or Narration, are called *Particles*. And it is in the right uſe of theſe, that more particularly conſiſts the Clearneſs and Beauty of a *Good Stile*. To expreſs the dependance of his Thoughts and Reaſonings one upon another, A Man muſt have Words to ſhew what Connexion, Reſtriction, Diſtinction, Oppoſition, Emphaſis, *&c.* he gives to each reſpective part of his Diſcourſe.

Theſe cannot be underſtood rightly, without a clear view of the Poſtures, Stands, Turns, Limitations, Exceptions and ſeveral other thoughts of the Mind; of theſe there are a great variety, much exceeding the number of Particles that moſt Languages have to expreſs them by, for which reaſon it happens, that moſt of theſe Particles have divers, and ſometimes almoſt oppoſite Significations. Thus the Particle *But* in *Engliſh*, has ſeveral very different Significations, as, *But to ſay no more*: Here it intimates a ſtop of the Mind, in the courſe it was going, before it came to the end of it. *I ſaw but two Planets*: Here it ſhews that the Mind limits the Senſe to what is expreſſed with a Negation of all other; *You pray, but it is not That God*

would

would bring you to the true Religion, but that he would confirm you in your own. The former of these intimates a Supposition in the Mind of something otherwise than it should be: The latter shews, that the Mind makes a direct opposition between that and what goes before. *All Animals have Sense, but a Dog is an Animal.* Here it signifies the Connexion of the latter Proposition with the former. To these, divers other significations of this Particle might be added, if it were my business to examine it in its full Latitude.

I intend not here a full Explication of this sort of Signs, the Instances I have given in this one, may give occasion to reflect on their use and force in Language, and lead us into the Contemplation of several actions of our Minds in discoursing, which it has found a way to intimate to others by these *Particles*, some whereof constantly, and others in certain constructions, have the sense of a whole Sentence contained in them.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Abſtract and Concrete Terms.

THE Mind as has been ſhewn, has a power to *Abſtract* its *Idea*, whereby the Sorts of Things are diſtinguiſhed: now each *Abſtract Idæa* being diſtinct, ſo that the one can never be the other, the Mind will by its intuitive Knowledge perceive their difference; and therefore in Propoſitions, no two whole *Ideas* can ever be affirmed one of another: Nor does the common uſe of Language permit that any two Abſtract Words or Names of *Abſtract Ideas*, ſhould be affirmed one of another. All our Affirmations are only in *Concrete*, which is the affirming one *Abſtract Idea* to be joyned to another: which *Abſtract Ideas* in *Subſtances*, may be of any ſort, thô the moſt of them are of *Powers*: In all the reſt theſe are little elſe but Relations.

All our Simple *Ideas* have *Abſtract* as well as *Concrete* Names, as *Whiteneſs White*, *Sweetneſs Sweet*, &c. The like alſo holds

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in our *Ideas* of Modes and Relations, as *Juſtice Juſt*, *Equality Equal*, &c. But as to our *Ideas* of Subſtances, we have very few Abſtract Names at all. Thoſe few that the Schools have forged, as *Animalitas*, *Humanitas*, &c. hold no proportion with the infinite number of names of Subſtances, and could never get admittance into common uſe, or obtain the Licence of publick Approbation, which ſeems to intimate the confeſſion of all Mankind, that they have no *Ideas* of the real Eſſences of Subſtances, ſince they have not names for ſuch *Ideas*. It was only the Doctrine of *Subſtantial Forms* and the confidence of miſtaken Pretenders to a Knowledge they had not, which firſt coin'd, and then introduced *Animalitas*, *Humanitas*, and the like: which yet went very little farther than their own Schools, and could never get to be current amongſt underſtanding Men.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of the Imperfection of Words.

TO examine the *Perfection* or *Imperfection* of Words, it is neceſſary to conſider their uſe, and end: which is twofold, *Firſt*, to *record* our own Thoughts; *Secondly*, to *communicate* our Thoughts to others: The *Firſt* is for the help of our own Memories, whereby we do as it were talk to our ſelves: for this purpoſe any Words may ſerve turn: Words being *Arbitrary Signs*, we may uſe which we pleaſe for this purpoſe; and there will be no Imperfection in them, if we conſtantly uſe the ſame *Sign* for the ſame *Idea*.

Secondly, As to *Communication* by Words; that too has a double Uſe: *Firſt*, their *Civil Uſe*, which is ſuch a communication of Thoughts and *Ideas* by Words, as may ſerve in common Converſation and Commerce, about the ordinary Affairs and Conveniences of civil Life. *Secondly*, The *Philoſophical* Uſe of Words, by which

I mean ſuch an uſe of them, as may ſerve to convey the preciſe Notions of Things, and to expreſs certain Truths in general Propoſitions, theſe two uſes are very diſtinct, and a great deal leſs exactneſs will ſerve in the one, than in the other.

The end of Language in Communication is to be *underſtood*; that is, to excite by Sounds in the *Hearer*, the ſame *Idea* which they ſtand for in the mind of the *Speaker*. The doubtfulneſs and uncertainty of their Signification, which is the imperfection we are here ſpeaking of has its cauſe more in the *Ideas* themſelves than in any incapacity in the *Sounds* to ſignifie them; for in that regard they are all equally perfect. That then which makes the difference, is the difference of *Ideas* they ſtand for, which muſt be learned and retained by thoſe, who would diſcourſe together intelligibly. Now this is difficult in theſe caſes.

Firſt, Where the *Ideas* they ſtand for are very Complex: Hence the names of *Mixed Modes* are liable to great uncertainty and obſcurity in their Signification. For here the *Idea* being made up of many Parts, it is not eaſy to form and retain it exactly; of this ſort chiefly are Moral

Words,

Words, which have ſeldom in Two different Men, the ſame preciſe ſignification.

Secondly, where the *Ideas* they ſtand for, have no certain connexion in Nature, and therefore no ſettled *Standard* to rectifie and adjuſt them by. This again is the caſe of the names of *Mixed Modes*, which are Aſſemblages of *Ideas* put together at pleaſure. Common uſe indeed regulates the meaning of Words pretty well for common Converſation: but it is not ſufficient to adjuſt them to Philoſophical Diſcourſes; there being ſcarce a Name of any very *Complex Idea*, which in common uſe has not a great Latitude; and is not made the ſign of far different *Ideas*.

The way of learning theſe Names does not a little contribute to the doubtfulneſs of their Signification. For we may obſerve that Children are taught the names of Simple *Ideas*, and Subſtances, by having the Things ſhewn them; and then they repeat the Name that ſtands for it; as *White*, *Sweet*, *Milk*, *Sugar*, &c. But in Mixed *Modes* the Sounds are learned firſt; and Men are to learn afterwards their Signification, by their own Obſervation

vation and Induſtry, or the Explication of others: which is the reaſon that theſe Words are little more than *bare Sounds* in the Minds of moſt, becauſe few are at the pains to ſettle their *Ideas*, and Notions preciſely; and thoſe which are, make them the ſigns of *Ideas*, different from what others underſtand by them, which is the occaſion of moſt diſputes.

Thirdly, Where the ſignification of a Word is referred to a *Standard* which is not eaſily known: This is the caſe of the names of *Subſtances*, which being ſuppoſed to ſtand for their *Real Eſſences* muſt needs be of uncertain application, becauſe theſe Eſſences are utterly unknown; and it will be impoſſible to know what is, or is not *Antimony*, *v. g.* when that Word is to ſtand for the Real Eſſence of it; whereof we have no *Idea* at all.

Or ſuppoſe theſe Names only ſtand for Simple *Ideas*, found to co-exiſt in *Subſtances*, yet thus they will be liable to great uncerainty too: becauſe theſe Simple *Ideas* being very numerous, Men frame different *Ideas* of the ſame Subjects, by putting different *Ideas* into their Complex one, of ſuch Subſtances. Several Men obſerve ſeveral Properties in the

ſame Subſtance, and none of them all; who having but imperfect deſcriptions of Things, can have but uncertain ſignifications of Words.

Fourthly, Where the ſignification of the Word, and the real Eſſence of the Thing, are not the ſame, which is ſtill the caſe of Subſtances; from hence we may obſerve.

Firſt, That the names of Simple *Ideas* are leaſt liable to miſtakes: *Firſt*, Becauſe the *Ideas* they ſtand for, being each but one ſingle Perception, are eaſier got, and more clearly retained, than the more Complex ones of Subſtances and mixed Modes. *Secondly*, Becauſe they are not referr'd to any other Eſſence, but barely that Perception they immediately ſignify.

Secondly, Names of *Simple Modes* are next to *Simple Ideas* leaſt liable to Doubt or Uncertainty, eſpecially thoſe of *Figure* and *Number*, of which Men have ſo clear and diſtinct *Ideas*.

Thirdly, In *Mixed Modes*, when they are compoſed of a few and obvious *Ideas*, their Names are clear and diſtinct enough; otherwiſe doubtful and uncertain.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, The Names of *Subſtances* being annexed to *Ideas*, that are neither the real Eſſences, nor exact Repreſentations of Things, are liable yet to greater Imperfection, when we come to a Philoſophical uſe of them.

CHAP X.

Of the Abuſe of Words.

BEſide the natural and unavoidable Imperfections of Languages, there are *wilful Faults* and *Neglects*, which Men are often guilty of in their uſe of Words. For,

Firſt, They uſe Words *without clear and diſtinct* Ideas, or, which is worſe, Signs without any thing ſignified; ſuch are for the moſt part introduced by *Sects* of Philoſopy and Religion, either out of an affectation of *Singularity*, or to ſupport ſome ſtrange *Opinion*; or to cover the weakneſs of their *Hypotheſis*. Theſe are commonly ſuch as had no determinate collection of *Ideas* annexed to them,

when they were first invented; or at least such, as if well examined, will be found inconsistent, and therefore may justly be called insignificant Terms: Instances of this kind may easily be had from the *School-men* and *Metaphysicians*. Others learn Words which the propriety of Language has affixed to very important *Ideas*, and often upon occasion use them without any distinct meaning at all: whence their Notions being unsteady and confused, their Discourse must be filled with empty unintelligible *Noise* and *Jargon*, especially in Moral Matters where the Words stand for Arbitrary, and numerous Collections of *Ideas*, not regularly and permanently united in Nature.

Secondly, Another abuse is *Inconstancy in the use of Words*; it is hard to find a Discourse on any Subject wherein the same words are not used sometimes for one collection of *Ideas*, sometimes for another. The wilful doing whereof can be imputed to nothing but great Folly, or greater Dishonesty: And a Man in his Accompts with another, may with as much fairness make the characters of Numbers, stand sometimes for one, and sometimes for another collection of *Unites*;

as

as in his Diſcourſe, or Reaſoning, make the ſame Words ſtand for different collections of Simple *Ideas*.

Thirdly, Another is an *affected Obſcurity*, either by uſing old Words in new Significations, or by introducing new and ambiguous Terms, without defining them, or putting them together, ſo as to confound their ordinary meaning. Thô the *Peripatetick Philoſophy* has been moſt eminent in this way, yet other Sects have not been wholly clear of it. The admired *Art of Diſputing* hath added much to the natural imperfection of Languages, whilſt it has been made uſe of, and fitted to perplex the ſignification of Words, more than to diſcover the Knowledge and Truth of Things: And he that will look into that ſort of Learned Writings, will find the Words there much more obſcure, uncertain, and undetermined in their meaning, than they are in ordinary Converſation.

Fourthly, Another is the *Taking Words for Things*: This, thô it in ſome degree concerns all Names in general; yet more particularly affects thoſe of Subſtances. Thus in the *Peripatetick Philoſophy*, *Subſtantial Forms*, *Abhorrence of Vacuum*, &c.

are taken for ſomething Real. To this Abuſe thoſe Men are moſt ſubject, who confine their Thoughts to any one *Syſtem*; and give themſelves up into a firm belief of the perfection of any received *Hypotheſis*; whereby they come to be perſwaded, that the Terms of that Sect, are ſo ſuited to the nature of Things, that they perfectly correſpond with their real Exiſtence.

Fifthly, Another is the *Setting them in the place of Things, which they can by no means ſignify.* We may obſerve that in the general names of Subſtances, whereof the Nominal Eſſences are only known to us, when we affirm or deny any thing about them, we do moſt commonly tacitly ſuppoſe or intend they ſhould ſtand for the real Eſſence of a certain ſort of Subſtances. Thus when a Man ſays, *Gold is malleable*, he would inſinuate ſomething more than this, what I call *Gold* is *malleable*, (thô truly it amounts to no more) *namely*, That what has the real Eſſence of *Gold* is *malleable*, that is, that *malleableneſs* depends on, and is inſeparable from the real Eſſence of *Gold*. But a Man not knowing wherein that real Eſſence conſiſts the

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Connexion in his Mind of *Malleableneſs*, is not truly with an *Eſſence* he knows not, but with the Sound *Gold* he puts for it. It is true, the names of Subſtances would be much more uſeful; and Propoſitions expreſt by them much more certain, were the real Eſſences of Subſtances the *Ideas* in our Minds, which thoſe Words ſignified. And it is for want of thoſe real Eſſences that our Words convey ſo little Knowledge, or certainty in our Diſcourſes about them. But to ſuppoſe theſe Names to ſtand for a Thing, having the real Eſſence on which the Properties depend, is ſo far from diminiſhing the imperfection of our Words, that by a plain abuſe it adds to it; when we would make them ſtand for ſomething, which not being in our Complex *Ideas*, the name we uſe can no way be the ſign of it. In *Mixed Modes*, any *Idea* of the complex one being left out, or changed, it is allowed to be another thing, that is, to be of another *Species*, as is plain in *Chance-medley*, *Man-ſlaughter*, *Murder*, &c. becauſe the Complex *Idea* ſignified by that name, is the *Real* as well as *Nominal* Eſſence; and there is no ſecret reference of that name to

any other Eſſence, but that. But in Subſtances it is not ſo; for thô in that called *Gold*, one puts in his Complex *Idea*, what another leaves out, and *Vice verſâ*, yet Men do not uſually think the Species changed, becauſe they refer the name in their Minds to a real immutable Eſſence of a Thing Exiſting, on which thoſe Properties depend: but this reference of the Name to a Thing we have not the *Idea* of, is ſo far from helping us at all, that it only ſerves the more to involve us in difficulties. This reference is grounded on this Suppoſition, namely, that the ſame preciſe Internal Conſtitution goes always with the ſame ſpecifick Name: In which are contained theſe two falſe *Suppoſitions*.

Firſt, That there are certain preciſe *Eſſences*, according to which, Nature makes all particular Things; and by which they are diſtinguiſhed into *Species*.

Secondly, This tacitly inſinuates as if we had *Ideas* of theſe Eſſences; for why do we enquire, whether this or that Thing have the real Eſſence of that Species *Man* for Inſtance, if we did not ſuppoſe it known, which yet is utterly falſe; and therefore ſuch applications of Names

as

as would make them ſtand for *Ideas* we have not, muſt needs cauſe great diſorder in Diſcourſe and Reaſonings about them; and be a great Inconvenience in our Communication by Words.

Sixthly, Another more general, thô leſs obſerved, Abuſe of Words, is, that Men having by long and familiar uſe, annexed to them certain *Ideas*, they *are apt to imagine ſo near and neceſſary a Connexion, between the Names, and the Significations they uſe them in, that they forwardly ſuppoſe one cannot but underſtand what their meaning is*; As if it were paſt doubt, that in the uſe of theſe common received Sounds, the Speaker and Hearer had neceſſarily the ſame preciſe *Ideas*. And ſo likewiſe taking the Words of others, as naturally ſtanding for Juſt, what they themſelves have been accuſtomed to apply them to, they never trouble themſelves to explain their own, or underſtand anothers meaning: From whence commonly proceeds Noiſe, and Wrangling without Improvement or Information; whilſt Men take Words to be the conſtant regular Marks of agreed Notions, which in truth are no more but the voluntary and unſteady Signs of their own

own *Ideas*. Thus *Life* is a Term, none more familiar: Any one almoſt would take it for an affront, to be asked what he meant by it, and yet if it comes in queſtion, whether ſuch a Thing has *Life*, or not, it is eaſy to perceive, that a clear diſtinct ſettled *Idea*, does not always accompany the uſe of ſo known a Word.

Seventhly, *Figurative Speech* is alſo an abuſe of Language: for thô in Diſcourſes, where we ſeek rather Pleaſure and Delight, than Information and Improvement, ſuch Ornaments as are borrowed from Figurative Speeches and Alluſions, can ſcarce paſs for Faults; yet if we would ſpeak of Things as they are, we muſt allow, that all the *Art of Rhetorick*, beſides Order and Clearneſs, All the Artificial and Figurative application of Words, Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing elſe, but to inſinuate wrong *Ideas*, move the Paſſions, and thereby miſlead the Judgment, and ſo indeed are perfect Cheat. And therefore however allowable, they may be in Harangues and popular Addreſſes; they are certainly in all Diſcourſes that pretend to inform and inſtruct, wholly to be avoided; and where Truth and Knowledge are concerned,

cannot

cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the Language or Perſon that makes uſe of them.

To conclude this Conſideration, the *Ends of Language*, in our Diſcourſe with others, are chiefly theſe *Three*.

Firſt, To make our Thoughts or *Ideas* known to another; this we fail in Firſt, when we uſe Names without clear and diſtinct *Ideas* in our Minds. *Secondly*, When we apply received Names to *Ideas*, to which the common uſe of that Language does not apply them. *Thirdly*, When we apply them unſteadily, making them ſtand now for one, and by and by for another *Idea*.

Secondly, To make known our Thoughts *with as much Eaſe* and Quickneſs as is poſſible. This Men fail in when they have Complex *Ideas*, without having diſtinct Names for them, which may happen, either through the defect of a Language, which has none, or the fault of that Man who has not yet learned them.

Thirdly, To convey the knowledge of Things: This cannot be done, but when our *Ideas* agree to the reality of Things.

He that hath *Names* without *Ideas*, wants meaning in his Words, and ſpeaks only empty Sounds: He that hath *Complex Ideas*, without Names for them, wants Diſpatch in his Expreſſion. He that uſes his Words looſely and unſteadily, will either not be minded, or not underſtood. He that applies his Names to *Ideas*, different from their common Uſe, wants *Propriety* in his Language, and ſpeaks Gibberiſh. And he that hath *Ideas* of *Subſtances*, diſagreeing with the real Exiſtence of Things, ſo far wants the materials of true Knowledge in his Underſtanding, and has inſtead thereof, *Chimæras*.

Language being the great Conduit whereby Men convey their Diſcoveries, Reaſonings, and Knowledge from one to another, he that makes an ill uſe of it, thô he does not corrupt the Fountains of Knowledge which are in Things themſelves; yet he does as much as in him lies, break or ſtop the Pipes whereby it is diſtributed to the publick uſe, and advantage of Mankind. He that uſes Words without any clear and ſteady meaning, What does he but lead himſelf and others into Errors? And he that deſignedly does it,

ought

ought to be looked on, as an Enemy to Truth and Knowledge.

If we look into Books of Controverſy of any kind, we ſhall ſee that the Effect of obſcure, unſteady, and æquivocal Terms, is nothing but noiſe and wrangling about Sounds, without convincing or bettering a Man's Underſtanding. For if the *Idea* be not agreed on between Speaker and Hearer, for which the Words ſtand, the Argument is not about *Things* but *Names*.

It deſerves to be conſidered, and carefully examined, Whether the greateſt part of the Diſputes in the World, are not meerly *Verbal*, and about the Signification of Words; and that, if the Terms they are made in were defined and reduced in their Significations, to the ſingle *Ideas* they ſtand for, thoſe Diſputes would not end of themſelves, and immediately vaniſh.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Remedies of the foregoing Imperfections and Abuſes.

TO remedy the defects of Speech above-mentioned, the following Rules may be of uſe.

Firſt, A Man ſhould take care to uſe no Word without a Signification, no *Name* without an *Idea* for which he makes it ſtand. This Rule will not ſeem needleſs to any one, who will take the pains to recollect how often he has met with ſuch words, as *Inſtinct*, *Sympathy*, *Antipathy*. &c. ſo made uſe of, as he might eaſily conclude, that thoſe that uſed them, had no *Ideas* in their Minds, to which they applied them.

Secondly, Thoſe *Ideas*, he annexes them to, ſhould be *clear* and *diſtinct*, which in Complex *Ideas* is by knowing the particular ones, that make that Compoſition; of which, if any one be again Complex, we muſt know alſo the preciſe collection

lection that is united in each, and ſo till we come to Simple ones. In Subſtances the *Ideas* muſt not only be diſtinct, but alſo conformable to *Things* as they Exiſt.

Thirdly, He muſt apply his Words as near as may be to ſuch *Ideas*, as common uſe has annexed them to; for Words, eſpecially of Languages already framed, are no Man's private Poſſeſſion, but the common meaſure of Commerce and Communication; and therefore it is not for any one to change the ſtamp they are current in, nor alter the *Ideas* they are affixed to; or at leaſt, when there is a neceſſity to do ſo, he is bound to give notice of it. And therefore,

Fourthly, When common uſe has left the ſignification of a Word uncertain, and looſe, or where it is to be uſed in a peculiar Senſe; or where the Term is liable to any doubtfulneſs or miſtake, there it ought to be defined, and its Signification aſcertained.

Words ſtanding for *Simple Ideas* being not *defineable*, their Signification muſt be ſhewn either, *Firſt*, By a Synonymous Word. *Secondly*, by naming a Subject, wherein that Simple *Idea* is to be found.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, By presenting to the Senses that subject, which may produce it in the Mind, and make him actually have the *Idea* that word stands for. *Mixed Modes* may be perfectly defined, by exactly enumerating those *Ideas* that go to each Composition. This ought more especially to be done in mixed Modes belonging to *Morality*: since definition is the only way whereby the precise meaning of *Moral Words* can be known; and yet a way whereby their precise meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any room for any Contest about it.

For the explaining the Signification of the names of *Substances*, both the forementioned ways, *viz.* of Shewing, and Defining are requisite in many cases to be made use of; their Names are best defined by their *leading Qualities*, which are mostly *Shape* in Animals, and Vegetables: and *Colour* in inanimate Bodies; and in some, both together. Now these leading Qualities are best made known by shewing, and can hardly be made known otherwise. The shape of a *Horse* or *Cassowary* will be but imperfectly imprinted on the Mind by Words: the sight of the Animals doth it much better.

And

And the *Idea* of the particular Colour of *Gold* is not to be got by any deſcription of it, but only by the frequent exerciſe of the Eyes about it. The like may be be ſaid of thoſe other Simple *Ideas*, peculiar in their kind to any Subſtance, for which preciſe *Ideas* there are no peculiar Names.

But becauſe many of the Simple *Ideas*, which make up our ſpecifick *Ideas* of Subſtances, are *Powers* which lie not obvious to our Senſe in the Things, as they ordinarily appear; therefore in the Signification of our Names of Subſtances, ſome part of the Signification will be better made known, by enumerating thoſe Simple *Ideas*, than in ſhewing the Subſtance it ſelf. For he that to the *Yellow ſhining colour* of Gold, got by Sight, ſhall from my enumerating them have the *Ideas* of great *Ductibility*, *Fuſibility*, *Fixedneſs*, and *Solubility* in *Aqua Regia* will have a perfecter *Idea* of *Gold*, than he can have by ſeeing a piece of *Gold*, and thereby imprinting in his Mind only its obvious Qualities.

It were to be wiſhed that Words ſtanding for Things, which are known and diſtinguiſhed by their outward Shapes ſhould be expreſſed by little Drauhgts and

Prints made of them. A Vocabulary made after this fashion, would perhaps with more ease, and in less time teach the true Signification of many Terms, especially in Languages of remote Countreys, or Ages; and settle truer *Ideas* in Mens Minds of several Things, whereof we read the Names in ancient Authors, than all the large and laborious Comments of Learned Criticks. *Naturalists* that treat of *Plants* and *Animals*, have found the benefit of this way: And he that consults them will find that he has a clearer *Idea* of *Apium* and *Hex* from a little Print, of that Herb or Beast, than he could have from a long Definition of the Names of either of them: and so no doubt he would have of *Strigil*, and *Sistrum*, if instead of a *Curry-comb* or *Cymbal*, which are the English Names Dictionaries render them by, he could see stamped in the Margin small Pictures of these Instruments, as they were in use amongst the Ancients.

Fifthly, The last Rule that I shall mention is, That in all Discourses wherein one Man pretends to instruct or convince another, he should use the same Word, constantly in the same Sense; if this were

were done (which no body can refuſe, without great diſingenuity) many of the Books extant might be ſpared; many of the Controverſies in Diſpute, would be at an end; ſeveral of thoſe great Volumes ſwollen with ambiguous Words, now uſed in one Senſe, and by and by in another, would ſhrink into a very narrow compaſs: and many of the *Philoſophers* (to mention no other) as well as *Poets* Works, might be contained in a *Nutſhell.*

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Of Knowledge in General.

SInce the Mind in all its Thoughts and Reasonings, has no other immediate Object but its own *Ideas*, which alone it does or can contemplate; it is evident that our Knowledge is only conversant about them. *Knowledge* then seems to be nothing but the Perception of the Connexion and Agreement, or Disagreement and Repugnancy of any of our *Ideas*: Where this Perception is, there is Knowledge; and where it is not, there tho we fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of *Knowledge*. When we know that *White* is not *Black*, what do we but perceive that these two *Ideas* do not agree? Or that the three Angles of a *Triangle*, are equal to

two

two Righ tones; what do we more but perceive that Equality to two Right ones, does neceſſarily agree to, and is inſeparable from the three Angles of a Triangle? But to underſtand a little more diſtinctly, wherein this Agreement or Diſagreement conſiſts; we may reduce it all to theſe *Four ſorts*; Firſt, *Identity* or *Diverſity*; Secondly, *Relation*; Thirdly, *Co-exiſtence*; Fourthly, *Real Exiſtence*.

1. *Identity* or *Diverſity*; 'Tis the firſt Act of the Mind, *to perceive its* Ideas; and ſo far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby to perceive their difference, that is, the One not to be the Other: by this the Mind clearly perceives each *Idea* to agree with it ſelf, and to be what it is; and all diſtinct *Ideas* to diſagree. This it does without any pains or deduction, by its natural Power of Perception and Diſtinction. This is what Men of Art have reduced to thoſe General Rules, *viz. What is, is.* And *It is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be, and not to be.* But no *Maxime* can make a Man know it clearer, that *Round* is not *Square*, than the bare perception of thoſe two *Ideas*, which the Mind at firſt ſight perceives to diſagree.

2. The next ſort of Agreement or Diſagreement the Mind perceives in any of its *Ideas* may be called *Relative*, and is nothing but the Perception of the Relation, between any two *Ideas* of what kind ſoever: that is, their Agreement or Diſagreement one with another in ſeveral ways the Mind takes of comparing them.

3. The Third ſort of Agreement or Diſagreement to be found in our *Ideas*, is *Co-exiſtence* or *Non-coexiſtence* in the ſame Subject; and this belongs particularly to Subſtances. Thus when we pronounce concerning *Gold*, that it is fixed, it amounts to no more but this, that Fixedneſs, or a power to remain in the Fire unconſumed, is an *Idea* that always accompanies that particular ſort of *Yellowneſs*, *Weight*, *Fuſibility*, &c. which make our Complex *Idea*, ſignified by the word *Gold*.

4. The Fourth ſort is that of actual and *real Exiſtence* agreeing to any *Idea*. Within theſe Four ſorts of Agreement or Diſagreement, I ſuppoſe is contained all the Knowledge we have, or are capable of. For all that we know or can affirm concerning any *Idea*, is, that it is, or is not

not the ſame with ſome other: As that *Blue is not Yellow.* That it does, or does not co-exiſt with another in the ſame ſubject: As that *Iron is ſuſceptible of Magnetical Impreſſions*; That it has that or this Relation to ſome other *Ideas*: As that *Two Triangles upon equal Baſes between two parallels are equal*: or that it has a real Exiſtence without the Mind: As, *That God is.*

There are ſeveral ways wherein the Mind is poſſeſs'd of Truth, each of which is called Knowledge. *Firſt*, There is *Actual Knowleage*, when the Mind has a preſent view of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of its *Ideas*, or of the Relation they have one with another. *Secondly*, A Man is ſaid to know any Propoſition, when having once evidently perceived the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas*, whereof it conſiſts, and ſo lodged it in his Memory, that whenever it comes to be reflected on again, the Mind aſſents to it without Doubt or Heſitation, and is certain of the Truth of it. And this may be called *Habitual Knowledge*: And thus a Man may be ſaid to know all thoſe Truths which are lodged in his Memory,

by a foregoing clear, and full Perception.

Of this there are vulgarly ſpeaking *Two Degrees.* The one is of ſuch Truths laid up in the Memory, as whenever they occur to the Mind, it actually perceives the Relation, that is between thoſe *Ideas.* And this is in all thoſe Truths, where the *Ideas* themſelves, by an immediate view, diſcover their Agreement or Diſagreement one with another. The other is of ſuch Truths, whereof the Mind having been convinced, it retains the Memory of the Conviction, without the proofs. Thus a Man that remembers certainly, that he once perceived the Demonſtration, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right ones, is commonly allowed to know it, becauſe he cannot doubt of the Truth of it. But yet having forgot the Demonſtration, he rather believes his Memory, than knows the thing; or rather it is ſomething between Opinion and Knowledge: A Sort of Aſſurance, that exceeds bare belief, which relies on the Teſtimony of another; and yet comes ſhort of perfect Knowledge.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Of the Degrees of our Knowledge.

ALL our Knowlede conſiſting in the view the Mind has of its own *Ideas*, which is the utmoſt Light, and greateſt Certainty we are capable of; The *different clearneſs of our Knowledge*, ſeems to lye in the different way of Perception, the Mind has of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of its *Ideas*.

When the Mind perceives this Agreement or Diſagreement, of two *Ideas*, *immediately* by themſelves, without the Intervention of any other; we may call it *Intuitive Knowledge*, in which caſes the Mind perceives the Truth, as the Eye does Light, only by being directed towards it; of this ſort are, that *White is not Black*, that *Three are more than Two*, and *equal to One and Two*. This part of Knowledge is irreſiſtible, and like the bright Sun-ſhine, forces it ſelf immediately to be perceived as ſoon as ever the

the Mind turns its view that way. It is on this *Intuition*, that depends all the Certainty and Evidence of our other Knowledge; which Certainty every one finds to be ſo great, that he cannot imagine, and therefore not require a greater.

The next degree of Knowledge is, where the Mind perceives not this Agreement or Diſagreement immediately, or by the *Juxta-poſition* as it were of the *Ideas*, becauſe thoſe *Ideas*, concerning whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement the Enquiry is made, cannot by the Mind be ſo put together, as to ſhew it. In this caſe the Mind is fain to diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement which it ſearches, by the Intervention of other *Ideas*: and this is that which we call *Reaſoning*: And thus if we would know the Agreement or Diſagreement in bigneſs, between the three Angles of a Triangle, and two right Angles; we cannot by an immediate view, and comparing them do it; becauſe the three Angles of a Triangle cannot be brought at once, and be compared with any other one, or two Angles. And ſo of this, the Mind has no immediate or Intuitive

Knowledge.

Knowledge. In this caſe the Mind is fain to find out ſome other Angles, to which the three Angles of a Triangle have equality, and finding thoſe equal to two Right ones, comes to know the equality of theſe three Angles to two Right ones. Thoſe intervening *Ideas*, which ſerve to ſhew the Agreement of any two others, are called *Proofs* And where the Agreement or Diſagreement is by this means plainly and clearly perceived, it is called *Demonſtration.* A quickneſs in the Mind to find thoſe Proofs, and to apply them right, is, I ſuppoſe, that which is called *Sagacity.*

This Knowledge, thô it be certain, is not ſo clear and evident as *Intuitive* Knowledge. It requires pains and attention, and ſteady application of Mind, to diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* it conſiders, and there muſt be a Progreſſion by Steps and Degrees, before the Mind can in this way arrive at Certainty. Before Demonſtration there was a Doubt, which in *Intuitive* Knowledge cannot happen to the Mind, that has its Faculty of Perception left to a Degree capable of diſtinct *Ideas*, no more than it can be a Doubt to the Eye

(that can diſtinctly ſee *White* and *Black*) whether this Ink and Paper be all of a Colour.

Now in every ſtep that Reaſon makes in *Demonſtrative* Knowledge; there is an *Intuitive* Knowledge of that Agreement or Diſagreement it ſeeks with the next intermediate *Idea* which it uſes as a proof; for if it were not ſo, that yet would need a proof; ſince without the Perception of ſuch Agreement or Diſagreement, there is no Knowledge produced. By which it is evident, that every ſtep in reaſoning, that produces Knowledge, has *Intuitive* Certainty; which when the Mind perceives, there is no more required but to remember it, to make the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* concerning which we enquire, Viſible and Certain. This *Intuitive* Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of the Intermediate *Ideas* in each ſtep and progreſſion of the Demonſtration, muſt alſo be exactly carried in the Mind; and a Man muſt be ſure that no part is left out: which becauſe in long Deductions, the Memory cannot eaſily retain; this Knowledge becomes more imperfect than *Intuitive*; and Men often

ten embrace Falſhoods, for Demonſtrations.

It has been generally taken for granted, that *Mathematicks* alone are capable of Demonſtrative Certainty. But to have ſuch an Agreement or Diſagreement as may be *Intuitively* perceived, being as I imagine not the priviledge of the *Ideas* of *Number*, *Extenſion* and *Figure* alone; it may poſſibly be the want of due Method and Application in us, and not of ſufficient Evidence in Things, that Demonſtration has been thought to have ſo little to do in other parts of Knowledge. For in whatever *Ideas* the Mind can perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement immediately, there it is capable of *Intuitive* Knowledge: and where it can perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of any two *Ideas*, by an *Intuitive* Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement they have with any intermediate *Ideas*, there the Mind is capable of Demonſtration, which is not limited to the *Ideas* of Figure, Number, Extenſion, or their Modes. The reaſon why it has been generally ſuppoſed to belong to them only, is becauſe in comparing their Equality or Exceſs, the *Modes of Numbers*

bers have every the leaſt difference, very clear and perceivable: And in *Extenſion*, thô every the leaſt exceſs is not ſo perceptible, yet the Mind has found out ways to diſcover the juſt Equality of two Angles, Extenſions or Figures: and both, that is, Numbers and Figures can be ſet down by viſible and laſting Marks.

But in other Simple *Ideas*, whoſe Modes and Differences are made and counted by Degrees, and not Quantity, we have not ſo nice and accurate a diſtinction of their Differences, as to perceive, or find ways to meaſure their juſt Equality, or the leaſt Differences. For thoſe other Simple *Ideas* being Appearances or Senſations produced in us, by the *Size*, *Figure*, *Motion*, &c. of minute Corpuſcles ſingly inſenſible; their different Degrees alſo depend on the variation of ſome, or all of thoſe Cauſes, which ſince it cannot be obſerved by us in Particles of Matter, whereof each is too ſubtile to be perceived, it is impoſſible for us to have any exact meaſures of the different Degrees of theſe Simple *Ideas*. Thus for Inſtance, not knowing what number of Particles, nor what motion

tion of them is fit to produce any preciſe degree of *Whiteneſs*; we cannot demonſtrate the certain Equality of any two degrees of *Whiteneſs*, becauſe we have no certain Standard to meaſure them by, nor means to diſtinguiſh every the leaſt difference: the only help we have being from our Senſes, which in this point fail us.

But where the difference is ſo great as to produce in the Mind *Ideas* clearly diſtinct; there *Ideas* of *Colours*, as we ſee in different kinds, *Blue* and *Red* (for inſtance) are as capable of Demonſtration, as *Ideas* of Number and Extenſion. What is here ſaid of Colours, I think holds true in all Secondary Qualities. Theſe two then, *Intuition* and *Demonſtration*, are the degrees of our *Knowledge*, whatever comes ſhort of one of theſe, is but *Faith* or *Opinion*, not *Knowledge*, at leaſt in all *General Truths*. There is indeed another Perception of the Mind employed about the *particular Exiſtence of finite Beings*, without us, which going beyond probability, but not reaching to either of the foregoing degrees of Certainty, paſſes under the name of Knowledge.

Nothing

Nothing can be more certain, than that the *Idea* we receive from an External Object is in our Minds: this is *Intuitive Knowledge*; but whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of any Thing without us, corresponding to that *Idea*, is that whereof some Men think there may be a question made, because Men may have such an *Idea* in their Minds, when no such Thing Exists, no such Object affects their Senses. But 'tis evident that we are invincibly Conscious to our selves of a different Perception, when we look upon the *Sun* in the Day, and think on it by Night; when we actually taste *Wormwood*, or smell a *Rose*, or only think on that *Savour* or *Odour*: so that I think we may add to the two former sorts of Knowledge, this also of the Existence of particular external Objects, by that Perception and Consciousness we have, of the actual entrance of *Ideas* from them, and allow these three degrees of Knowledge, *viz. Intuitive*, *Demonstrative*, and *Sensitive*,

But since our Knowledge is founded on, and employed about our *Ideas* only: Will it follow thence that it must be conformable to our *Ideas*, and that where our

our *Ideas* are clear and distinct, obscure and confused, there our Knowledge will be so too? *I answer, No*: For our Knowledge consisting in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any two *Ideas*; its clearness or obscurity consists in the clearness or obscurity of that Perception, and not in the clearness or obscurity of the *Ideas* themselves. A Man (for instance) that has a clear *Idea* of the Angles of a Triangle, and of Equality to two Right ones, may yet have but an obscure Perception of their Agreement; and so have but a very obscure Knowledge of it. But obscure and confused *Ideas* can never produce any clear or distinct Knowledge: because, as far as any *Ideas* are obscure or confused, so far the Mind can never perceive clearly, whether they Agree or Disagree.

CHAP. III.

Of the Extent of Humane Knowledge.

FRom what has been ſaid concerning Knowledge, it follows that, *Firſt*, We can have no Knowledge farther than we have *Ideas*.

Secondly, That we have no Knowledge farther than we can have Perception of that Agreement or Diſagreement of our *Ideas*, either by *Intuition*, *Demonſtration*, or *Senſation*.

Thirdly, We cannot have an *Intuitive* Knowledge that ſhall extend it ſelf to all our *Ideas*, and all that we would know about them; becauſe we cannot examine and perceive all the Relations they have one to another, by Juxta-poſition, or an immediate Compariſon one with another. Thus we cannot *intuitively* perceive the equality of two Extenſions, the difference of whoſe Figures makes their parts uncapable of an exact and immediate application.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, our *rational* Knowledge can not reach to the whole extent of our *Ideas*; becauſe between two different *Ideas* we would examine, we cannot always find ſuch *proofs*, as we can connect one to another, with an *Intuitive* Knowledge in all the parts of the Deduction.

Fifthly, *Senſitive* Knowledge reaching no farther than the Exiſtence of Things actually preſent to our Senſes, is yet much narrower than either of the former.

Sixthly, From all which it is evident, that the *extent of our Knowledge*, comes not only ſhort of the Reality of *Things*, but even of the extent of our own *Ideas*. We have the *Ideas* of a *Square*, a *Circle* and *Equality*, and yet perhaps ſhall never be able to find a *Circle equal to a Square*.

The Affirmations or Negations we make concerning the *Ideas* we have, being reduced to the four Sorts above-mentioned, *viz. Identity*, *Co-exiſtence*, *Relation*, and *Real Exiſtence*; I ſhall examine how far our Knowledge extends in each of theſe.

Firſt, As to *Identity and Diverſity*, our *Intuitive* Knowledge is as far extended as our *Ideas* themſelves; and there can

be no *Idea* in the Mind, which it does not presently by an *Intuitive Knowledge*, perceive to be what it is, and to be different from any other.

Secondly, As to the Agreement or Disagreement of our *Ideas* in *Co-existence*: in this our Knowledge is very short, thô in this consists the greatest and most material part of our Knowledge, concerning *Substances*: for our *Ideas* of *Substances* being as I have shewed, nothing but certain *Collections of Simple* Ideas, *co-existing in one Subject*, (Our *Idea* of *Flame* for Instance, is a Body *hot*, *Luminous* and *moving upward*.) When we would know any thing farther concerning this or any other sort of Substance, What do we but enquire what other Qualities or Powers these Substances have or have not? which is nothing else but to know, what other Simple *Ideas* do, or do not *Co-exist* with those that make up that Complex *Idea*. The reason of this is, because the Simple *Ideas* which make up our Complex *Ideas* of Substances, have no visible necessary Connexion or Inconsistence with other Simple *Ideas*, whose co-existence with them we would inform our selves about. These *Ideas* being likewise for the most

part

part *Secundary Qualities*, which depend upon the *Primary* Qualities of their minute or inſenſible Parts, or on ſomething yet more remote from our Comprehenſion; it is impoſſible we ſhould know which have a neceſſary Union, or Inconſiſtency one with another, ſince we know not the root from whence they ſpring, or the Size, Figure, and Texture of Parts on which they depend, and from which they reſult.

Beſides this, there is no *diſcoverable Connexion* between any *Secundary* Qualitie, and thoſe *Primary* Qualities that it depends on. We are ſo far from knowing what Figure, Size or Motion produces, (for Inſtance) A *Yellow Colour*, or *Sweet Taſte*, or a *Sharp Sound*, that we can by no means conceive how any *Size*, *Figure*, or *Motion* can poſſibly produce in us the *Idea* of any *Colour*, *Taſte* or *Sound* whatſoever; and there is no conceivable Connexion between the One and the Other.

Our Knowledge therefore of Co-exiſtence reaches little farther than *Experience*. Some few indeed of the *Primary* Qualities have a neceſſary Dependance, and viſible Connexion one with another:

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As *Figure* neceſſarily ſuppoſes *Extenſion*: *receiving or communicating Motion by Impulſe*, ſuppoſes *Solidity*. But Qualities Co-exiſtent in any Subject, without this Dependance and Connexion, cannot certainly be known to Co-exiſt any farther, than Experience by our Senſes informs us. Thus, thô upon trial we find *Gold* Yellow, Weighty, Malleable, Fuſible and Fixed, yet becauſe none of theſe have any evident Dependance, or neceſſary Connexion with the other; we cannot certainly know, that where any *Four* of theſe are, the *Fifth* will be there alſo, how highly probable ſoever it may be: But the higheſt degree of *Probability*, amounts not to *Certainty*; without which, there can be no true Knowledge: For this Co-exiſtence can be no farther known, then it is perceived; and it cannot be perceived, but either in *particular* Subjects, by the obſervation of our Senſes; or in *general*, by the neceſſary Connexion of the *Ideas* themſelves.

As to *Incompatibility*, or *Repugnancy to Co-exiſtence*, we may know that any Subject can have of each ſort of *Primary* Qualities, but One particular at once. One Extenſion, One Figure; and ſo

ſo of ſenſible *Ideas* peculiar to each Senſe: For whatever of each kind, is preſent in any Subject, excludes all other of that Sort; for Inſtance, One Subject cannot have *Two Smells*, or *Two Colours* at the ſame time.

As to *Powers of Subſtances*, which makes a great part of our Enquiries about them, and is no inconſiderable branch of our Knowledge: Our Knowledge as to theſe reaches little farther than *Experience*; becauſe they conſiſt in a Texture and Motion of Parts, which we cannot by any means come to diſcover; and I doubt whether with thoſe *Faculties* we have, we ſhall ever be able to carry our general Knowledge much farther in this part. *Experience* is that which in this part we muſt depend on; and it were to be wiſhed that it were improved: we find the Advantages ſome Mens generous pains, have this way brought to the ſtock of *Natural Knowledge*. And if others, eſpecially the *Philoſophers by Fire* who pretend to it, had been ſo wary in their Obſervations, and ſincere in their Reports, as thoſe who call themſelves *Philoſophers* ought to have been: our acquaintance with the Bodies here about us, and our

insight into their Powers and Operations had been yet much greater.

As to the Third Sort the *Agreement or Disagreement of our* Ideas *in any other Relation*: This is the largest field of Knowledge, and it is hard to determine how far it may extend. This part depending on our Sagacity in finding intermediate *Ideas*, that may shew the Habitudes and Relations of *Ideas*; It is an hard matter to tell when we are at an end of such Discoveries. They that are ignorant of *Algebra*, cannot imagine the Wonders in this kind, are to be done by it: and what farther Improvements and Helps, advantageous to other parts of Knowledge, the Sagacious Mind of Man may yet find out, it is not easy to determine. This at least I believe that the *Ideas* of *Quantity*, are not those alone that are capable of Demonstration and Knowledge: and that other, and perhaps more useful parts of Contemplation, would afford us Certainty, if Vices, Passions, and domineering Interests, did not oppose or menace Endeavours of this kind.

The *Idea* of a *Supream Being*, Infinite in Power, Goodness, and Wisdom, whose Workmanship we are, and on whom we depend;

depend; and the *Idea* of *our Selves*, as understanding rational Creatures, would I suppose, if duly considered, afford such Foundations of our *Duty*, and *Rules of Action*, as might place *Morality* among the Sciences capable of Demonstration: wherein I doubt not but from Principles as Inconteſtable as thoſe of the *Mathematicks*, by neceſſary Conſequences, the meaſure of *Right* and *Wrong* might be made out, to any one that will apply himſelf with the ſame Indifferency and Attention to the One, as he does to the Other of theſe Sciences. The Relations of other Modes may certainly be perceived as well as thoſe of Number, and Extenſion. *Where there is no Property, there is no Injuſtice*, is a Propoſition as certain as any Demonſtration in *Euclid*: for the *Idea* of *Property*, being a right to any thing; and the *Idea* of *Injuſtice*, being the invaſion or violation of that Right: it is evident that theſe *Ideas* being thus eſtabliſhed, and theſe Names annexed to them, I can as certainly know this Propoſition to be true, as that a *Triangle has three Angles equal to Two right ones*. Again, *No Government allows abſolute Liberty*. The *Idea* of *Government* being the eſtabliſh-

ment

ment of Society upon certain Rules or Laws, which require Conformity to them; and the *Idea* of *Abſolute Liberty*, being for any one to do whatever he pleaſes, I am as capable of being certain of the Truth of this Propoſition, as of any in *Mathematicks*.

What has given the advantage to the *Ideas* of *Quantity*, and made them thought more capable of Certainty and Demonſtration, is,

Firſt, That they can be repreſented by ſenſible Marks, which have a nearer Correſpondence with them, than any Words or Sounds. *Diagrams* drawn on Paper, are Copies of the *Ideas*, and not liable to the uncertainty that Words carry in their Signification. But we have no ſenſible Marks that reſemble our *Moral Ideas*, and nothing but Words to expreſs them by; which thô, when written, they remain the ſame; yet the *Ideas* they ſtand for, may change in the ſame Man; and it is very ſeldom that they are not different in different Perſons.

Secondly, *Moral Ideas* are commonly more Complex than Figures: whence theſe two Inconveniencies follow: *Firſt*, That their Names are of more uncertain Signi-

Signification; the preciſe collection of Simple *Ideas* they ſtand for, not being ſo eaſily agreed on, and ſo the ſign that is uſed for them in Communication always, and in Thinking often, does not ſteadily carry with it the ſame *Idea*. *Secondly*, The Mind cannot eaſily retain thoſe preciſe Combinations ſo exactly and perfectly as is neceſſary; in the examination of the Habitudes and Correſpondencies, Agreements or Diſagreements of ſeveral of them one with another, eſpecially where it is to be judged of by long Deductions, and the intervention of ſeveral other Complex *Ideas*, to ſhew the Agreement or Diſagreement of two remote ones.

One part of theſe Diſadvantages in *Moral Ideas*, which has made them be thought not capable of Demonſtration, may in a good meaſure be remedied by *Definitions*, ſetting down that collection of Simple *Ideas* which every Term ſhall ſtand for, and then uſing the Terms ſteadily and conſtantly for that preciſe Collection.

As to the Fourth ſort of Knowledge, *viz.* of *the real actual exiſtence of Things*, we have an *Intuitive* Knowledge of our

own

own Exiſtence: a *Demonſtrative* Knowledge, of *the Exiſtence of God*; and a *Senſitive* Knowledge of *the Objects that preſent themſelves to our Senſes.*

From what has been ſaid we may diſcover the *Cauſes of our Ignorance*, which are chiefly theſe Three; *Firſt*, want of *Ideas*; *Secondly*, Want of a diſcoverable Connexion between the *Ideas* we have. *Thirdly*, Want of tracing and examining our *Ideas.*

Firſt, There are ſome things we are ignorant of for *want of Ideas.* All the Simple *Ideas* we have, are confined to the obſervation of our Senſes, and the operations of our own Minds, that we are conſcious of in our Selves. What other *Ideas* it is poſſible other Creatures may have, by the aſſiſtance of other Senſes and Faculties more or perfecter than we have, or different from ours, it is not for us to determine; but to ſay or think, there are no ſuch, becauſe we conceive nothing of them, is no better an Argument, than if a blind Man ſhould be poſitive in it, that there was no ſuch thing as Sight and Colours, becauſe he had no manner of *Idea* of any ſuch thing. What Faculties therefore other ſpecies of Creatures

Creatures have to penetrate into the Nature and inmoſt conſtitutions of Things, we know not. This we know, and certainly find, that we want other views of them, beſides thoſe we have to make diſcoveries of them more perfect. The *Intellectual* and *Senſible* World are in this perfectly alike, that the parts which we ſee of either of them, hold no proportion with that we ſee not, and whatſoever we can reach with our Eyes, or our Thoughts of either of them, is but a point, almoſt nothing, in compariſon of the reſt.

Another great cauſe of Ignorance, is *the want of* Ideas *that we are capable of.* This keeps us in ignorance of Things we conceive capable of being known. Bulk, Figure and Motion we have *Ideas* of: yet not knowing what is the particular Bulk, Motion and Figure of the greateſt part of the Bodies of the Univerſe, we are ignorant of the ſeveral Powers, Efficacies, and ways of Operation, whereby the effects we daily ſee, are produced. Theſe are hid from us in ſome things, by being *too Remote*, in others by being *too Minute.*

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When we consider the vast distance of the known and visible parts of the World, and the reasons we have to think that what lies within our Ken, is but a small part of the immense Universe; we shall then discover an huge abyss of Ignorance. What are the particular Fabricks of the great Masses of Matter, which make up the whole stupendous frame of corporeal Beings, how far they are extended, and what is their motion, and how continued, and what influence they have upon one another, are contemplations that at first glimpse our Thoughts lose themselves in. If we confine our Thoughts to this little Canton, I mean this System of our Sun, and the grosser Masses of Matter that visibly move about it; What several sorts of Vegetables, Animals, and Intellectual corporeal Beings, infinitely different from those of our little spot of Earth, may probably be in other *Planets*, to the knowledge of which, even of their outward Figures, and Parts, we can no way attain, whilst we are confined to this Earth, there being no natural means, either by Sensation or Reflection, to convey their certain *Ideas* into our Minds?

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There are other Bodies in the Univerſe, no leſs concealed from us by their *Minuteneſs*. Theſe inſenſible Corpuſcles being the active parts of Matter, and the great inſtruments of Nature, on which depend all their *Secundary* Qualities and Operations, our want of preciſe diſtinct *Ideas*, and their *Primary* Qualities, keeps us in incurable Ignorance of what we deſire to know about them. Did we know the Mechanical Affections of *Rhubarb* or *Opium*, we might as eaſily account for their Operations of *Purging* and *cauſing Sleep*, as a Watch-maker can for the Motions of his Watch. The diſſolving of Silver in *Aqua fortis*, or Gold in *Aqua Regia*, and not *Vice verſâ*, would be then perhaps no more difficult to know, than it is to a *Smith*, to underſtand why the turning of one Key, will open a Lock, and not the turning of another. But whilſt we are deſtitute of Senſes, acute enough to diſcover the minute Particles of Bodies, and to give us *Ideas* of their Mechanical Affections, we muſt be content to be ignorant of their Properties and Operations; nor can we be aſſured about them any farther, than ſome few Trials we make, are able

able to reach: but whether they will ſucceed again another time, we cannot be certain. This hinders our certain Knowledge of Univerſal Truths concerning Natural Bodies: and our Reaſon carries us herein very little beyond particular Matter of Fact. And therefore I am apt to doubt, that how far ſoever Humane Induſtry may advance uſeful and *Experimental Philoſophy* in Phyſical Things, yet *Scientifical* will ſtill be out of our reach; becauſe we want perfect and adequate *Ideas* of thoſe very Bodies which are neareſt to us, and moſt under our Command.

This at firſt ſight ſhews us how diſproportionate our Knowledge is to the whole extent, even of *Material* Beings: to which, if we add the Conſideration of that infinite number of *Spirits* that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our Knowledge, whereof we have no cognizance: we ſhall find this cauſe of Ignorance, conceal from us in an impenetrable Obſcurity, almoſt the whole *Intellectual* World: a greater Certainly, and more beautiful World than the *material*. For bating ſome very few *Ideas* of Spirit, we get from our own Mind

Mind by Reflection, and from thence the beſt we can collect, of the *Father of all Spirits*, the Author of them, and us, and all Things: we have no certain Information, ſo much as of the *Exiſtence* of other Spirits but by Revelation: much leſs have we diſtinct *Ideas* of their different Natures, States, Powers, and ſeveral Conſtitutions, wherein they agree or differ one from another, and from us. And therefore in what concerns their different Species, and Properties, we are under an abſolute Ignorance.

The *Second* cauſe of Ignorance is the *want of diſcoverable Connexion* between thoſe *Ideas* we have; where we want that, we are utterly incapable of *Univerſal* and *Certain* Knowledge; and are as in the former caſe, left only to *Obſervation* and *Experiment*. Thus the Mechanical Affections of Bodies, having no affinity at all with the *Ideas* they produce in us; we can have no diſtinct Knowledge of ſuch operations beyond our Experience; and can reaſon no otherwiſe about them, than as the effects or appointment of an Infinitly *Wiſe Agent*, which perfectly ſurpaſs our Comprehenſions.

The operation of our Minds upon our Bodies, is as unconceivable. How any *Thought* ſhould produce a Motion in *Body*, is as remote from the nature of our *Ideas*, as how any *Body* ſhould produce any *Thought* in the *Mind*. That it is ſo, if Experience did not convince us, the conſideration of the Things themſelves, would never be able in the leaſt to diſcover to us.

In ſome of our *Ideas*, there are certain Relations, Habitudes, and Connexions, ſo viſibly included in the nature of the *Ideas* themſelves, that we cannot conceive them ſeparable from them by any Power whatſoever: In theſe only we are capable of Certain and Univerſal Knowledge. Thus the *Ideas* of a *right lined Triangle*, neceſſarily carries with it, an *Equality of its Angles to two right ones*. But the coherence and continuity of the Parts of Matter; the production of Senſation in us, of *Colours* and *Sounds*, &c. by Impulſe, and Motion, being ſuch wherein we can diſcover no natural Connexion with any *Ideas* we have, we cannot but aſcribe them to the arbitrary Will and good Pleaſure of the wiſe Architect.

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The Things that we obſerve conſtantly to proceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a Law ſet them; but yet by a Law that we know not; whereby, thô Cauſes work ſteadily, and effects conſtantly flow from them; yet their Connexions and Dependencies being not diſcoverable in our *Ideas*, we can have but an experimental Knowledge of them. Several Effects come every day within the notice of our *Senſes*, of which we have ſo far *Senſitive* Knowledge. But the Cauſes, Manner and Certainty of their Production, we muſt for the foregoing reaſons be content to be ignorant of. In theſe we can go no farther than particular *Experience* informs us of matter of Fact, and by *Analogy*, gueſs what Effects the like Bodies are upon other Tryals like to produce. But as to perfect Science of *Natural Bodies* (not to mention *Spiritual* Beings) we are, I think, ſo far from being capable of any ſuch thing, that I conclude it loſt labour to ſeek after it.

The *Third* cauſe of Ignorance is our *Want of tracing thoſe* Ideas *we have*, or may have; and finding out thoſe intermediate *Ideas* which may ſhew us what

Habitude of Agreement or Diſagreement, they may have one with another: and thus many are ignorant of *Mathematical* Truths, for want of application in enquiring, examining, and by due ways comparing thoſe *Ideas*.

Hitherto we have examined the *Extent* of our Knowledge, in reſpect of the ſeveral ſorts of Beings that are. There is another *Extent* of it, in reſpect of *Univerſality*, which will alſo deſerve to be conſidered; and in this regard our Knowledge follows the Nature of our *Ideas*. If the *Ideas* are *Abſtract*, whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement we perceive, our Knowledge is *Univerſal*. For what is known of ſuch general *Ideas*, will be true of every particular thing in which that *Eſſence*, that is, that *Abſtract Idea* is to be found: And what is once known of ſuch *Ideas*, will be perpetually, and for ever true. So that as to all general Knowledge, we muſt ſearch and find it only in our own Minds: and it is only the examining of our own *Ideas*, that furniſhes us with the Truths belonging to Eſſences of Things (that is, to *Abſtract Ideas*) that are *Eternal*, and are to be found out by the Contempla-

tion

tion only of thoſe Eſſences; as the Exiſtence of Things is to be known only from Experience. But I ſhall ſay more of this in the following Chapters, where I ſhall ſpeak of *General*, and *Real* Knowledge.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Reality of our Knowledge.

I Doubt not but my Reader by this time, may be apt to think that I have been all this while, only building a *Caſtle* in the Air: and be ready to object, If it be true, that all Knowledge lies only in the perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our own *Ideas*, the Viſions of an *Enthuſiaſt*, and the reaſonings of a *Sober* Man will be equally Certain: It is no matter how Things are, ſo a Man obſerve but the Agreement of his own Imaginations, and talk conformably, It is all Truth, all Certainty, That an *Harpy* is not a *Centaur*, is by this way as certain Knowledge, and as much Truth, as that a Square is not a Circle.

But of what uſe is all this knowledge of Mens own imaginations, to a Man that enquires after the reality of Things?

To which *I Anſwer*, That if our knowledge of our *Ideas* ſhould terminate in them, and reach no farther, where there is ſomething farther intended; our moſt ſerious Thoughts would be of little more uſe, than the *Reveries* of a crazy Brain. But I hope before I have done, to make it evident, that this way of *Certainty* by the knowledge of our own *Ideas*, goes a little farther, than bare imagination: and that all the certainty of general Truths a Man has, lies in nothing elſe but this knowledge of our *Ideas*.

'Tis evident that the Mind knows not Things immediately, but by the intervention of the *Ideas* it has of them. Our Knowledge therefore is *real*, only ſo far as there is a conformity bteween our *Ideas*, and the reality of Things. But how ſhall we know when our *Ideas* agree, with Things themſelves? I Anſwer, There be *Two ſorts* of *Ideas* that, we may be aſſured agree with Things: Theſe are,

Firſt,

Firſt, *Simple* Ideas; Which ſince the Mind can by no means make to it ſelf, muſt be the effect of Things operating upon the Mind, in a natural way; and producing therein thoſe Perceptions, which by the Will of our Maker, they are ordained and adapted to. Hence it follows, that *Simple Ideas* are not fictions of our Fancies, but the natural and regular productions of Things without us, really operating upon us; which carry with them all the conformity our State requires, which is to repreſent Things, under thoſe appearances they are fitted to produce in us. Thus the *Idea* of *Whiteneſs*, as it is in the Mind, exactly anſwers that Power which is in any Body to produce it there. And this conformity between our *Simple Ideas*, and the exiſtence of Things, is ſufficient for real Knowledge.

Secondly, All our *Complex Ideas*, except thoſe of Subſtances, being *Archetypes*, of the Mind's own making, and not referred to the Exiſtence of Things as to their Originals, cannot want any Conformity neceſſary to real Knowledge. For that which is not deſigned to repreſent any thing but it ſelf, can never be capable of

a wrong Repreſentation. Here the *Ideas* themſelves are conſidered as *Archetypes*, and Things no otherwiſe regarded, than as they are conformable to them. Thus the *Mathematician* conſiders the Truth and Properties belonging to a *Rectangle* or *Circle* only, as they are *Ideas* in his own Mind, which poſſibly he never found exiſting Mathematically, that is, preciſely True: yet his Knowledge is not only Certain, but *Real*; becauſe Real Things are no farther concern'd nor intended to be meant by any ſuch Propoſitions, than as Things really agree to thoſe *Archetypes* in his Mind. It is true of the *Idea* of a *Triangle, that its three Angles are equal to two right ones*; It is true alſo of a *Triangle*, wherever it *Exiſts*: what is true of thoſe *Figures*, that have barely an *Ideal* Exiſtence in his Mind, will hold true of them alſo, when they come to have a *Real* Exiſtence in Matter.

Hence it follows that *Moral* Knowledge, is as capable of *Real Certainty* as *Mathematicks*. For *Certainty* being nothing but the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of our *Ideas*,, and *Demonſtration* nothing, but the Perception of

of ſuch Agreement by the intervention of other *Ideas*; our *Moral Ideas* as well as *Mathematical*, being *Archetypes* themſelves, and ſo Adequate or Complete *Ideas* all the Agreement or Diſagreement we ſhall find in them, will produce *Real* Knowledge as well as in *Mathematical Figures*. That which is requiſite to make our Knowledge *Certain*, is the clearneſs of our *Ideas*; and that which is required to make it *Real*, is, that they anſwer their *Archetypes*.

But it will here be ſaid, That if *Moral* Knowledge be placed in the Contemplation of our own *Moral Ideas*; and thoſe be of our own making, what ſtrange Notions will there be of *Juſtice* and *Temperance*? What confuſion of *Vertues* and *Vices*, if every Man may make what *Ideas* of them he pleaſes? *I Anſwer*, No Confuſion, nor Diſorder at all, in the Things themſelves, nor the Reaſonings about them; no more, than there would be a change in the Properties of Figures, and their Relations one to another, If a Man ſhould make a *Triangle* with four corners, or a *Trapezium* with four right Angles; that is in plain Engliſh, change the Names of the Figures, and call that by one

one Name, which is called ordinarily by another. The change of Name will indeed at first disturb him, who knows not what *Idea*, it stands for: but as soon as the Figure is drawn, the Consequences and Demonstration are plain, and clear. Just the same is it in *Moral* Knowledge: Let a Man have the *Idea* of taking from others, without their consent, what they are justly possessed of, and call this *Justice*, if he pleases: he that takes the Name here, without the *Idea* put to it, will be mistaken by joyning another *Idea* of his own to that Name; but *strip* the *Idea* of that *Name*, or take it such as it is in the Speakers Mind; and the same Things will agree to it, as if you called it *Injustice*.

One thing we are to take notice of, That where *God*, or any other Law-maker has defined any *Moral Names*, there they have made the Essence of that *Species* to which that Name belongs: And there it is not safe to apply, or use them otherwise. But in other cases it is bare impropriety of Speech, to apply them contrary to the common usage of the Country they are used in.

Third'y,

Thirdly, But the Complex *Ideas* which we refer to *Archetypes* without us, may differ from them, and ſo our Knowledge about them may come ſhort of being real: and thus are our *Ideas* of *Subſtances*. Theſe muſt be taken from ſomething, that does or has Exiſted, and not be made up of *Ideas* arbitrarily put together, without any real Pattern. Herein therefore is founded the reality of our Knowledge concerning *Subſtances*, that all our Complex *Ideas* of them muſt be ſuch, and ſuch only, as are made up of ſuch Simple ones, as have been diſcovered to co-exiſt in Nature. Wherever then we perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of our *Ideas*, there is *Certain Knowledge*; and wherever we are ſure thoſe *Ideas* agree with the reality of Things, there is *Certain real Knowledge*.

CHAP

CHAP V.

Of Truth in General.

Truth in the proper import of the Word, ſignifies the joyning or ſeparating of Signs; as the Things ſignified by them, do Agree or Diſagree one with another. The joyning or ſeparating of Signs, is what we call *Propoſitions*; ſo that *Truth* properly belongs only to *Propoſitions*; whereof there are *Two* ſorts, *Mental* and *Verbal*, as there are *Two* ſorts of Signs commonly made uſe of, *Ideas* and *Words*.

'Tis difficult to treat of *Mental* Propoſitions without *Verbal*: becauſe in ſpeaking of *Mental*, we muſt make uſe of *Words*, and then they become *Verbal*. Again, Men commonly in their Thoughts and Reaſonings, uſe *Words* inſtead of *Ideas*; eſpecially if the ſubject of their Meditation contains in it *Complex Ideas*. If we have occaſion to form *Mental* Propoſitions about *White*, *Black*, *Circle*, &c. we can, and often do, frame in our Minds the

the *Ideas* themſelves, without reflecting on the *Names*. But when we would conſider, or make Propoſitions about the more *Complex Ideas*, as of a *Man*, *Vitriol*, *Fortitude*, *Glory*, &c. we uſually put the *Name* for the *Idea*; becauſe the *Idea* theſe *Names* ſtand for, being for the moſt part confuſed, imperfect, and undetermined; we reflect on the *Names* themſelves, as being more Clear, Certain, and Diſtinct, and readier to occur to our Thoughts, than pure *Ideas*: and ſo we make uſe of theſe *Words* inſtead of the *Ideas* themſelves, even when we would Meditate and Reaſon within our ſelves, and make tacit *Mental Propoſitions*.

We muſt then obſerve Two ſorts of *Propoſitions* that we are capable of making. *Firſt*, *Mental Propoſitions*, wherein the *Ideas* in our Underſtandings are put together, or ſeparated by the Mind, perceiving or judging of their Agreement or Diſagreement. *Secondly*, *Verbal Propoſitions*, which are Words put together, or ſeparated in Affirmative or Negative Sentences: So that *Propoſition* conſiſts, in joyning or ſeparating Signs: and *Truth* conſiſts, in putting together or ſeparating theſe Signs, according as the Things they

they ſtand for, Agree or Diſagree.

Truth as well as Knowledge may well come under the Diſtinction of *Verbal* and *Real*; That being only *Verbal Truth*, wherein Terms are joyned according to the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* they ſtand for, without regarding whether our *Ideas* are ſuch as really have or are capable of having an Exiſtence in Nature. But then it is they contain *Real Truth*, when theſe Signs are joyned, as our *Ideas* agree; and when our *Ideas* are ſuch as we know, are capable of having an Exiſtence in Nature: which in Subſtances we cannot know, but by knowing that ſuch have Exiſted. *Truth* is the marking down in Words, the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, as it is. *Falſhood* is the marking down in Words, the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, otherwiſe than it is; and ſo far as theſe *Ideas* thus marked by Sounds, agree to their *Archetypes*, ſo far only is the *Truth Real*. The knowledge of this *Truth* conſiſts in knowing what *Ideas* the Words ſtand for, and the Perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of thoſe *Ideas*, according as it is marked by thoſe Words.

Beſides

Beſides *Truth* taken in the ſtrict Senſe before-mentioned; there are other ſorts of *Truths*, As *Firſt*, *Moral Truth*, which is, ſpeaking Things according to the perſwaſion of our own Minds. *Secondly*, *Metaphyſical Truth*, which is nothing but the Real Exiſtence of Things conformable to the *Ideas*, to which we have annexed their Names.

Theſe Conſiderations of *Truth*, either having been before taken notice of, or not being much to our preſent purpoſe; it may ſuffice here only to have mentioned them.

CHAP. VI.

Of Univerſal Propoſitions, their Truth and Certainty.

THE prevailing Cuſtom of uſing *Sounds*, for *Ideas*, even when Men think and reaſon within their own Breaſts, makes the conſideration of *Words* and *Propoſitions* ſo neceſſary a part of the Treatiſe of Knowledge, that it is very hard to ſpeak intelligibly of the one, without explaining

explaining the other. And ſince *General Truths*, which with Reaſon are moſt ſought after, can never be well made known, and are ſeldom apprehended, but as conceived and expreſſed in Words; it is not out of our way in the Examination of our own Knowledge, to enquire into the *Truth* and *Certainty* of *Univerſal Propoſitions*. But it muſt be obſerved, that Certainty is Twofold, Certainty of *Truth*, and Certainty of *Knowledge*.

Certainty of Truth is, when Words are ſo put together in *Propoſitions*, as exactly to expreſs the Agreement or Diſagreement of the *Ideas* they ſtand for; as really it is. *Certainty of Knowledge*, is to perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, as expreſſed in any *Propoſitions*. This we uſually call *Knowing*, or being Certain of the Truth of any *Propoſition*.

Now becauſe we cannot be Certain of the truth of any *General Propoſition*, unleſs we know the preciſe Bounds and Extent of the *Species* its Terms ſtand for; it is neceſſary we ſhould know the Eſſence of each *Species*, which is that which conſtitutes and bounds it. This in all *Simple Ideas*, and *Modes* is not hard to do: for in theſe the *Real* and *Nominal* Eſſence being

being the ſame, there can be no doubt how far the *Species* extends, or what Things are comprehended under each Term: which it is evident are all that have an exact Conformity with the *Idea* it ſtands for, and no other. But in *Subſtances*, wherein a *Real* Eſſence, diſtinct from the *Nominal*, is ſuppoſed to conſtitute, and bound the *Species*, the extent of the general Word is very uncertain; becauſe not knowing this Real Eſſence, we cannot know what is, or is not of that *Species*, and conſequently what may, or may not with Certainty be affirmed of it.

Hence we may ſee that the Names of Subſtances, when made to ſtand for *Species*, ſuppoſed to be conſtituted by *Real Eſſences*, which we know not, are not capable of conveying Certainty to the Unnderſtanding. Of the *Truth* of *General Propoſitions* made up of ſuch Terms, we cannot be ſure. For how can we be ſure that this or that Quality is in *Gold*, for Inſtance, when we know not what is, or is not *Gold*, that is, what has, or has not the *Real Eſſence* of *Gold*, whereof we have no *Idea* at all. On the other ſide, the Names of Subſtances when made

uſe of for the *Complex Ideas*, Men have in their Minds; thô they carry a clear and determinate Signification with them, will not yet ſerve us to make many Univerſal *Propoſitions*, of whoſe Truth we can be certain: becauſe the *Simple Ideas*, out of which the *Complex* are combined, carry not with them any diſcoverable Connexion, or Repugnancy, but with a very few other *Ideas*. For Inſtance, *All Gold is fixed*, is a *Propoſition* we cannot be certain of how Univerſally ſoever it be believed: For if we take the Term *Gold*, to ſtand for a *Real Eſſence*, it is evident we know not what particular Subſtances are of that *Species*, and ſo cannot with certainty affirm any Thing Univerſally of *Gold*. But if we make the Term *Gold* ſtand for a *Species*, determined by its *Nominal Eſſence*, be its *Complex Idea* what it will; for Inſtance, A Body *Yellow*, *Fuſible*, *Malleable*, and *very heavy*; no Quality can with Certainty be Denyed or Affirmed Univerſally of it, but what has a diſcoverable Connexion, or Inconſiſtency with that *Nominal Eſſence*: *Fixedneſs*, for Inſtance, having no neceſſary Connexion that we can diſcover with any *Simple Idea* that makes the *Complex* one, or with the

the whole Combination together: it is impoſſible that we ſhould certainly know the truth of this Propoſition, *All Gold is fixed.*

But is not this an Univerſal certain Propoſition, *All Gold is Malleable?* I anſwer, it is ſo, if *Malleableneſs* be a part of the *Complex Idea*, the word *Gold* ſtands for: But then here is nothing affirmed of *Gold*, but that, that Sound ſtands for an *Idea*, in which *Malleableneſs* is contained. And ſuch a ſort of Truth and Certainty it is, to ſay, a *Centaur is Four-footed.* I imagine amongſt all the Secundary Qualities of Subſtances, and the Powers relating to them, there cannot any two be named, whoſe neceſſary Co-exiſtence or Repugnance to Co-exiſt can be certainly known, unleſs in thoſe of the ſame Senſe, which neceſſarily exclude one another. Thus by the Colour we cannot certainly know what *Smell*, *Taſt*, &c. any Body is of. 'Tis no wonder then that Certainty is to be found but in very few general Propoſitions concerning Subſtances: Our Knowledge of their Qualities and Properties goes very ſeldom farther than our Senſes reach, or inform us. Inquiſitive and Obſerving Men may by ſtrength of

Judgment, penetrate farther; and on Probabilities taken from wary Obſervations, and Hints well laid together, often gueſs right at what Experience has not yet diſcovered to them: But this is but *gueſſing* ſtill, it amounts only to *Opinion*; and has not that certainty, which is requiſite to *Knowledge*.

To conclude, general Propoſitions of what kind ſoever, are then only capable of Certainty, when the Terms uſed in them, ſtand for ſuch *Ideas*, whoſe Agreement or Diſagreement, as there expreſſed, is capable to be diſcovered by us. And we are then certain of their Truth or Falſhood, when we perceive the *Ideas* they ſtand for, to Agree or not Agree, according as they are affirmed or denyed one of another; whence we may take notice, that general Certainty, is never to be found but in our *Ideas*.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of Maxims.

THERE are a ſort of Propoſitions, which under the Name of *Maxims* and *Axioms*, have paſſed for Principles of Science: and becauſe they are Self-evident, have been ſuppoſed *Innate*. It may be worth while to enquire into the reaſon of their Evidence, and examine how far they influence our other Knowledge.

Knowledge being but the perception of the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Ideas*, where that Agreement or Diſagreement is perceived immediately by it ſelf, without the intervention or help of any other, there our *Knowledge* is *Self-evident*: which being ſo, not only *Maxims*, but an infinite number of other Propoſitions partake equally with them in this Self-evidence. For,

In reſpect of *Identity* and *Diverſity*, we may have as many Self-evident Propoſitions as we have diſtinct *Ideas*. Tis the

First Act of the Mind, to know every one of its *Ideas* by it ſelf, and diſtinguiſh it from others. Every one finds in himſelf, that he knows the *Ideas* he has; that he knows alſo when any one is in his Underſtanding, and what it is; and that when more than one are there, he knows them diſtinctly and unconfuſedly, one from another; ſo that all Affirmations, or Negations concerning them, are made without any poſſibility of doubt or uncertainty; and muſt neceſſarily be aſſented to, as ſoon as underſtood: that is, as ſoon as we have in our Minds the *Ideas* clear and diſtinct, which the Terms in the Propoſition ſtand for. Thus a *Circle is a Circle*, *Blue is not Red*, are as Self-evident Propoſitions, as thoſe general ones, *What is, is*, and *'Tis impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not to be*; nor can the conſideration of theſe *Axioms* add any thing to the Evidence, or Certainty of our Knowledge of them.

As to the Agreement or Diſagreement of *Co-exiſtence*, the Mind has an immediate perception of this, but in very few. And therefore, in this ſort we have very little *Intuitive* Knowledge: thô in ſome few Propoſitions we have. *Two Bodies*

cannot

cannot be in the ſame place I think is a ſelf-evident Propoſition. The *Idea* of fitting a Place equal to the Contents of its Superficies, being annexed to our *Idea* of Body.

As to the Relations of *Modes*, Mathematicians have framed many Axioms concerning that one Relation of Equality, as *Equals taken from Equals, the remainder will be Equal*, &c. which however received for Axioms, yet I think have not a clearer Self-Evidence than theſe, that *One and One are equal to Two*, that if from the Five Fingers of one Hand, you take Two, and from the Five Fingers of the other Hand Two, the remaining Numbers will be equal. Theſe, and a thouſand other ſuch Propoſitions may be found in Numbers, which carry with them an equal, if not greater clearneſs, than thoſe Mathematical Axioms.

As to *Real Exiſtence*, ſince that has no Connexion with any other of our *Ideas*, but that of our Selves, and of a *Firſt Being*; we have not ſo much as a Demonſtrative, much leſs a Self-Evident Knowledge, concerning the *Real Exiſtence* of other Beings.

In the next place let us consider what influence these Maxims have upon the other parts of our Knowledge. The Rules established in the Schools, That all Reasonings are *Ex præcognitis & præconceptis*, seem to lay the foundation of all other Knowledge in these Maxims, and to suppose them to be *Præcognita*; whereby I think is meant Two Things: *First*, That these Axioms are those Truths that are first known to the Mind: *Secondly*, That upon them the other parts of our Knowledge depend.

First, That these Axioms are not the Truths first known to the Mind, is evident from *Experience*: For who knows not that a *Child perceives that a Stranger is not its Mother*, long before he knows, that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be? And how many Truths are there about Numbers, which the Mind is perfectly acquainted with, and fully convinced of, before it ever thought on these general Maxims? Of this the reason is plain; for that which makes the Mind assent to such Propositions, being nothing but the Perception it has of the Agreement or Disagreement of its *Ideas*, according as it finds them affirmed

ed or denied in Words one of another; and every *Idea* being known to be what it is, and every two distinct *Ideas* not to be the same, it must necessarily follow, that such Self-evident Truths must be first known, which consist of *Ideas*, that are first in the Mind; and the *Ideas* first in the Mind, it is evident, are those of particular Things; from whence, by slow degrees the Understanding proceeds to some few general ones, which being taken from the ordinary and familiar Objects of Sense, are settled in the Mind, with general Names to them. Thus particular *Ideas* are first received and distinguished, and so Knowledge got about them, and next to them the less general or specifick, which are next to particular ones.

Secondly, From what has been said, it plainly follows, that these magnified *Maxims* are not the Principles and Foundations of all our other Knowledge: for if there be a great many other Truths, as Self-evident as they, and a great many that we know before them, it is impossible that they should be the Principles, from which we deduce all other Truths. Thus, that *One and Two are equal to Three*, is as evident, and easier known

then that the *Whole is equal to all its parts.* Nor after theknowledge of this Maxim, do we know that One and Two are equal to Three, better, or more certainly, than we did before. For if there be any odds in these *Ideas*, the *Ideas* of *Whole*, and *Parts*, are more obscure, or at least more difficult to be setled in the Mind, than those of *One*, *Two* and *Three*. Either therefore all Knowledge does not depend on certain *Præcognita*, or general Maxims, called Principles; or else, such as these (*That One and One are Two, that Two and Two are Four*, &c.) and a great part of Numeration will be so. To which if we add all the Self-evident Propositions that may be made about all our distinct *Ideas*; Principles will be almost infinite, at least innumerable, which Men arrive to the knowledge of, at different Ages; and a great many of those innate Principles, they never come to know all their Lives. But whether they come in view earlier or later, they are all known by their Native Evidence, and receive no Light, nor are capable of any Proof one from another; much less the more particular, from the more general; or the more simple from the more compounded.

pounded: the more ſimple, and leſs abſtract, being the moſt familiar, and the eaſier and earlier apprehended.

Theſe *general Maxims* then, are only of uſe in diſputes, to ſtop the Mouths of Wranglers; but not of much uſe to the diſcovery of unknown Truths; or to help the Mind forwards in its ſearch after Knowledge. Several general Maxims, are no more than bare verbal Propoſitions; and teach us nothing but the reſpect and import of Names, one to another, as, *The whole is equal to all its Parts*: What real Truth does it teach us more, than what the ſignification of the word *Totum*, or *whole* does of it ſelf import?

But yet, *Mathematicians* do not without reaſon place this, and ſome other ſuch amongſt their *Maxims*; that their Scholars having in the Entrance perfectly acquainted their Thoughts with theſe Propoſitions, made in ſuch general Terms, may have them ready to apply to all particular Caſes: not that if they be equally weighed, they are more clear and evident, than the particular Inſtances they are brought to confirm, but that being more familiar to the Mind, the very naming them is enough to ſatisfy the Underſtanding

derſtanding. But this I ſay, is more from our Cuſtom of uſing them, than the different Evidence of the Things.

So that if rightly conſider'd, I think we may ſay, that where our *Ideas* are clear and diſtinct, there is little, or no uſe at all of theſe *Maxims*, to prove the Agreement or Diſagreement of any of them. He that cannot diſcern the Truth, or falſhood of ſuch Propoſitions, without the help of theſe and the like Maxims, will not be helped by theſe Maxims to do it. He that needs any proof to make him certain, and give his aſſent to this Propoſition, that *Two are equal to Two*, or that *White is not Black*, will alſo have need of a proof to make him admit that, *What is, is*, or, *That it is impoſſible for the ſame thing to be and not to be.*

And as theſe *Maxims* are of little uſe, where we have clear and diſtinct *Ideas*; ſo they are of dangerous uſe, where our *Ideas* are confuſed, and where we uſe words that are not annexed to clear and diſtinct *Ideas*; but to ſuch as are of a looſe and wandring ſignification, ſometimes ſtanding for one, and ſometimes for another *Idea*, from which follows Miſtake and Error, which theſe Maxims (brought

(brought as proofs to eſtabliſh Propoſitions wherein the Terms ſtand for confuſed and uncertain *Ideas*) do by their Authority confirm and rivet.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Trifling Propoſitions.

THere are Univerſal Propoſitions, which thô they be certainly true, yet add no Light to our Underſtandings, bring no increaſe to our Knowledge, ſuch are,

Firſt, All *Purely Identical Propoſitions*. Theſe at firſt *bluſh*, appear to contain no Inſtruction in them: for when we affirm the ſame Term of it ſelf, it ſhews us nothing but what we muſt certainly know before, whether ſuch a Propoſition be either made by, or propoſed to us.

Secondly, Another ſort of trifling Propoſitions is, when a *part of the Complex* Idea *is prædicated of the name of the whole*; a part of the definition, of the word defined, as, *Lead is a Metal, Man an Animal*. Theſe carry no Information at all, to

thoſe

those who know the Complex *Ideas*, the Names *Lead*, and *Man* stand for: Indeed, to a Man that knows the signification of the word *Metal*, and not of the word *Lead*, it is a shorter way to explain the signification of the word *Lead*, by saying it is a *Metal*, than by enumerating the Simple *Ideas* one by one, which make up the Complex *Idea* of *Metal*.

Alike trifling it is to predicate any one of the Simple *Ideas* of a Complex one, of the name of the whole Complex *Idea*: as *All Gold is fusible*; for fusibility being one of the Simple *Ideas* that goes to the making up the Complex one, the Sound *Gold* stands for; what can it be but playing with Sounds, to affirm that of the name *Gold*, which is comprehended in its received signification? What instruction can it carry, to tell one that which he is supposed to know before? For I am supposed to know the signification of the word another uses to me, or else he is to tell me.

The general Propositions that are made about Substances, if they are certain, are for the most part but *Trifling*. And if they are Instructive, are Uncertain; and such as we have no knowledge of their

real

real Truth, how much ſoever conſtant Obſervation and Analogy may aſſiſt our Judgments in *Gueſſing*. Hence it comes to paſs, that one may often meet with very clear and coherent Diſcourſes, that amount yet to nothing. For names of Subſtantial Beings, as well as others, having ſetled Significations affixed to them, may with great Truth be joyned Negatively and Affirmatively in Propoſitions, as their Definitions make them fit to be ſo joyned; and Propoſitions conſiſting of ſuch Terms, may with the ſame clearneſs be deduced one from another, as thoſe that convey the moſt real Truths; and all this without any knowledge of the Nature or Reality of Things exiſting without us. Thus he that has learnt the following words, with their ordinary Acceptations annexed to them, *viz. Subſtance, Man, Animal Form, Soul, Vegetative, Senſitive, Rational*, may make ſeveral undoubted Propoſitions about the *Soul*, without any Knowledge at all of what the Soul really is. And of this ſort a Man may find an infinite number of Propoſitions, Reaſonings and Concluſions in Books of *Metaphyſicks*, *School-Divinity*, and ſome part of *Natural Philoſophy*; and after

after all, know as little of *God*, *Spirits*, or *Bodies*, as he did before he ſet out.

Thirdly, The worſt ſort of *Trifling*, is, *To uſe words looſely and uncertainly*, which ſets us yet farther from the certainty of Knowledge we hope to attain to by them, or find in them. That which occaſions this, is, That Men may find it convenient to ſhelter their Ignorance or Obſtinacy, under the Obſcurity or Perplexedneſs of their Terms; to which, perhaps, Inadvertency and ill Cuſtom does in many Men much contribute.

To conclude, barely *Verbal Propoſitions* may be known by theſe following marks.

Firſt, All Propoſitions, wherein two Abſtract Terms are affirmed one of another, are barely about the ſignification of Sounds. For ſince no Abſtract *Idea* can be the ſame with any other, but it ſelf; when its Abſtract Name is affirmed of any other Term, it can ſignifie no more but this, that it may, or ought to be called by that name; or that theſe two Names ſignify the ſame *Idea*.

Secondly, All Propoſitions, wherein a part of the Complex *Idea*, which any Term ſtands for, is predicated of that Term, are only *Verbal*: and thus all Propoſitions

Propoſitions wherein more comprehenſive Terms called *Genera*, are affirmed of Subordinate, or leſs Comprehenſive, called *Species*, or *Individuals*, are barely *Verbal*. When by theſe two Rules we examine the Propoſitions that make up the Diſcourſes we ordnarily meet with, both in and out of Books; we ſhall, perhaps find, that a greater part of them, than is uſually ſuſpected, are purely about the ſignification of Words, and contain nothing in them, but the uſe and application of theſe Signs.

CHAP. IX.

Of our Knowledge of Exiſtence.

HItherto we have only conſidered the *Eſſences* of Things, which being only *Abſtract Ideas*, and thereby removed in our Thoughts from particular Exiſtence, give us no Knowledge of *Exiſtence* at all. We proceed now to enquire concerning our *Knowledge of the Exiſtence* of Things, and how we come by it.

I ſay then that we have the Knowledge of our *own Exiſtence*, by *Intuition*; of the *Exiſtence of God*, by *Demonſtration*; and of *other Things*, by *Senſation*. As for our *own Exiſtence*, we perceive it ſo plainly, that it neither needs, nor is capable of any proof. I think, I reaſon; I feel Pleaſure and Pain; Can any of theſe be more evident to me, than my *own Exiſtence*? If I doubt of all other Things, that very *Doubt* makes me perceive my *own Exiſtence*, and will not ſuffer me to doubt of that. If I know I doubt, I have as certain a Perception of the *Thing* Doubting, as of that *Thought* which I call *Doubt*. Experience then convinces us that we have an *Intuitive Knowledge of our own Exiſtence*; and an Internal Infallible Perception that we are. In every act of Senſation, Reaſoning or Thinking, we are conſcious to our ſelves of our own Being, and in this matter come not ſhort of the higheſt Degree of *Certainty*.

CHAP.

CHAP X.

Of our Knowledge of the Exiſtence of a God.

THO' *God* has given us no *innate Ideas* of himſelf, yet having furniſhed us with thoſe Faculties our Minds are endowed with, he hath not *left himſelf without a Witneſs*, ſince we have Senſe, Perception, and Reaſon; and cannot want a clear proof of him, as long as we carry our ſelves about us: nor can we juſtly complain of our Ignorance in this great point, ſince he has ſo plentifully provided us with means to diſcover, and know him, ſo far as is neceſſary to the end of our Being, and the great concernment of our Happineſs. But thô this be the moſt obvious Truth that Reaſon diſcovers, yet it requires Thought and Attention: and the Mind muſt apply it ſelf to a Regular deduction of it, from ſome part of our *Intuitiv* Knowledge; or elſe we ſhall be as ignorant of this as of

other Propoſitions which are in themſelves capable of clear demonſtration. To ſhew therefore, that we are capable of Knowing, that is, *being certain*, that *there is a God*, and how we may come by this Certainty, I think we need go no farther than our ſelves, and that undoubted Knowledge we have of our own *Exiſtence*. I think it is beyond queſtion, that *Man has a clear Perception of his own Being*: he knows certainly, that he Exiſts, and that he is Something. In the next place, Man knows by an *Intuitive* Certainty, that *bare nothing can no more produce any real Being, than it can be equal to two Right Angles*. If therefore we know there is ſome Real Being, it is an evident Demonſtration, that *from Eternity there has been Something*; ſince what was not from Eternity, had a Beginning; and what had a Beginning, muſt be produced by ſomething elſe Next it is evident, that *what has its Being from another, muſt alſo have all that which is in, and belongs to its Being from another too:* All the Powers it has muſt be owing to, and received from the ſame Source. This Eternal Source then of all Being muſt be alſo the Source and Original of all Pow-

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er; and ſo this *Eternal Being*, muſt be alſo the *moſt powerful*.

Again, Man finds in himſelf *Perception*, and *Knowledge*: we are certain then that there is not only ſome Being, but ſome Knowing, Intelligent Being in the World. There was a time then, when there was no knowing Being, or elſe there has been a knowing Being from Eternity. If it be ſaid, there was a time when that Eternal Being, had no Knowledge; I reply, that then it is impoſſible there ſhould have ever been any Knowledge. It being as impoſſible that Things wholly void of Knowledge, and operating blindly, and without any Perception, ſhould produce a knowing Being, as it is impoſſible that a Triangle ſhould make it ſelf Three Angles, bigger than Two Right ones.

Thus from the Conſideration of our ſelves, and what we infallibly find in our own Conſtitutions, our Reaſon leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, that *there is an Eternal, moſt Powerful, and Knowing Being*, which, whether any one will call *God*, it matters not. The thing is evident, and from this *Idea* duly conſider'd, will eaſily be deduced

all those other *Attributes*, we ought to ascribe to this *Eternal Being*.

From what has been said, it is plain to me, we have a more certain Knowledge of the Existence of a *God*, than of any thing our Senses have not immediately discovered to us. Nay, I presume I may say, that we more certainly know that there is a *God*, than that there is any thing else without us. When I say, we know, I *mean*, there is such a Knowledge within our reach, which we cannot miss, if we will but apply our Minds to that, as we do to several other Enquiries.

It being then unavoidable for all rational Creatures to conclude, that *something has Existed from Eternity*; let us next see What *kind of Thing* that must be: there are but two sorts of Beings in the World, that Man knows or conceives; *First*, Such as are purely material, without Sense or Perception, as the clippings of our Beards, and parings of our Nails. *Secondly*, Sensible perceiving Beings; such as we find our selves to be. These two sorts we shall hereafter call *Cogitative* and *Incogitative* Beings; which to our present purpose are better than *Material* and *Immaterial*.

If then there muſt be ſomething *Eternal*, it is very obvious to Reaſon, that it muſt neceſſarily be a *Cogitative* Being, Becauſe it is as impoſſible to conceive that ever bare *Incogitative* Matter ſhould produce a *Thinking* intelligent Being, as that nothing ſhould of it ſelf produce Matter. Let us ſuppoſe any parcel of Matter *Eternal*, we ſhall find it in it ſelf unable to produce any thing. Let us ſuppoſe its parts firmly at reſt together: if there were no other Being in the World, muſt it not Eternally remain ſo, a dead unactive Lump? Is it poſſible to conceive it can add Motion to it ſelf, or produce any thing? *Matter* then by its own Strength cannot produce in it ſelf, ſo much as *Motion*. The Motion it has, muſt alſo be from Eternity, or elſe added to Matter by ſome other Being, more powerful than Matter. But let us ſuppoſe Motion Eternal too, yet Matter, *Incogitative* Matter and motion could never produce *Thought*: *Knowledge* will ſtill be as far beyond the power of *Motion* and *Matter* to produce, as Matter is beyond the power of Nothing to produce. Divide *Matter* into as minute parts as you will, vary the Figure and Motion of it, as much

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as you pleaſe, it will operate no otherwiſe upon other Bodies of proportionable bulk, than it did before this diviſion. The minuteſt Particles of Matter, knock, impell, and reſiſt one another, juſt as the greater do, and that is all they can do, ſo that if we will ſuppoſe *nothing Eternal, Matter can never begin to be.* If we ſuppoſe *bare Matter* without Motion *Eternal, Motion can never begin to be.* If we ſuppoſe only Matter and Motion Eternal, *Thought can never begin to be*: For it is impoſſible to conceive, that Matter either with or without Motion, could have originally in and from it ſelf, Senſe, Perception, and Knowledge, as is evident from hence, that the Senſe, Perception and Knowledge, muſt be a Property Eternally inſeparable from Matter, and every Particle of it. Since therefore whatſoever is the firſt Eternal Being, muſt neceſſarily be *Cogitative*: and whatſoever is firſt of all Things, muſt neceſſarily contain in it, and actually have, at leaſt, all the Perfections that can ever after Exiſt, it neceſſarily follows, that the *Firſt Eternal Being cannot be Matter.*

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If therefore it be evident that ſomething neceſſarily muſt exiſt from Eternity, it is alſo as evident that, that *Something muſt neceſſarily be a Cogitative Being.* For it is as impoſſible that *Incogitative Matter* ſhould produce a *Cogitative Being*, as that Nothing, or the Negation of all Being ſhould produce a poſitive Being or Matter.

This diſcovery of the neceſſary Exiſtence of an Eternal Mind, does ſufficiently lead us into the knowledge of *God.* For it will hence follow, that all other knowing Beings, that have a Beginning, muſt depend on him, and have no other ways of Knowledge or extent of Power, than what he gives them: and therefore if he made thoſe, he made alſo the leſs excellent Pieces of this Univerſe, all *inanimate Bodies*, whereby his *Omniſcience, Power* and *Providence* will be eſtabliſhed; and from thence all his other Attributes neceſſarily follow.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Of our Knowledge of the Exiſtence of other Things.

THE knowledge of our own Being we have by *Intuition*: the Exiſtence of a *God*, *Reaſon* clearly makes known to us, as has been ſhewn: The *knowledge of the Exiſtence* of any other Thing, we can have only by *Senſation*; for there being no neceſſary Connexion of *Real Exiſtence* with any *Idea*, a Man hath in his Memory; nor of any other Exiſtence, but that of *God*, with the Exiſtence of any particular Man; no particular Man can know the Exiſtence of any other Being, but only, when by actual operating upon him, it makes it ſelf be perceived by him. The having the *Idea* of any thing in our Mind, no more proves the Exiſtence of that thing, than the Picture of a Man evidences his Being in the World, or the Viſions of a Dream, make thereby a true Hiſtory. It is therefore the actual receiving of *Ideas* from without, that

that gives us notice of the Exiſtence of other Things, and makes us know that ſomething doth Exiſt at that time without us, which cauſes that *Idea* in us, thô perhaps we neither know nor conſider how it does it; for it takes not from the *Certainty* of our Senſes, and the *Ideas* we receive by them, that we know not the manner wherein they are produced. This *notice* we have by our *Senſes* of the exiſting of Things without us, thô it be not altogether ſo Certain as *Intuition* and *Demonſtration*, deſerves the name of Knowledge, if we perſwade our ſelves that our Faculties act and inform us right, concerning the exiſtence of thoſe Objects, that affect them. But beſides the aſſurance we have from our *Senſes* themſelves, that they do not err in the Information they give us of the exiſtence of Things without us, we have other concurrent Reaſons: As *Firſt*, It is plain thoſe Perceptions are are produced in us by Exterior Cauſes affecting our *Senſes*, becauſe thoſe that want the *Organs* of any *Senſe*, never can have the *Ideas* belonging to that Senſe produced in their Minds. This is too evident to be doubted, and therefore we cannot

but

but be assured, that they come in by the Organs of that Sense, and no other way.

Secondly, Because we find sometimes that we cannot avoid the having those *Ideas* pro duced in our Minds, as when my Eyes are shut, I can at pleasure recall to my Mind the *Ideas* of *Light* or the *Sun*, which former Sensations had lodged in my Memory; but if I turn my Eyes towards the *Sun*, I cannot avoid the *Ideas* which the *Light* or the *Sun*, then produces in me: which shews a manifest difference between those *Ideas* laid up in the Memory, and such as force themselves upon us, and we cannot avoid having. And therefore it must needs be some *Exterior* Cause, whose Efficacy I cannot resist, that produces those *Ideas* in my Mind, whether I will or no. Besides, no Man but perceives the difference in himself, between actually looking upon the *Sun*, and contemplating the *Idea* he has of it in his Memory; and therefore he hath certain Knowledge, that they are not both Memory or Fancy; but that actual Seeing has a Cause without.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, Add to this, that many *Ideas* are produced in us without pain, which we afterwards remember without the leaſt offence. Thus the pain of *Heat* or *Cold*, when the *Idea* of it is received in our Minds, gives us no diſturbance: which when felt was very troubleſome; and we remember the pain of *Hunger*, *Thirſt*, *Head-ach*, &c. without any pain at all; which would either never diſturb us, or elſe conſtantly do it, as often as we thought of it, were there nothing more but *Ideas* floating in our Minds, and appearances entertaining our Fancies, without the real Exiſtence of Things affecting us from abroad.

Fourthly, Our *Senſes* in many caſes, bear witneſs to the Truth of each others Report, concerning the Exiſtence of ſenſible Things without us: He that doubts when he ſees a *Fire*, whether it be *Real*, may, if he pleaſe, feel it too; and by the exquiſite pain he will be convinced, that it is not a bare *Idea* or *Phantom*.

If after all this, any one will be ſo *Sceptical*, as to diſtruſt his Senſes, and to queſtion the Exiſtence of all Things, or our Knowledge of any Thing; Let him conſider that the certainty of Things exiſting

ing in *Rerum naturâ*, when we have the Teſtimony of our Senſes for it, is not only as great as our Frame can attain to, but as our condition needs. For our *Faculties* being not ſuited to the full extent of Being, nor a clear comprehenſive knowledge of all Things, but to the preſervation of us, in whom they are, and accommodated to the uſe of Life; they ſerve our purpoſe well enough, if they will but give give us certain notice of thoſe Things, that are convenient or inconvenient to us. For he that ſees a *Candle* burning, and has experimented the force of the Flame, by putting his Finger in it, will little doubt, that this is ſomething Exiſting without him, which does him harm, and puts him to pain, which is aſſurance enough; when no Man requires greater Certainty to govern his Actions by, than what is as certain as his Actions themſelves: So that this Evidence is as great as we can deſire, being as Certain to us as our Pleaſure or Pain, that is *Happineſs* or *Miſery*, beyond which we have no concernment, either of Knowing, or Being.

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In fine, when our *Senſes* do actually convey into our Underſtandings any *Idea*, we are aſſured that there is ſomething at that time *really Exiſting* without us. But this Knowledge extends only as far as the preſent Teſtimony of our Senſes, employed about particular Objects, that do then affect them, and no farther. My ſeeing a *Man* a Minute ſince, is no certain Argument of his preſent Exiſtence.

As when our *Senſes* are actually employed about any Object, we know that it does Exiſt: ſo by our Memory we may be aſſured, that heretofore Things that affected our *Senſes, have Exiſted*: and thus we have the knowledge of the paſt Exiſtence of ſeveral Things; whereof our *Senſes* having informed us, our Memories ſtill retain the *Ideas*: and of this we are paſt all doubt, ſo long as we Remember well.

As to the *Exiſtence* of *Spirits*, our having *Ideas* of them, does not make us know, that any ſuch Things do Exiſt without us; or that there are any *Finite Spirits*; or any other *Spiritual Beings* but the *Eternal God*. We have ground from *Revelation*, and ſeveral other Reaſons, to believe with aſſurance, that there are ſuch Creatures:

Creatures: but our Senſes not being able to diſcover them, we want the means of knowing their particular Exiſtence, for we can no more know that there are *Finite Spirits* really Exiſting, by the *Idea* we have of ſuch Beings, than by the *Ideas* any one has of *Fairies* or *Centaurs*, he can come to know that Things anſwering thoſe *Ideas*, do really Exiſt.

Hence we may gather, that there are *Two ſorts* of Propoſitions, *One* concerning the Exiſtence of any Thing anſwerable to ſuch an *Idea*; as that of an *Elephant*, *Phenix*, *Motion*, or *Angel*, viz. Whether ſuch a Thing does any where Exiſt: and this Knowledge is only of *Particulars*, and not to be had of any Thing without us, but only of *God*, any other way than by our *Senſes*.

Another ſort of Propoſitions is, wherein is expreſſed the Agreement or Diſagreement of our Abſtract *Ideas*, and their Dependence of another. And theſe may be *Univerſal* and Certain: So having the *Idea* of *God*, and my *Self*, of *Fear* and *Obedience*, I cannot but be ſure that *God is to be feared and obeyed by me*; and this Propoſition will be certain concerning *Man* in general; If I have made an *Abſtract*

ſtract Idea of ſuch a *Species*, whereof I am one Particular. But ſuch a Propoſition, how Certain ſoever, proves not to me the Exiſtence of Men in the World; but will be true of all ſuch Creatures, whenever they do Exiſt: which *Certainty* of ſuch general Propoſitions, depends on the Agreement or Diſagreement diſcoverable in thoſe *Abſtract Ideas*. In the former Caſe, our Knowledge is the conſequence of the *Exiſtence of Things*, producing *Ideas* in our Minds by our Senſes: In the later, the conſequence of the *Ideas* that *are in our Minds*, and producing theſe general Propoſitions, many whereof are called, *Eternæ veritatis*; and all of them indeed are ſo, not from being written all, or any of them in the Minds of all Men, or that they were any of them Propoſitions in any ones Mind, till he having got the *Abſtract Ideas*, joyned or ſeparated them by Affirmation or Negation: But whereſoever we can ſuppoſe ſuch a Creature as *Man* is, endowed with ſuch Faculties, and thereby furniſhed with ſuch *Ideas*, as we have; we muſt conclude, he muſt needs, when he applies his Thoughts to the Conſideration of his *Ideas*, know the

truth of certain Propoſitions, that will ariſe from the Agreement or Diſagreement he will perceive in his own *Ideas*. Such Propoſitions being once made about *Abſtract Ideas*, ſo as to be true, they will whenever they can be ſuppoſed to be made again, at any time paſt, or to come by a Mind having thoſe *Ideas*, alway actually be true. For Names being ſuppoſed to ſtand perpetually for the ſame *Ideas*; and the ſame *Ideas* having immutably the ſame Habitudes one to another; Propoſitions concerning any *Abſtract Ideas*, that are once true, muſt needs be *Eeternal Verities*.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Improvement of our Knowledge.

IT being the received Opinion amongſt Men of Letters, that *Maxims are the Foundations of all Knowledge*, and that Sciences are each of them built upon certain *Præcognita*, from whence the Underſtanding

derſtanding was to take its riſe, and by which it was to Conduct it ſelf in its Inquiries in the Matters belonging to that *Science*, the beaten Road of the Schools has been to lay down in the beginning one or more general Propoſitions, called *Principles*, as Foundations whereon to build the Knowledge, was to be had of that Subject.

That which gave occaſion to this way of proceeding, was, I ſuppoſe, the good Succeſs it ſeem'd to have in *Mathematicks*, which of all other Sciences, have the greateſt Certainty, Clearneſs, and Evidence in them. But if we conſider it, we ſhall find that, the great *Advancement* and Certainty of *Real Knowledge* Men arrived to in theſe *Sciences*, was not owing to the influence of theſe Principles, but to the clear diſtinct and compleat *Ideas* their Thoughts were employed about; and the relation of *Equality* and *Exceſs*, ſo clear between ſome of them, that they had a *Intuitive Knowledge*; and by that, a way to diſcover it in others: and this without the help of thoſe *Maxims*: For I ask, Is it not poſſible for a Lad to know that his whole Body is bigger than his little Finger, but by virtue of this Axi-

om, *The Whole is bigger than the Part*; nor be assured of it, till he has learned that *Maxim*? Let any one consider from what has been elsewhere said, which is known first and cleerest by most People, the *particular* Instance, or the *general* Rule; and which it is that gives Life and Birth to the other. These *general Rules* are but the comparing our more general and *Abstract Ideas*, which *Ideas* are made by the Mind, and have Names given them, for the easier dispatch in its reasonings: But Knowledge began in the Mind, and was founded on *Particulars*, thô afterwards perhaps no notice be taken thereof: It being natural for the Mind, to lay up those general Notions, and make the proper use of them, which is to disburthen the Memory of the cumbersome load of Particulars.

The way to *improve in Knowledge*, is not to swallow Principles, with an implicite Faith, and without examination, which would be apt to mislead Men, instead of guiding them into Truth; but to get and fix in our Minds, *clear* and *complete Ideas*, as far as they are to be had, and annex to them *proper*, and *constant* Names: and thus barely by considering

dering our *Ideas*, and comparing them together, obſerving their Agreement or Diſagreement, their Habitudes and Relations, we ſhall get more true and clear Knowledge by the conduct of this one *Rule*, than by taking up *Principles*, and thereby putting our Minds into the Diſpoſal of others.

We muſt therefore, if we will proceed as *Reaſon* adviſes, adapt our methods of Enquiry, to the nature of the *Ideas* we examine, and the truth we ſearch after. *General* and *Certain Truths*, are only founded in the Habitudes and Relations of *Abſtract Ideas*. Therefore a Sagacious Methodical Application of our Thoughts for the finding out theſe Relations, is the only way to diſcover all that can with Truth and Certainty be put into general Propoſitions. By what ſteps we are to proceed in theſe, is to be Learned in the Schools of the *Mathematicians*, who from every plain and eaſie beginnings, by gentle Degrees, and a continued chain of Reaſonings, proceed to the Diſcovery and Demonſtration of *Truths*, that appear at firſt ſight beyond Humane Capacity. This, I think I may ſay, that if other *Ideas*, that are *Real* as well as

Nominal Eſſences of their *Species*, were purſued in the way familiar to *Mathematicians*, they would carry our Thoughts farther, and with greater Evidence and Clearneſs, than poſſibly we are apt to imagine. This gave me the confidence to advance that conjecture, which I ſuggeſt, *Chapter* the Third, viz. that *Morality is capable of Demonſtration*, as well as *Mathematicks*: for *Moral Ideas* being real Eſſences, that have a diſcoverable Connexion and Agreement one with another, ſo far as we can find their Habitudes and Relations, ſo far we ſhall be poſſeſſed of *Real* and *General Truths*.

In our knowledge of *Subſtances*, we are to proceed after a quite different Method: the bare Contemplation of their *Abſtract Ideas* (which are but *Nominal* Eſſences, will carry us but a very little way, in the ſearch of Truth and Certainty. Here *Experience* muſt teach us what *Reaſon* cannot: and it is by trying alone, that we can certainly know, what other Qualities co-exiſt with thoſe of our *Complex Idea*; (for Inſtance) Whether that *Yellow heavy fuſible* Body, I call *Gold*, be *Malleable*, or no, which Experience (however it prove in that particular Body

dy we examine) makes us not certain that it is ſo in all, or any other *Yellow*, *Heavy*, *Fuſible* Bodies, but that which we have tried; becauſe it is no conſequence one way or the other from our *Complex Idea*: The neceſſity or inconſiſtence of *Malleability*, hath no viſible Connexion with the combination of that *Colour*, *Weight*, and *Fuſibility* in any Body. What I have here ſaid of the *Nominal* Eſſence of *Gold*, ſuppoſed to conſiſt of a Body of ſuch a determinate *Colour*, *Weight*, and *Fuſibility*, will hold true, if other Qualities be added to it. Our Reaſonings from thoſe *Ideas*, will carry us but a little way in the certain diſcovery of the other *Properties*, in thoſe maſſes of Matter wherein all thoſe are to be found. As far as our Experience reaches, we may have certain Knowledge, and no farther.

I deny not, but a Man accuſtomed to rational and regular Experiments, ſhall be able to ſee farther into the nature of Bodies, and their unknown Properties, than one that is a ſtranger to them. But this is but *Judgment*, and *Opinion*, not *Knowledge* and *Certainty*. This makes me ſuſpect that *Natural Philoſophy* is not capable of being made a *Science*: From

Experiments and Hiſtorical Obſervations we may draw advantages of Eaſe and Health, and thereby increaſe our ſtock of Conveniences for this Life; but beyond this, I fear our *Talents* reach not, nor are our Faculties, as I gueſs, able to advance.

From whence it is obvious to conclude, That ſince our Faculties are not fitted to penetrate the *Real Eſſences* of Bodies, but yet plainly to diſcover to us the *Being* of a *God*, and the *Knowledge* of our *Selves*; enough to give us a clear diſcovery of our *Duty*, and great Concernment; it will become us as Rational Creatures, to employ our Faculties, about what they are moſt adapted to, and follow the direction of Nature, where it ſeems to point us out the way. For it is rational to conclude, that our proper Employment lies in thoſe Enquiries, and that ſort of Knowledge which is moſt ſuited to our natural Capacities, and carries in it our greateſt Intereſt, that is, *the condition of our Eternal State*: And therefore it is, I think, that *Morality* is the proper Science and Buſineſs of *Mankind* in general (who are both concerned and fitted to ſearch out their *Summum Bonum*)

Bonum) as ſeveral *Arts* converſant about the ſeveral parts of Nature, are the Lot and private Talent of particular Men, for the common uſe of Humane Life, and their own particular Subſiſtance in this World.

The ways to enlarge our Knowledge, as far as we are capable, ſeem to me to be *theſe Two*: The *Firſt* is to get and ſettle in our Minds, as far as we can, clear, diſtinct, and conſtant *Ideas* of thoſe Things we would conſider and know. For it being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our *Ideas*; where they are either imperfect, confuſed or obſcure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear Knowledge. The *other* is the Art of finding out the intermediate *Ideas*, which may ſhew us the Agreement or Repugnancy of other *Ideas*, which cannot be immediately compared.

That theſe *Two* (and not the relying on *Maxims*, and drawing Conſequences from ſome general Propoſitions) are the right method of improving our Knowledge, in the *Ideas* of other *Modes*, beſides thoſe of Quantity, the conſideration of *Mathematical* Knowledge will eaſily inform us. Where *Firſt*, We ſhall find that

that he that has not clear and perfect *Ideas* of those *Angles* or *Figures*, of which he desires to know any thing, is utterly thereby incapable of any knowledge about them. Suppose a Man not to have an exact *Idea* of a *Right Angle*, *Scalenum*, or *Trapezium*, and it is clear, that he will in vain seek any Demonstration about them. And *farther* it is evident, that it was not the influence of *Maxims* or *Principles*, that hath led the Masters of this *Science* into those wonderful Discoveries they have made. Let a Man of good Parts know all the *Maxims* of *Mathematicks* never so well, and contemplate their Extent and Consequences as much as he pleases, he will by their assistance, I suppose, scarce ever come to know, that the Square of the *Hypotenuse*, *in a Right Angl'd Triangle*, *is equal to the Squares of the Two other sides*. This, and other *Mathematical* Truths have been discovered by the Thoughts, otherwise applied. The Mind had other Objects, other views before it, far different from those *Maxims* which Men well enough acquainted with those received *Axioms*, but ignorant of their method, who first made these Demonstrations, can never sufficiently admire.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Some farther Conſiderations concerning Knowledge.

OUR *Knowledge*, as in other things, ſo in this, has a great conformity with our *Sight*, that it is neither wholly *Neceſſary*, nor wholly *Voluntary*. Men that have Senſes cannot chuſe but receive ſome *Ideas* by them; and if they have Memory, they cannot but retain ſome of them; and if they have any diſtinguiſhing Faculty, cannot but perceive the Agreement or Diſagreement of ſome of them, one with another. As he that has Eyes, if he will open them by day, cannot but ſee ſome Objects, and perceive a difference in them, yet he may chuſe whether he will turn his Eyes towards an Object, curiouſly ſurvey it, and obſerve accurately all that is viſible in it. But what he does ſee, he cannot ſee otherwiſe than he does: it depends not on his *Will*, to ſee that *Black* which appears *Yellow*: Juſt thus it is with our *Underſtanding*;

derſtanding; All that is voluntary in our Knowledge, is the employing or withholding any of our Faculties from this or that ſort of *Objects*; and a more or leſs accurate Survey of them: But they being employed, our *Will* hath no power to determine the Knowledge of the Mind, one way or other. That is done only by the *Objects* themſelves, as far as they are clearly diſcovered.

Thus he that has got the *Ideas* of *Numbers*, and hath taken the pains to compare *One*, *Two* and *Three*, to *Six*, cannot chuſe but know that they are equal. He alſo that hath the *Idea* of an Intelligent, but weak and frail *Being*, made by and depending on another, who is *Eternal*, *Omnipotent*, perfectly *Wiſe* and *Good*, will as certainly know that *Man* is to Honour, Fear, and Obey *God*, as that the Sun ſhines when he ſees it. But yet theſe Truths, being never ſo certain, never ſo clear, he may be ignorant of either or both of them, who will not take the pains to employ his Faculties as he ſhould, to inform himſelf about them.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIV.

Of Judgment.

THE *Underſtanding Faculties* being given to Man, not barely for Speculation, but alſo for the conduct of his Life; A Man would be at a great loſs if he had nothing to direct him, but what has the certainty of true Knowledge: he that will not *Eat* till he has demonſtration that it will nouriſh him; nor *Stir* till he is infallibly aſſured of Succeſs in his Buſineſs, will have little elſe to do, but *Sit ſtill* and *periſh*.

Therefore as *God* has ſet ſome things in broad *Day-light*, as he has given us ſome certain Knowledge, thô limited to a few Things, in compariſon, probably as a Taſte of what *Intellectual* Creatures are capable of, to excite in us a Deſire and Endeavour after a better State: ſo in the greateſt part of our concernment, he has afforded us only the *Twilight*, as I may ſo ſay, of *Probability*, ſuitable to that ſtate of *Mediocrity* and *Probationerſhip*, he has been pleaſed to place us in here.

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The Faculty which *God* has given *Man* to enlighten him, next to certain Knowledge is *Judgment*, whereby the Mind takes its *Ideas* to Agree or Diſagree, without perceiving a demonſtrative Evidence in the Proofs. The Mind exerciſes this Judgment, ſometimes out of *neceſſity*, where demonſtrative Proofs, and certain Knowledge are not to be had: and ſometimes out of *Lazineſs*, Unskilfulneſs, or Haſte, even where they are to be had.

This Faculty of the Mind when it is exerciſed immediately about Things, is called *Judgment*; when about Truths delivered in Words, is moſt commonly called *Aſſent*, or *Diſſent*. Thus the Mind has *Two Faculties* converſant about Truth and Falſhood: *Firſt*, *Knowledge*, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly ſatisfied of the Agreement or Diſagreement of any *Ideas*. *Secondly*, *Judgment*, which is the putting *Ideas* together, or ſeparating them from one another in the Mind, when their certain Agreement or Diſagreement is not *perceived*, but *preſumed* to be ſo. And if it ſo unites or ſeparates them, as in Reality Things are, it is *right Judgment*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XV.

Of Probability.

PRobability is nothing but the appearance of the Agreement or Diſagreement of two *Ideas*, by the intervention of Proofs, whoſe connexion is not conſtant, and immutable; or is not perceived to be ſo; but is, or appears for the moſt part to be ſo, and is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Propoſition to be *true* or *falſe*, rather than the contrary.

Of *Probability* there are Degrees from the neighborhood of *Certainty* and *Demonſtration*, quite down to *Improbability* and *Unlikelineſs*, even to the confines of *Impoſſibility*: And alſo degrees of *Aſſent* from certain Knowledge and what is next it, full Aſſurance and Confidence, quite down to conjecture Doubt, Diſtruſt, and Disbelief.

That Propoſition then is *Probable*, for which there are Arguments or Proofs to make it paſs, or be received for *True*. The

Enter-

Entertainment the Mind gives to this ſort of Propoſitions, is called *Belief*, *Aſſent* or *Opinion*. *Probability* then being to ſupply the defect of our Knowledge, is always converſant about a Thing, whereof we have no *Certainty*, but only ſome *Inducements* to receive it for true. The *Grounds* of it are in ſhort *theſe Two* following.

Firſt, The *Conformity* of any thing with our own Knowledge, Experience or Obſervation.

Secondly, The *Teſtimony* of others, vouching their Obſervation and Experience. In the *Teſtimony* of others, is to be conſidered; *Firſt*, The Number; *Secondly*, The Integrity; *Thirdly*, The Skill of the Witneſſes; *Fourthly*, The Deſign of the Author, if it be a Teſtimony cited out of a Book; *Fifthly*, The conſiſtency of the Parts and Circumſtances of the Relation; *Sixthly*, Contrary Teſtimonies.

The Mind before it rationally *Aſſents* or *Diſſents* to any probable Propoſition, ought to examine all the Grounds of *Probality*, and ſee how they make, more or leſs, for or againſt it; and upon a due balancing of the whole, reject or receive

ceive it, with a more or leſs firm *Aſſent*, according to the Preponderancy of the greater *Grounds* of *Probability*, on one ſide or the other.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Degrees of Aſſent.

THE *Grounds of Probability* laid down in the foregoing *Chapter*, as they are the foundations on which our *Aſſent* is built; ſo are they alſo the meaſure whereby its ſeveral *Degrees* are, (or ought) to be regulated. Only we are to take notice that no grounds of Probability operate any farther on the Mind, which ſearches after Truth, and endeavours to judge right, than they appear; at leaſt in the firſt Judgment, or Search that the Mind makes. It is indeed in many caſes impoſſible, and in moſt very hard, even for thoſe who have admirable Memories, to retain all the proofs, which upon a due Examination, made them embrace that ſide of the Queſtion. It ſuffices that they have once with Care

and Fairneſs, ſifted the matter as far as they could, and having once found on which ſide the *Probability* appeared to them, they lay up the Concluſion in their Memories, as a *Truth* they have diſcovered; and for the future remain ſatisfied with the teſtimony of their Memories, that this is the Opinion, that by the proofs they have once ſeen of it, deſerves ſuch a *Degree* of their *Aſſent* as they afford it.

It is unavoidable then that the Memory be relied on in this caſe, and that Men be perſwaded of ſeveral *Opinions*, whereof the proofs are not actually in their Thoughts, nay, which perhaps they are not able actually to recall; without this the greateſt part of Men, muſt be either *Scepticks*, or change every Moment, when any one offers them Arguments, which for want of Memory, they are not preſently able to Anſwer.

It muſt be owned that Men's ſticking to paſt Judgments, is often the cauſe of a great *Obſtinacy* in error and miſtake. But the fault is not, that they relye on their Memories, for what they have before well judged; but becauſe they judged,

judged, before they had well examined. Who almoſt is there that hath the Leiſure, Patience, and Means to collect together, all the proofs concerning moſt of the Opinions he has, ſo as ſafely to conclude that he has a clear and full view, and that there is no more to be alledged for his better information? and yet we are forced, to determine our ſelves on one ſide or other: The conduct of our Lives, and the management of our great Concerns, will not bear delay. For thoſe depend for the moſt part, on the determination of our Judgment in points wherein we are not capable of certain Knowledge, and wherein it is neceſſary for us to embrace one ſide or the other.

The Propoſitions we receive upon Inducements of *Probability*, are of *Two ſorts*: *Firſt*, Concerning ſome particular Exiſtence, or matter of *Fact*, which falling under Obſervation, is capable of *Humane Teſtimony*. *Secondly*, Concerning Things which being beyond the diſcovery of our *Senſes*, are not capable of Humane Teſtimony.

Concerning the Firſt of theſe, *viz. Particular matter of Fact*.

Firſt, Where any particular Thing, conſonant to the conſtant Obſervation of our ſelves, and others in the like caſe, comes atteſted with the concurrent Reports of all that mention it, we receive it as eaſily, and build as firmly upon it, as if it were certain Knowledge. Thus, if all *Engliſhmen* who have occaſion to mention it, ſhould report, that it *Froze* in *England* laſt Winter, or the like, I think a Man would as little doubt of it, as that *Seven and four are eleven*.

The *Firſt* and *higheſt* Degree of *Probability* then is, when the general conſent of all Men, in all Ages, as far as can be known, concurs with a Man's own conſtant Experience in the like caſes, to confirm the Truth of any particular matter of Fact, atteſted by fair Witneſſes: Such are the ſtated *Conſtitutions* and *Properties* of Bodies, and the regular proceedings of *Cauſes* and *Effects* in the ordinary courſe of *Nature*; this we call an *Argument* from the nature of Things themſelves. For what we and others always obſerve to be after the ſame manner, we conclude with Reaſon, to be the Effects of ſteddy and regular *Cauſes*, thô they come not within the reach of our Knowledge. As

that

that Fire warmed a Man, or made *Lead fluid*; that *Iron* ſunk in Water, ſwam in Quick-ſilver. A Relation affirming any ſuch thing to have been, or a Predication that it will happen again in the ſame manner, is received without doubt or heſitation: and our *Belief* thus grounded, riſes to *Aſſurance*.

Secondly, The next degree of *Probability*, is when by my own Experience, and the Agreement of all others that mention it: a *Thing* is found to be for the moſt part ſo, and that the particular Inſtance of it is atteſted by many and undoubted *Witneſſes*: Thus *Hiſtory* giving us ſuch an account of Men in all Ages, and my own Experience confirming it, that moſt Men prefer their own private Advantage, to the Publick: If all Hiſtorians that write of *Tiberius*, ſay that he did ſo, it is extreamly probable: And in this caſe, our *Aſſent* riſes to a Degree which we may call *Confidence*.

Thirdly, In matters happening indifferently, as that a *Bird* ſhould fly this or that way: when any particular matter of Fact comes atteſted by the concurrent Teſtimony of unſuſpected *Witneſſes*, there our *Aſſent* is alſo unavoidable. Thus,

that there is in *Italy* ſuch a City as *Rome*; that about One thouſand and ſeven hundred Years ago, there lived ſuch a Man in it as *Julius Cæſar*, *&c.* A Man can as little doubt of this, and the like, as he does of the Being and Actions of his own Acquaintance, whereof he himſelf is a witneſs.

Probability, on theſe grounds, carries ſo much Evidence with it, that it leaves us as little liberty to Believe or Disbelieve, as Demonſtration does, whether we will know or be ignorant. But the difficulty is, when Teſtimonies contradict common Experience, and the Reports of Witneſſes clath with the ordinary courſe of Nature, or with one another. Here Diligence, Attention, and Exactneſs is required to form a *Right Judgment*, and to proportion the *Aſſent* to the Evidence and *Probability* of the Thing, which riſes and falls, according as the two Foundations of Credibility, Favour, or contradict it. Theſe are liable to ſuch variety of contrary Obſervations, Circumſtances, Reports, Tempers, Deſigns, Over ſights, *&c.* of Reporters, that it is impoſſible to reduce to preciſe Rules, the various Degrees wherein Men give their

Aſſent.

Assent. This in general may be said, That as the *Proofs* upon due Examination, shall to any one appear, in a greater or less Degree, to Preponderate on either side, so they are fitted to produce in the Mind, such different Entertainments, as are called *Belief*, *Conjecture*, *Guess*, *Doubt*, *Wavering*, *Distrust*, *Disbelief*, &c.

It is a *Rule* generally approved, that any Testimony the farther off it is removed from the Original Truth, the less Force it has: and in *Traditional* Truths, each Remove weakens the force of the *Proof*. There is a *Rule* quite contrary to this, advanced by some Men, who look *Opinions* to gain Force by growing *Older*: Upon this ground, Propositions evidently false or doubtful in their first beginning, come by an inverted *Rule* of *Probability*, to pass for *Authentick* Truths; and those which deserved little Credit from the Mouths of their first Relators, are thought to grow *venerable* by Age, and are urged as undeniable.

But certain it is, that no *Probability can rise above its First Original*. What has no other Evidence than the single Testimony of *one Witness*, must stand or fall by his *only* Testimony, thô afterwards

cited by Hundreds of others; and is so far from receiving any Strength thereby that it becomes the weaker. Because Passion, Interest, Inadvertency, Mistake of his Meaning, and a thousand odd Reasons, or Caprichois Mens Minds are acted by, may make one Man quote another's Words or Meaning wrong. This is certain, that what in one Age was affirmed upon slight grounds, can never after come to be more valid in future Ages, by being often repeated.

The Second sort of Probability, is concerning Things not falling under the reach of our Senses, and therefore not capable of Testimony: And such are,

First, The Existence, Nature and Operations of *Finite*, *Immaterial* Beings without us, as *Spirits*, *Angels*, &c. or the Existence of *material* Beings, such as for their smallness or remoteness, our *Senses* cannot take notice of: As whether there be any *Plants*, *Animals*, &c. in the *Planets*, and other Mansions of the vast Universe.

Secondly, Concerning the manner of Operation in most parts of the works of *Nature*, wherein, thô we see the sensible *Effects*; yet their *Causes* are unknown, and

and we perceive not the ways, and manner how they are produced. We ſee *Animals* are generated, nouriſhed and move; the *Loadſtone* draws *Iron*, &c. but the Cauſes that operate, and the manner they are produced in, we can only gueſs, and probably conjecture. In theſe matters *Analogy* is the only help we have; and it is from that alone we draw all our grounds of *Probability*. Thus obſerving, that the bare rubbing of two Bodies violently upon one another, produces *Heat*, and very often *Fire*; we have reaſon to think that what we call *Heat* and *Fire*, conſiſts, in a certain violent agitation of the imperceptible minute Parts of the burning Matter. This ſort of *Probability*, which is the beſt conduct of rational Experiments, and the riſe of *Hypotheſes* has alſo its uſe and influence. And a wary reaſoning from *Analogy* leads us often into the diſcovery of *Truths*, and uſeful *Deductions*, which would otherwiſe lie concealed.

Thô the common Experience, and the ordinary courſe of Things, have a mighty influence on the Minds of Men, to make them give or refuſe Credit, to any thing propoſed to their Belief; yet there

is

is one case wherein the strangeness of the Fact lessens not the *Assent* to a fair Testimony given of it. For where such supernatural *Events* are suitable to Ends aimed at by him, who has the power to change the course of Nature; there under such Circumstances they may be the fitter to procure Belief, by how much the more they are beyond, or contrary to ordinary Observation. This is the proper case of *Miracles*, which well attested, do not only find Credit themselves, but give it also to other *Truths*.

There are Propositions that challenge the highest degree of our *Assent* upon bare Testimony, whether the Thing proposed Agree or Disagree with common Experience, and the ordinary course of Things or no: The reason whereof is, because the Testimony is of such *an one*, as cannot deceive nor be deceived; and that is *God* himself. This carries with it Certainty beyond Doubt, Evidence beyond Exception. This is called by a peculiar Name, *Revelation*, and our *Assent* to it, *Faith*; which has as much Certainty in it, as our Knowledge it self; and we may as well doubt of our own *Being*, as we can, whether any *Revelation* from

God

God be *True*. So that *Faith* is a ſettled and ſure Principle of *Aſſent* and *Aſſurance*, and leaves no manner of room for Doubt or Heſitation; only we muſt be ſure, that it be a Divine *Revelation*, and that we underſtand it right; elſe we ſhall expoſe our ſelves to all the extravagancy of *Enthuſiaſm*, and all the error of wrong Principles, if we have *Faith* and *Aſſurance*, in what is not *Divine Revelation*.

CHAP. XVII.

Of Reaſon.

THE word *Reaſon* in *Engliſh*, has different Significations. Sometimes it is taken for *True and Clear Principles*: Sometimes for *Clear* and *Fair Deductions* from thoſe Principles: Sometimes for the *Cauſe*, and particularly for the *Final Cauſe*; but the Conſideration I ſhall have of it here, is, as it ſtands for a *Faculty*, whereby *Man* is ſuppoſed to be diſtinguiſhed from *Beaſts*; and wherein it is evident, he much ſurpaſſes them.

Reaſon

Reaſon is neceſſary, both for the enlargement of our Knowledge, and regulating our Aſſent: for it hath to do both in Knowledge and Opinion, and is neceſſary and aſſiſting to all our other Intellectual Faculties; and indeed, contains *Two* of them, *viz. Firſt, Sagacity.* whereby it finds intermediate *Ideas. Secondly, Illation,* whereby it ſo orders and diſpoſes of them, as to diſcover what connexion there is in each link of the Chain, whereby the Extremes are held together, and thereby, as it were, to draw into view the Truth ſought for; which is that we call *Illation* or *Inference*: and conſiſts in nothing, but the Perception of the Connexion there is between the *Ideas,* in each ſtep of the Deduction, whereby the Mind comes to ſee, either the Certain Agreement or Diſagreement of any two *Ideas,* as in *Demonſtration,* in which it arrives at Knowledge: or their probable Connexion, on which it gives or with-holds its *Aſſent,* as in *Opinion.*

Senſe and *Intuition* reach but a little way: the greateſt part of our Knowledge depends upon Deductions, and intermediate *Ideas.* In thoſe Caſes where we muſt take Propoſitions for true, without being

being certain of their being ſo, we have need to find out, examine, and compare the grounds of their *Probability:* In both Caſes, the Faculty which finds out the Means, and rightly applies them to diſcover Certainty in the one, and Probability in the other, is that which we call *Reaſon.* So that in reaſon we may conſider theſe *Four* Degrees; *Firſt,* The diſcovering and finding out of Proofs. *Secondly,* The regular and methodical Diſpoſition of them, and laying them in ſuch order, as their Connexion may be plainly perceived. *Thirdly,* The perceiving their Connexion. *Fourthly,* The making a right Concluſion.

There is one thing more which I ſhall deſire to be conſidered concerning *Reaſon,* and that is, whether *Syllogiſm,* as is generally thought, be the proper inſtrument of it; ant the uſefulleſt way of exerciſing this Faculty. The Cauſes I have to doubt of it, are theſe.

Firſt, Becauſe *Syllogiſm* ſerves our *Reaſon,* but in one only of the fore-mentioned parts of it, and that is to ſhew the Connexion of the proofs of any one Inſtance, and no more: but in this it is of no great uſe, ſince the Mind can perceive

ceive ſuch Connexion, where it really is, as eaſily, nay, perhaps better without it. We may obſerve that there are many Men that reaſon exceeding clear and rightly, who know not how to make a *Syllogiſm*: and I believe ſcarce any one makes *Syllogiſms* in reaſoning within himſelf. Indeed, ſometimes they may ſerve to diſcover a Fallacy, hid in a *Rhetorical* Flouriſh; or by ſtripping an abſurdity of the cover of Wit and good Language, ſhew it in its naked deformity. But the Mind is not taught to reaſon by theſe *Rules*; It has a native Faculty to perceive the Coherence or Incoherence of its *Ideas*, and can range them right, without any ſuch perplexing *Repetitions*: and I think every one will perceive in *Mathematical* Demonſtrations, that the Knowledge gained thereby comes ſhorteſt and cleareſt without *Syllogiſm*.

Secondly, Becauſe thô *Syllogiſm* ſerves to ſhew the force or fallacy of an Argument made uſe of in the uſual way of Diſcourſing, by ſupplying the abſent Propoſition, and ſo ſetting it before the view in a clear Light; yet it no leſs engages the Mind in the perplexity of obſcure and equivocal Terms, wherewith this

this artificial way of reaſoning, always abounds: it being adapted more to the attaining of victory in Diſpute, than the diſcovery or confirmation of *Truth* in fair Enquiries. But however it be in Knowledge, I think it is of far leſs, or no uſe at all in *Probabilities*: For the *Aſſent* there being to be determined by the Preponderancy, after a due weighing of all the proofs on both ſides; nothing is ſo unfit to aſſiſt the Mind in that, as *Syllogiſm*; which running away with one aſſumed *Probability*, purſues that till it has led the Mind quite out of ſight of the Thing under Conſideration.

But let it help us (as perhaps may be ſaid) *in convincing Men of their Errors or Miſtakes*; yet ſtill it fails our Reaſon in that part, which if not its higheſt perfection, is yet certainly its hardeſt Task; and that which we muſt need its help in, and that is, *The finding out of Proofs, and making new Diſcoveries.* This way of Reaſoning, diſcovers no new proofs, but is the Art of Marſhalling and Ranging the old ones we have already. A Man knows firſt, and then he is able to prove *Syllogiſtically*; ſo that *Syllogiſm* comes after Knowledge; and then a Man

a Man has little or no need of it. But it is chiefly by the finding out thoſe *Ideas* that ſhew the Connexion of diſtant ones, that our ſtock of Knowledge is increaſed; and that uſeful Arts and Sciences are advanced.

Reaſon, Thô of a very large Extent fails us in ſeveral Inſtances: as *Firſt*, Where our *Ideas* fail. *Secondly*, It is often at a loſs, becauſe of the Obſcurity, Confuſion, or Imperfection of the *Ideas*, it is employed about. Thus having no perfect *Idea* of the leaſt Extenſion of *Matter*, nor of *Infinity*, we are at a loſs about the Diviſibility of *Matter*. *Thirdly*, Our *Reaſon* is often at a ſtand, becauſe it perceives not thoſe *Ideas* which would ſerve to ſhew the certain or probable Agreement or Diſagreement of any two other *Ideas*. *Fourthly*, Our *Reaſon*, is often engaged in Abſurdities and Difficulties, by proceeding upon falſe Principles, which being followed, lead Men into Contradictions to themſelves, and inconſiſtancy in their own Thoughts. *Fifthly*, Dubious Words, and uncertain Signs often puzzle Mens *Reaſon*, and bring them to a Non-plus.

In Reaſoning, Men ordinarily uſe *Four* ſorts of *Arguments.*

The *Firſt*, is to alledge the Opinions of Men, whoſe Parts, Learning, Eminency, Power, or ſome other Cauſe, has gained a Name, and ſettled their Reputation in the common Eſteem with ſome kind of Authority. This may be called *Argumentum ad Verecundiam.*

Secondly, Another way is, to require the Adverſary to admit what they alledge as a proof; or to aſſign a better. This I call *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam.*

A *Third* way, is to preſs a Man with Conſequences drawn from his own Principles or Conceſſions. This is already known under the name of *Argumentum ad hominem.*

Fourthly, The uſing of Proofs drawn from any of the foundations of Knowledge or Probability. This I call *Argumentum ad Judicium.* This alone of all the Four, brings true Inſtruction with it, and advances us in our way to Knowledge. For *Firſt*, It argues not another Man's Opinion to be right, becauſe I, out of reſpect, or any other conſideration, but that of Conviction, will not contra-

dict him. *Secondly*, It proves not another Man to be in the right way, nor that I ought to take the same with him, because I know not a better. *Thirdly*, Nor does it follow, that another Man is in the right way, because he has shewn me that I am in the wrong. This may dispose me perhaps, for the reception of Truth, but helps me not to it: that must come from *Proofs* and *Arguments*, and Light arising from the nature of Things themselves; not from my shame-facedness, Ignorance or Error.

By what has been said of *Reason*, we may be able to make some guess at the distinction of Things, into those that are according to, above, and contrary to *Reason*. *According to Reason*, are such Propositions, whose Truth we can discover, by examining and tracing those *Ideas* we have from *Sensation* and *Reflection*, and by natural Deduction find to be true, or probable. *Above Reason* are such Propositions, whose *Truth* or *Probability* we cannot by *Reason* derive from those Principles. *Contrary to Reason*, are such Propositions as are inconsistent with, or irreconcilable to, our clear and distinct

Ideas.

Ideas. Thus the *Exiſtence of one God*, is according to Reaſon: the *Exiſtence of more than one God*, contrary to *Reaſon*: the *Reſurrection of the Body* after Death, above *Reaſon*. *Above Reaſon*, may be alſo taken in a double Senſe, *viz*. *Above Probability*, or *Above Certainty*. In that large Senſe alſo, *Contrary to Reaſon*, is, I ſuppoſe, ſometimes taken.

There is another uſe of the word *Reaſon*, wherein it is oppoſed to *Faith*; which, thô authorized by common uſe, yet is it in it ſelf, a very improper way of Speaking: For *Faith* is nothing but a firm *Aſſent* of the Mind, which if it be regulated, as is our Duty, cannot be afforded to any thing but upon good *Reaſon*; and ſo cannot be oppoſite to it. He that believes without having any Reaſon for believing, may be in love with his own Fancies; but neither ſeeks *Truth* as he ought, nor pays the Obedience due to his Maker, who would have him uſe thoſe diſcerning Faculties he has given him, to keep him out of Miſtake and Error. But ſince *Reaſon* and *Faith* are by ſome Men oppoſed, we will ſo conſider them in the following *Chapter*.

CHAP XVIII.

Of Faith and Reaſon, and their diſtinct Provinces.

Reaſon, as contra-diſtinguiſhed to *Faith*, I take to be the diſcovery of the *Certainty* or *Probability* of ſuch Propoſitions or Truths which the Mind arrives at by deductions made from ſuch *Ideas*, which it has got by the uſe of its natural Faculties, *viz.* by *Senſation* or *Reflection*.

Faith on the other ſide, is the Aſſent to any Propoſition, upon the credit of the Propoſer, as coming immediately from *God*; which we call *Revelation*: concerning which we muſt obſerve.

Firſt, That *no Man inſpired by God, can by any Revelation communicate to others, any new* Simple Ideas, which they had not before from *Senſation* or *Reflection*: Becauſe Words, by their immediate Operation on us, cannot cauſe other *Ideas*, but

but of their natural Sounds, and ſuch as Cuſtom has annexed to them, which to us they have been wont to be ſigns of, but cannot introduce any new, and formerly unknown *Simple Ideas*. The ſame holds in all other *Signs*, which cannot ſignify to us Things, of which we have never before had any *Idea* at all. For our *Simple Ideas*, we muſt depend wholly on our natural Faculties, and can by no means receive them from *Traditional Revelation*; I ſay *Traditional*, in diſtinction to *Original Revelation*. By the *One*, I mean that impreſſion which is made immediately by *God* on the Mind of any Man, to which we cannot ſet any bounds. And by the *Other*, thoſe Impreſſions delivered over to others in Words, and the ordinary ways of conveying our Conceptions one to another.

Secondly, I ſay, that *the ſame Truths may be diſcovered by Revelation, which are diſcoverable to us by Reaſon*; but in ſuch there is little need or uſe of *Revelation: God* having furniſhed us with natural means to arrive at the knowledge of them: and Truths diſcovered by our natural Faculties, are more certain, than when conveyed

veyed to us by *Traditional Revelation*. For the Knowledge we have, that this *Revelation* came at first from *God*, can never be so sure as the Knowledge we have from our own clear and distinct *Ideas*. This also holds in matters of Fact, knowable by our Senses: as the *History* of the *Deluge* is conveyed to us by Writings, which had their Original from Revelation, and yet no body, I think, will say he has as certain and clear Knowledge of the *Flood*, as *Noah* that saw it, or that he himself would have had, had he then been alive and seen it. For he has no greater assurance, than that of his *Senses*, that it is writ in the Book, supposed to be writ by *Moses* inspired. But he has not so great an assurance, that *Moses* writ that Book, as if he had seen *Moses* write it; so that the assurance of its being a *Revelation*, is still less than our assurance of his *Senses*.

Revelation cannot be admitted against the clear evidence of *Reason*. For since no evidence of our Faculties, by which we receive such a *Revelation*, can exceed, if equal, the Certainty of our *Intuitive* Knowledge; we can never receive for a

Truth

Truth any, that is directly contrary to our clear and distinct Knowledge. The *Ideas* of *One Body* and *One Place* do so clearly agree, that we can never assent to a Proposition that affirms *the same Body to be in two distinct places at once*; however, it should pretend to the Authority of a *Divine Revelation*: Since the Evidence *First*, That we deceive not our Selves in ascribing it to *God*. *Secondly*, That we understand it right, can never be so great as the Evidence of our own *Intuitive* Knowledge, whereby we discern it impossible, for *the same Body to be in two places at once*.

In Propositions therefore, contrary to our distinct and clear *Ideas*, it will be in vain to urge them as matters of *Faith*. For *Faith* can never convince us of any thing that contradicts our *Knowledge*. Because, thô *Faith* be founded upon the Testimony of *God*, who cannot lye, yet we cannot have an assurance of the truth of its being a *Divine Revelation*, greater than our own *Knowledge*. For if the Mind of Man can never have a clearer Evidence of any thing to be a *Divine Revelation*, than it has of the Principles

of its own Reaſon; it can never have a ground to quit the clear Evidence of its Reaſon, to give place to a Propoſition, whoſe *Revelation* has not a greater Evidence than thoſe Principles have.

In all things therefore where we have clear Evidence from our *Ideas*, and the Principles of Knowledge above-mentioned *Reaſon* is the proper Judge; and *Revelation* cannot in ſuch caſes invalidate its Decrees; nor can we be obliged, where we have the clear and evident Sentence of *Reaſon*, to quit it for the contrary Opinion, under a pretence that it is *Matter of Faith*, which can have no Authority againſt the plain and clear dictates of *Reaſon*. But,

Thirdly, There being many Things, of which we have but imperfect Notions, or none at all; and other things, of whoſe paſt, preſent, or future Exiſtence, by the natural uſe of our Faculties, we can have no knowledge at all: Theſe being beyond the *diſcovery of our Faculties, and above Reaſon*, when revealed, become the *proper matter of Faith*. Thus, that part of the Angels rebelled againſt *God*: that the Bodies of Men ſhall riſe and live again,

again, and the like, are purely matters of *Faith*, with which *Reaſon* has directly nothing to do.

Firſt then, Whatever Propoſition is revealed, of whoſe Truth our Mind, by its natural Faculties and Notions cannot judge; that is purely *Mater of Faith*, and *above Reaſon*.

Secondly, All Propoſitions, whereof the Mind by its natural Faculties, can come to determine and judge from natural acquired *Ideas*, are *Matter of Reaſon*: but with this difference; that in thoſe concerning which it has but an uncertain Evidence, and ſo is perſwaded of their Truth only upon probable grounds: in ſuch I ſay, an *Evident Revelation ought to determine our Aſſent*, even againſt *Probability*. Becauſe the Mind, not being certain of the Truth of that, it does not evidently know, is bound to give up its *Aſſent* to ſuch a Teſtimony, which it is ſatisfied comes from one, who cannot err, and will not deceive. But yet it ſtill belongs to *Reaſon* to judge of the truth of its being a *Revelation*, and of the ſignification of the words wherein it is delivered.

Thus

Thus far the Dominion of *Faith* reaches; and that without any violence to *Reason*, which is not injured or disturbed, but assisted and improved by new discoveries of Truth, coming from the *Eternal Fountain* of all Knowledge. Whatever *God* hath Revealed is certainly true; no doubt can be made of it, This is the proper object of *Faith*: But whether it be a Divine *Revelation*, or no, *Reason* must judge; which can never permit the Mind, to reject a greater Evidence, to embrace what is less evident, nor prefer less Certainty to the greater. There can be no Evidence, that any Traditional *Revelation* is of Divine Original, in the words we receive it, and the Sense we understand it, so clear and so certain, as those of the Principles of *Reason*: and therefore, *Nothing that is contrary to the clear and self-evident Dictates of* Reason, *has a right to be urged or assented to, as a matter of Faith, wherein* Reason *has nothing to do.* Whatsoever is Divine *Revelation*, ought to over-rule all our Opinions, Prejudices and Interests, and hath a right to be received with a full *Assent*. Such a submission as this, of

our

our *Reaſon* to *Faith*, takes not away the Land-marks of Knowledge: this ſhakes not the foundations of *Reaſon*, but leaves us that uſe of our Faculties, for which they were given us.

CHAP. XIX.

Of wrong Aſſent or Error.

ERROR is a miſtake of our Judgment, giving *Aſſent* to that which is not true. The Reaſons whereof may be reduced to theſe *Four*; Firſt, *Want of Proofs*. Secondly, *Want of Ability to uſe them*. Thirdly, *Want of Will to uſe them*. Fourthly, *Wrong meaſures of Probability*.

Firſt, Want of Proofs, by which I do not mean only the want of thoſe Proofs which are not to be had, but alſo of thoſe Proofs which are in being, or might be procured. The greateſt part of Mankind want the Conveniencies, and Opportunities of making Experiments and Obſervations themſelves, or of collecting

lecting the Teſtimonies of others, being enſlaved to the neceſſity of their mean condition, whoſe Lives are worn out only in the proviſions for living. Theſe Men are by the conſtitution of Humane Affairs, unavoidably given over to invincible Ignorance of thoſe Proofs, on which others build; and which are neceſſary to eſtabliſh thoſe Opinions. For having much to do to get the means of living, they are not in a condition to look after thoſe of learned and laborious Enquiries.

It is true, that *God* has furniſhed Men with Faculties ſufficient to direct them in the way they ſhould take, if they will but ſeriouſly employ them that way, when their ordinary Vocations allow them leiſure. No Man is ſo wholly taken up with the attendance on the means of living, as to have no ſpare time at all, to think on his *Soul*, and inform himſelf in matters of Religion, were Men as intent on this, as they are on Things of lower concernment. There are none ſo enſlaved to the neceſſity of Life, who might not find many Vacancies, that might be husbanded to this advantage of their Knowledge.

Secondly,

Secondly, Want of *Ability* to uſe them. There be many who cannot carry a Train of Conſequences in their Heads, nor weigh exactly the preponderancy of contrary Proofs, and Teſtimonies. Theſe cannot diſcern that ſide on which the ſtrongeſt Proofs lie; nor follow that which in it ſelf is the moſt probable Opinion. It is certain that there is a wide difference in Mens Underſtandings, Apprehenſions and Reaſonings, to a very great Latitude, ſo that one may, without doing injury to Mankind, affirm that there is a greater diſtance between ſome *Men* and *others* in this reſpect, than between ſome *Men* and ſome *Beaſts*; But how this comes about, is a ſpeculation, thô of great conſequence; yet not neceſſary to our preſent purpoſe.

Thirdly, For want of *Will* to uſe them. Some, thô they have opportunities and leiſure enough, and want neither Parts nor Learning, nor other Helps, are yet never the better for them, and never come to the knowledge of ſeveral Truths that lie within their reach; either upon the account of their hot purſuit of Pleaſure, conſtant Drudgery in Buſineſs, Lazineſs and

and Oſcitancy in general, or a particular averſion for Books and Study: and ſome out of Fear that an impartial inquiry would not favour thoſe Opinions, which beſt ſuit their Prejudices, Lives, Deſigns, Intereſts, *&c.* as many Men forbear to caſt up their Accounts, who have reaſon to fear that their Affairs are in no very good poſture.

How Men, whoſe plentiful Fortunes allow them leiſure to improve their Underſtandings, can ſatisfie themſelves with a lazy Ignorance, I cannot tell: But methinks they have a low Opinion of their *Souls*, who lay out all their Incomes in Proviſions for the Body, and employ none of it to procure the means and helps of Knowledge. I will not here mention how unreaſonable this is for Men that ever think of a future ſtate, and their concernment in it, which no rational Man can avoid to do ſometimes: nor ſhall I take notice what a ſhame it is to the greateſt Contemners of Knowledge, to be found ignorant in Things they are concerned to know. But this, at leaſt, is worth the conſideration of thoſe who call themſelves *Gentlemen*, that however they

they may think Credit, Reſpect, and Authority, the Concomitants of their Birth and Fortune; yet they will find all theſe ſtill carried away from them by Men of lower condition, who ſurpaſs them in Knowledge. They who are blind, will always be led by thoſe that ſee, or elſe fall into the Ditch: and he is certainly the moſt ſubjected, the moſt enſlaved, who is ſo in his Underſtanding.

Fourthly, Wrong meaſures of *Probability*, which are,

First, *Propoſitions that are not in themſelves certain and evident, but doubtful and falſe, taken for Principles.* Propoſitions looked on as Principles, have ſo great an influence upon our Opinions, that it is uſually by them we judge of Truth, and what is inconſiſtent with them, is ſo far from paſſing for *Probable* with us, that it will not be allowed *Poſſible*. The reverence born to theſe Principles is ſo great, that the Teſtimony, not only of other Men, but the Evidence of our own Senſes are often rejected, when they offer to vouch any thing contrary to theſe eſtabliſhed Rules. The great obſtinacy that

is

is to be found in Men, firmly believing quite contrary Opinions, thô many times equally abſurd, in the various Religions of Mankind, are as evident a proof, as they are an unavoidable conſequence of this way of reaſoning from received traditional Principles: ſo that Men will disbelieve their own Eyes, renounce the Evidence of their Senſes, and give their own Experience the Lye, rather than admit of any thing diſagreeing with theſe Sacred Tenents.

Secondly, *Received Hypotheſes.* The difference between theſe and the former, is, that thoſe who proceed by theſe, will admit of matter of Fact, and agree with Diſſenters in that; but differ in aſſigning of Reaſons, and explaining the manner of Operation. Theſe are not at that open defiance with their *Senſes* as the former: they can endure to hearken to their Information a little more patiently: but will by no means admit of their Reports in the explanation of Things; nor be prevailed on by *Probabilities* which would convince them, that things are not brought about juſt after the ſame manner, that they have decreed within themſelves that they are.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, *Predominant Paſſions or Inclinations*: Let never ſo much *Probability* hang on one ſide of a *Covetous* Man's Reaſoning, and *Money* on the other, it is eaſie to foreſee which will prevail. Thô Men cannot always openly gain-ſay, or reſiſt the force of manifeſt *Probabilities*, that make againſt them, yet yield they not to the Argument. Not but that it is the nature of the Underſtanding, conſtantly to cloſe with the more probable ſide; but yet a Man hath power to ſuſpend, and reſtrain its Enquiries, and not permit a full and ſatisfactory Examination. Until that be done there will be always theſe *Two ways* left of evading the moſt apparent *Probabilities*.

Firſt, That the Arguments being brought in *Words*, there may be a *fallacy* latent in them; and the conſequences being perhaps, many in train, may be ſome of them incoherent. There are few Diſcourſes ſo ſhort and clear, to which Men may not, with ſatisfaction enough to themſelves raiſe this Doubt, and from whoſe Conviction they may not without reproach of Diſingenuity or Unreaſonableneſs ſet themſelves free.

Secondly, Manifeſt *Probabilities* may be evaded upon this Suggeſtion, that *I know not yet all that may be ſaid on the contrary ſide*: and therefore, thô a Man be beaten, it is not neceſſary he ſhould yield, not knowing what Forces there are in reſerve behind.

Fourthly, *Authority*, or the *giving up our Aſſent to the common received Opinions*, either of our Friends or Party, Neighbourhood or Country. How many Men have no other ground for their Tenents, than the ſuppoſed Honeſty or Learning, or Number of thoſe of the ſame Profeſſion? As if Honeſt or Bookiſh Men could not err; or Truth were to be eſtabliſhed by the Vote of the Multitude. Yet this with moſt Men, ſerves the turn. All Men are liable to Error, and moſt Men are in many points by *Paſſion* or *Intereſt* under temptation to it. This is certain, that there is not an Opinion ſo abſurd, which a Man may not receive upon this ground. There is no Error to be named, which has not had its *Profeſſors*. And a Man ſhall never want crooked paths to walk in, if he thinks that he is in the right way, wherever he has

has the Footſteps of others to follow. But, notwithſtanding the great noiſe is made in the World about Errors and Opinions, I muſt do Mankind that right as to ſay, there are not *ſo many Men in Errors and wrong Opinions as is commonly ſuppoſed*: not that I think they embrace the Truth, but indeed, becauſe, concerning thoſe Doctrines they keep ſuch a ſtirr about, they have *no Thought, no Opinion at all.* For if any one ſhould a little Catechize the greateſt part of the *Partiſans* of moſt of the *Sects* in the World, he would not find concerning thoſe matters they are ſo zealous for, that they have any Opinions of their own. Much leſs would he have reaſon to think, that they took them upon the examination of Arguments, and appearance of Probability. They are reſolved to ſtick to a Party, that Education or Intereſt has engaged them in; and there, like the common Soldiers of an Army, ſhew their Courage and Warmth, as their Leaders direct, without ever examining, or ſo much as knowing the Cauſe they contend for.

CHAP. XX.

Of the Division of the Sciences.

ALL that can fall within the compass of Humane Understanding, being either, *First*, The Nature of Things; their Relations, and their manner of Operation: Or, *Secondly*, That which *Man* himself ought to do as a rational and voluntary Agent, for the attainment of any End, especially *Happiness*: Or, *Thirdly*, The ways and means whereby the Knowledge of both of these are attained, and communicated: I think *Science* may be properly divided into these *Three Sorts*.

First, The Knowledge of Things, Their Constitutions, Properties, and Operations; whether Material or Immaterial: This, in a little more enlarged Sense of the Word, I call φυσικὴ, or *Natural Philosophy*. The end of this is bare *Speculative Truth*, and whatsoever can afford the Mind of Man any such, falls under this branch: whether it be

be *God* himſelf, *Angels*, *Spirits*, *Bodies*, or any of their Affections, as *Number*, *Figure*, &c.

Secondly, Πρακτικὴ, The skill of Right applying our own Powers and Actions for the attainment of Things, good and uſeful. The moſt conſiderable under this head, is *Ethicks*, which is the ſeeking out thoſe Rules and Meaſures of humane Actions, which lead to *Happineſs*, and the means to practiſe them. The end of this is not bare *Speculation* but *Right*, and a Conduct ſuitable thereto.

Thirdly, Σημειωτικὴ, Or the *Doctrine of Signs*: the moſt uſual being *Words*, it is aptly enough termed *Logick*: The Buſineſs whereof is to conſider the nature of *Signs*, which the Mind makes uſe of for the Underſtanding of Things, or conveying its Knowledge to others. Things are repreſented to the Mind by *Ideas*: and Mens *Ideas* are communicated to one another, by *Articulate Sounds*, or *Words*. The Conſideration then of *Ideas* and *Words*, as the great Inſtruments of Knowledge makes no deſpicable part of their Contemplation, who would take a view of Humane Knowledge in the whole Extent of it.

This

This ſeems to me the *Firſt and moſt general, as well as natural Diviſion*, of the Objects of our Underſtanding. For a Man can employ his Thoughts about nothing, but either the Contemplation of *Things* themſelves for the diſcovery of Truth, or about the *Things* in his own Power, which are his *Actions*, for the attainment of his own Ends; or the *Signs* the Mind makes uſe of, both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them, for its clearer Information. All which Three, *viz. Things*, as they are in themſelves Knowable: *Actions*, as they depend on us in order to Happineſs, and the right uſe of *Signs*, in order to Knowledge, being *Toto Cælo* different, they ſeemed to me to be the Three great Provinces of the *Intellectual* World wholly ſeparate, and diſtinct one from another

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